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submodule-config.h: move check_submodule_url

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Move 'check_submodule_url' out of 'fsck.c' and into 'submodule-config.h' as
a public method, similar to 'check_submodule_name'. With the function now
accessible outside of 'fsck', it can be used in a later commit to extend
'test-tool submodule' to check the validity of submodule URLs as it does
with names in the 'check-name' subcommand.

Other than its location, no changes are made to 'check_submodule_url' in
this patch.

Signed-off-by: Victoria Dye <vdye@github.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
This commit is contained in:
Victoria Dye
2024-01-18 01:55:15 +00:00
committed by Junio C Hamano
parent 564d0252ca
commit 13320ff610
3 changed files with 137 additions and 133 deletions
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133
fsck.c
View File

@ -21,7 +21,6 @@
#include "packfile.h"
#include "submodule-config.h"
#include "config.h"
#include "credential.h"
#include "help.h"
static ssize_t max_tree_entry_len = 4096;
@ -1048,138 +1047,6 @@ done:
return ret;
}
static int starts_with_dot_slash(const char *const path)
{
return path_match_flags(path, PATH_MATCH_STARTS_WITH_DOT_SLASH |
PATH_MATCH_XPLATFORM);
}
static int starts_with_dot_dot_slash(const char *const path)
{
return path_match_flags(path, PATH_MATCH_STARTS_WITH_DOT_DOT_SLASH |
PATH_MATCH_XPLATFORM);
}
static int submodule_url_is_relative(const char *url)
{
return starts_with_dot_slash(url) || starts_with_dot_dot_slash(url);
}
/*
* Count directory components that a relative submodule URL should chop
* from the remote_url it is to be resolved against.
*
* In other words, this counts "../" components at the start of a
* submodule URL.
*
* Returns the number of directory components to chop and writes a
* pointer to the next character of url after all leading "./" and
* "../" components to out.
*/
static int count_leading_dotdots(const char *url, const char **out)
{
int result = 0;
while (1) {
if (starts_with_dot_dot_slash(url)) {
result++;
url += strlen("../");
continue;
}
if (starts_with_dot_slash(url)) {
url += strlen("./");
continue;
}
*out = url;
return result;
}
}
/*
* Check whether a transport is implemented by git-remote-curl.
*
* If it is, returns 1 and writes the URL that would be passed to
* git-remote-curl to the "out" parameter.
*
* Otherwise, returns 0 and leaves "out" untouched.
*
* Examples:
* http::https://example.com/repo.git -> 1, https://example.com/repo.git
* https://example.com/repo.git -> 1, https://example.com/repo.git
* git://example.com/repo.git -> 0
*
* This is for use in checking for previously exploitable bugs that
* required a submodule URL to be passed to git-remote-curl.
*/
static int url_to_curl_url(const char *url, const char **out)
{
/*
* We don't need to check for case-aliases, "http.exe", and so
* on because in the default configuration, is_transport_allowed
* prevents URLs with those schemes from being cloned
* automatically.
*/
if (skip_prefix(url, "http::", out) ||
skip_prefix(url, "https::", out) ||
skip_prefix(url, "ftp::", out) ||
skip_prefix(url, "ftps::", out))
return 1;
if (starts_with(url, "http://") ||
starts_with(url, "https://") ||
starts_with(url, "ftp://") ||
starts_with(url, "ftps://")) {
*out = url;
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
static int check_submodule_url(const char *url)
{
const char *curl_url;
if (looks_like_command_line_option(url))
return -1;
if (submodule_url_is_relative(url) || starts_with(url, "git://")) {
char *decoded;
const char *next;
int has_nl;
/*
* This could be appended to an http URL and url-decoded;
* check for malicious characters.
*/
decoded = url_decode(url);
has_nl = !!strchr(decoded, '\n');
free(decoded);
if (has_nl)
return -1;
/*
* URLs which escape their root via "../" can overwrite
* the host field and previous components, resolving to
* URLs like https::example.com/submodule.git and
* https:///example.com/submodule.git that were
* susceptible to CVE-2020-11008.
*/
if (count_leading_dotdots(url, &next) > 0 &&
(*next == ':' || *next == '/'))
return -1;
}
else if (url_to_curl_url(url, &curl_url)) {
struct credential c = CREDENTIAL_INIT;
int ret = 0;
if (credential_from_url_gently(&c, curl_url, 1) ||
!*c.host)
ret = -1;
credential_clear(&c);
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
struct fsck_gitmodules_data {
const struct object_id *oid;
struct fsck_options *options;

