http-backend: Protect GIT_PROJECT_ROOT from /../ requests
Eons ago HPA taught git-daemon how to protect itself from /../ attacks, which Junio brought back into service ind79374c7b5
("daemon.c and path.enter_repo(): revamp path validation"). I did not carry this into git-http-backend as originally we relied only upon PATH_TRANSLATED, and assumed the HTTP server had done its access control checks to validate the resolved path was within a directory permitting access from the remote client. This would usually be sufficient to protect a server from requests for its /etc/passwd file by http://host/smart/../etc/passwd sorts of URLs. However in917adc0360
Mark Lodato added GIT_PROJECT_ROOT as an additional method of configuring the CGI. When this environment variable is used the web server does not generate the final access path and therefore may blindly pass through "/../etc/passwd" in PATH_INFO under the assumption that "/../" might have special meaning to the invoked CGI. Instead of permitting these sorts of malformed path requests, we now reject them back at the client, with an error message for the server log. This matches git-daemon behavior. Signed-off-by: Shawn O. Pearce <spearce@spearce.org> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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committed by
Junio C Hamano

parent
92815b3363
commit
34b6cb8bb0
@ -559,7 +559,13 @@ static char* getdir(void)
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if (root && *root) {
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if (!pathinfo || !*pathinfo)
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die("GIT_PROJECT_ROOT is set but PATH_INFO is not");
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if (daemon_avoid_alias(pathinfo))
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die("'%s': aliased", pathinfo);
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strbuf_addstr(&buf, root);
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if (buf.buf[buf.len - 1] != '/')
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strbuf_addch(&buf, '/');
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if (pathinfo[0] == '/')
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pathinfo++;
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strbuf_addstr(&buf, pathinfo);
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return strbuf_detach(&buf, NULL);
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} else if (path && *path) {
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