134
submodule-config.c
View File

@ -14,6 +14,8 @@
#include "parse-options.h"
#include "thread-utils.h"
#include "tree-walk.h"
#include "url.h"
#include "credential.h"
/*
* submodule cache lookup structure
@ -228,6 +230,138 @@ in_component:
return 0;
}
static int starts_with_dot_slash(const char *const path)
{
return path_match_flags(path, PATH_MATCH_STARTS_WITH_DOT_SLASH |
PATH_MATCH_XPLATFORM);
}
static int starts_with_dot_dot_slash(const char *const path)
{
return path_match_flags(path, PATH_MATCH_STARTS_WITH_DOT_DOT_SLASH |
PATH_MATCH_XPLATFORM);
}
static int submodule_url_is_relative(const char *url)
{
return starts_with_dot_slash(url) || starts_with_dot_dot_slash(url);
}
/*
* Count directory components that a relative submodule URL should chop
* from the remote_url it is to be resolved against.
*
* In other words, this counts "../" components at the start of a
* submodule URL.
*
* Returns the number of directory components to chop and writes a
* pointer to the next character of url after all leading "./" and
* "../" components to out.
*/
static int count_leading_dotdots(const char *url, const char **out)
{
int result = 0;
while (1) {
if (starts_with_dot_dot_slash(url)) {
result++;
url += strlen("../");
continue;
}
if (starts_with_dot_slash(url)) {
url += strlen("./");
continue;
}
*out = url;
return result;
}
}
/*
* Check whether a transport is implemented by git-remote-curl.
*
* If it is, returns 1 and writes the URL that would be passed to
* git-remote-curl to the "out" parameter.
*
* Otherwise, returns 0 and leaves "out" untouched.
*
* Examples:
* http::https://example.com/repo.git -> 1, https://example.com/repo.git
* https://example.com/repo.git -> 1, https://example.com/repo.git
* git://example.com/repo.git -> 0
*
* This is for use in checking for previously exploitable bugs that
* required a submodule URL to be passed to git-remote-curl.
*/
static int url_to_curl_url(const char *url, const char **out)
{
/*
* We don't need to check for case-aliases, "http.exe", and so
* on because in the default configuration, is_transport_allowed
* prevents URLs with those schemes from being cloned
* automatically.
*/
if (skip_prefix(url, "http::", out) ||
skip_prefix(url, "https::", out) ||
skip_prefix(url, "ftp::", out) ||
skip_prefix(url, "ftps::", out))
return 1;
if (starts_with(url, "http://") ||
starts_with(url, "https://") ||
starts_with(url, "ftp://") ||
starts_with(url, "ftps://")) {
*out = url;
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
int check_submodule_url(const char *url)
{
const char *curl_url;
if (looks_like_command_line_option(url))
return -1;
if (submodule_url_is_relative(url) || starts_with(url, "git://")) {
char *decoded;
const char *next;
int has_nl;
/*
* This could be appended to an http URL and url-decoded;
* check for malicious characters.
*/
decoded = url_decode(url);
has_nl = !!strchr(decoded, '\n');
free(decoded);
if (has_nl)
return -1;
/*
* URLs which escape their root via "../" can overwrite
* the host field and previous components, resolving to
* URLs like https::example.com/submodule.git and
* https:///example.com/submodule.git that were
* susceptible to CVE-2020-11008.
*/
if (count_leading_dotdots(url, &next) > 0 &&
(*next == ':' || *next == '/'))
return -1;
}
else if (url_to_curl_url(url, &curl_url)) {
struct credential c = CREDENTIAL_INIT;
int ret = 0;
if (credential_from_url_gently(&c, curl_url, 1) ||
!*c.host)
ret = -1;
credential_clear(&c);
return ret;
}
return 0;
}
static int name_and_item_from_var(const char *var, struct strbuf *name,
struct strbuf *item)
{

3
submodule-config.h
View File

@ -91,6 +91,9 @@ int config_set_in_gitmodules_file_gently(const char *key, const char *value);
*/
int check_submodule_name(const char *name);
/* Returns 0 if the URL valid per RFC3986 and -1 otherwise. */
int check_submodule_url(const char *url);
/*
* Note: these helper functions exist solely to maintain backward
* compatibility with 'fetch' and 'update_clone' storing configuration in