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Author SHA1 Message Date
ecf9b4a443 Git 2.31.5
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
2022-10-06 17:39:26 -04:00
122512967e Sync with 2.30.6
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
2022-10-06 17:39:15 -04:00
abd4d67ab0 Git 2.30.6
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
2022-10-06 17:38:16 -04:00
0ca6ead81e alias.c: reject too-long cmdline strings in split_cmdline()
This function improperly uses an int to represent the number of entries
in the resulting argument array. This allows a malicious actor to
intentionally overflow the return value, leading to arbitrary heap
writes.

Because the resulting argv array is typically passed to execv(), it may
be possible to leverage this attack to gain remote code execution on a
victim machine. This was almost certainly the case for certain
configurations of git-shell until the previous commit limited the size
of input it would accept. Other calls to split_cmdline() are typically
limited by the size of argv the OS is willing to hand us, so are
similarly protected.

So this is not strictly fixing a known vulnerability, but is a hardening
of the function that is worth doing to protect against possible unknown
vulnerabilities.

One approach to fixing this would be modifying the signature of
`split_cmdline()` to look something like:

    int split_cmdline(char *cmdline, const char ***argv, size_t *argc);

Where the return value of `split_cmdline()` is negative for errors, and
zero otherwise. If non-NULL, the `*argc` pointer is modified to contain
the size of the `**argv` array.

But this implies an absurdly large `argv` array, which more than likely
larger than the system's argument limit. So even if split_cmdline()
allowed this, it would fail immediately afterwards when we called
execv(). So instead of converting all of `split_cmdline()`'s callers to
work with `size_t` types in this patch, instead pursue the minimal fix
here to prevent ever returning an array with more than INT_MAX entries
in it.

Signed-off-by: Kevin Backhouse <kevinbackhouse@github.com>
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
2022-10-01 00:23:38 -04:00
71ad7fe1bc shell: limit size of interactive commands
When git-shell is run in interactive mode (which must be enabled by
creating $HOME/git-shell-commands), it reads commands from stdin, one
per line, and executes them.

We read the commands with git_read_line_interactively(), which uses a
strbuf under the hood. That means we'll accept an input of arbitrary
size (limited only by how much heap we can allocate). That creates two
problems:

  - the rest of the code is not prepared to handle large inputs. The
    most serious issue here is that split_cmdline() uses "int" for most
    of its types, which can lead to integer overflow and out-of-bounds
    array reads and writes. But even with that fixed, we assume that we
    can feed the command name to snprintf() (via xstrfmt()), which is
    stuck for historical reasons using "int", and causes it to fail (and
    even trigger a BUG() call).

  - since the point of git-shell is to take input from untrusted or
    semi-trusted clients, it's a mild denial-of-service. We'll allocate
    as many bytes as the client sends us (actually twice as many, since
    we immediately duplicate the buffer).

We can fix both by just limiting the amount of per-command input we're
willing to receive.

We should also fix split_cmdline(), of course, which is an accident
waiting to happen, but that can come on top. Most calls to
split_cmdline(), including the other one in git-shell, are OK because
they are reading from an OS-provided argv, which is limited in practice.
This patch should eliminate the immediate vulnerabilities.

I picked 4MB as an arbitrary limit. It's big enough that nobody should
ever run into it in practice (since the point is to run the commands via
exec, we're subject to OS limits which are typically much lower). But
it's small enough that allocating it isn't that big a deal.

The code is mostly just swapping out fgets() for the strbuf call, but we
have to add a few niceties like flushing and trimming line endings. We
could simplify things further by putting the buffer on the stack, but
4MB is probably a bit much there. Note that we'll _always_ allocate 4MB,
which for normal, non-malicious requests is more than we would before
this patch. But on the other hand, other git programs are happy to use
96MB for a delta cache. And since we'd never touch most of those pages,
on a lazy-allocating OS like Linux they won't even get allocated to
actual RAM.

The ideal would be a version of strbuf_getline() that accepted a maximum
value. But for a minimal vulnerability fix, let's keep things localized
and simple. We can always refactor further on top.

The included test fails in an obvious way with ASan or UBSan (which
notice the integer overflow and out-of-bounds reads). Without them, it
fails in a less obvious way: we may segfault, or we may try to xstrfmt()
a long string, leading to a BUG(). Either way, it fails reliably before
this patch, and passes with it. Note that we don't need an EXPENSIVE
prereq on it. It does take 10-15s to fail before this patch, but with
the new limit, we fail almost immediately (and the perl process
generating 2GB of data exits via SIGPIPE).

Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
2022-10-01 00:23:38 -04:00
32696a4cbe shell: add basic tests
We have no tests of even basic functionality of git-shell. Let's add a
couple of obvious ones. This will serve as a framework for adding tests
for new things we fix, as well as making sure we don't screw anything up
too badly while doing so.

Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
2022-10-01 00:23:38 -04:00
a1d4f67c12 transport: make protocol.file.allow be "user" by default
An earlier patch discussed and fixed a scenario where Git could be used
as a vector to exfiltrate sensitive data through a Docker container when
a potential victim clones a suspicious repository with local submodules
that contain symlinks.

That security hole has since been plugged, but a similar one still
exists.  Instead of convincing a would-be victim to clone an embedded
submodule via the "file" protocol, an attacker could convince an
individual to clone a repository that has a submodule pointing to a
valid path on the victim's filesystem.

For example, if an individual (with username "foo") has their home
directory ("/home/foo") stored as a Git repository, then an attacker
could exfiltrate data by convincing a victim to clone a malicious
repository containing a submodule pointing at "/home/foo/.git" with
`--recurse-submodules`. Doing so would expose any sensitive contents in
stored in "/home/foo" tracked in Git.

For systems (such as Docker) that consider everything outside of the
immediate top-level working directory containing a Dockerfile as
inaccessible to the container (with the exception of volume mounts, and
so on), this is a violation of trust by exposing unexpected contents in
the working copy.

To mitigate the likelihood of this kind of attack, adjust the "file://"
protocol's default policy to be "user" to prevent commands that execute
without user input (including recursive submodule initialization) from
taking place by default.

Suggested-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
2022-10-01 00:23:38 -04:00
f4a32a550f t/t9NNN: allow local submodules
To prepare for the default value of `protocol.file.allow` to change to
"user", ensure tests that rely on local submodules can initialize them
over the file protocol.

Tests that interact with submodules a handful of times use
`test_config_global`.

Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
2022-10-01 00:23:38 -04:00
0d3beb71da t/t7NNN: allow local submodules
To prepare for the default value of `protocol.file.allow` to change to
"user", ensure tests that rely on local submodules can initialize them
over the file protocol.

Tests that only need to interact with submodules in a limited capacity
have individual Git commands annotated with the appropriate
configuration via `-c`. Tests that interact with submodules a handful of
times use `test_config_global` instead. Test scripts that rely on
submodules throughout use a `git config --global` during a setup test
towards the beginning of the script.

Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
2022-10-01 00:23:38 -04:00
0f21b8f468 t/t6NNN: allow local submodules
To prepare for the default value of `protocol.file.allow` to change to
"user", ensure tests that rely on local submodules can initialize them
over the file protocol.

Tests that only need to interact with submodules in a limited capacity
have individual Git commands annotated with the appropriate
configuration via `-c`.

Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
2022-10-01 00:23:38 -04:00
225d2d50cc t/t5NNN: allow local submodules
To prepare for the default value of `protocol.file.allow` to change to
"user", ensure tests that rely on local submodules can initialize them
over the file protocol.

Tests that only need to interact with submodules in a limited capacity
have individual Git commands annotated with the appropriate
configuration via `-c`. Tests that interact with submodules a handful of
times use `test_config_global` instead. Test scripts that rely on
submodules throughout use a `git config --global` during a setup test
towards the beginning of the script.

Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
2022-10-01 00:23:38 -04:00
ac7e57fa28 t/t4NNN: allow local submodules
To prepare for the default value of `protocol.file.allow` to change to
"user", ensure tests that rely on local submodules can initialize them
over the file protocol.

Tests that only need to interact with submodules in a limited capacity
have individual Git commands annotated with the appropriate
configuration via `-c`. Tests that interact with submodules a handful of
times use `test_config_global` instead. Test scripts that rely on
submodules throughout use a `git config --global` during a setup test
towards the beginning of the script.

Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
2022-10-01 00:23:38 -04:00
f8d510ed0b t/t3NNN: allow local submodules
To prepare for the default value of `protocol.file.allow` to change to
"user", ensure tests that rely on local submodules can initialize them
over the file protocol.

Tests that only need to interact with submodules in a limited capacity
have individual Git commands annotated with the appropriate
configuration via `-c`. Tests that interact with submodules a handful of
times use `test_config_global` instead. Test scripts that rely on
submodules throughout use a `git config --global` during a setup test
towards the beginning of the script.

Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
2022-10-01 00:23:38 -04:00
99f4abb8da t/2NNNN: allow local submodules
To prepare for the default value of `protocol.file.allow` to change to
"user", ensure tests that rely on local submodules can initialize them
over the file protocol.

Tests that only need to interact with submodules in a limited capacity
have individual Git commands annotated with the appropriate
configuration via `-c`. Tests that interact with submodules a handful of
times use `test_config_global` instead. Test scripts that rely on
submodules throughout use a `git config --global` during a setup test
towards the beginning of the script.

Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
2022-10-01 00:23:38 -04:00
8a96dbcb33 t/t1NNN: allow local submodules
To prepare for the default value of `protocol.file.allow` to change to
"user", ensure tests that rely on local submodules can initialize them
over the file protocol.

Tests that only need to interact with submodules in a limited capacity
have individual Git commands annotated with the appropriate
configuration via `-c`. Tests that interact with submodules a handful of
times use `test_config_global` instead.

Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
2022-10-01 00:23:38 -04:00
7de0c306f7 t/lib-submodule-update.sh: allow local submodules
To prepare for changing the default value of `protocol.file.allow` to
"user", update the `prolog()` function in lib-submodule-update to allow
submodules to be cloned over the file protocol.

This is used by a handful of submodule-related test scripts, which
themselves will have to tweak the value of `protocol.file.allow` in
certain locations. Those will be done in subsequent commits.

Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
2022-10-01 00:23:38 -04:00
6f054f9fb3 builtin/clone.c: disallow --local clones with symlinks
When cloning a repository with `--local`, Git relies on either making a
hardlink or copy to every file in the "objects" directory of the source
repository. This is done through the callpath `cmd_clone()` ->
`clone_local()` -> `copy_or_link_directory()`.

The way this optimization works is by enumerating every file and
directory recursively in the source repository's `$GIT_DIR/objects`
directory, and then either making a copy or hardlink of each file. The
only exception to this rule is when copying the "alternates" file, in
which case paths are rewritten to be absolute before writing a new
"alternates" file in the destination repo.

One quirk of this implementation is that it dereferences symlinks when
cloning. This behavior was most recently modified in 36596fd2df (clone:
better handle symlinked files at .git/objects/, 2019-07-10), which
attempted to support `--local` clones of repositories with symlinks in
their objects directory in a platform-independent way.

Unfortunately, this behavior of dereferencing symlinks (that is,
creating a hardlink or copy of the source's link target in the
destination repository) can be used as a component in attacking a
victim by inadvertently exposing the contents of file stored outside of
the repository.

Take, for example, a repository that stores a Dockerfile and is used to
build Docker images. When building an image, Docker copies the directory
contents into the VM, and then instructs the VM to execute the
Dockerfile at the root of the copied directory. This protects against
directory traversal attacks by copying symbolic links as-is without
dereferencing them.

That is, if a user has a symlink pointing at their private key material
(where the symlink is present in the same directory as the Dockerfile,
but the key itself is present outside of that directory), the key is
unreadable to a Docker image, since the link will appear broken from the
container's point of view.

This behavior enables an attack whereby a victim is convinced to clone a
repository containing an embedded submodule (with a URL like
"file:///proc/self/cwd/path/to/submodule") which has a symlink pointing
at a path containing sensitive information on the victim's machine. If a
user is tricked into doing this, the contents at the destination of
those symbolic links are exposed to the Docker image at runtime.

One approach to preventing this behavior is to recreate symlinks in the
destination repository. But this is problematic, since symlinking the
objects directory are not well-supported. (One potential problem is that
when sharing, e.g. a "pack" directory via symlinks, different writers
performing garbage collection may consider different sets of objects to
be reachable, enabling a situation whereby garbage collecting one
repository may remove reachable objects in another repository).

Instead, prohibit the local clone optimization when any symlinks are
present in the `$GIT_DIR/objects` directory of the source repository.
Users may clone the repository again by prepending the "file://" scheme
to their clone URL, or by adding the `--no-local` option to their `git
clone` invocation.

The directory iterator used by `copy_or_link_directory()` must no longer
dereference symlinks (i.e., it *must* call `lstat()` instead of `stat()`
in order to discover whether or not there are symlinks present). This has
no bearing on the overall behavior, since we will immediately `die()` on
encounter a symlink.

Note that t5604.33 suggests that we do support local clones with
symbolic links in the source repository's objects directory, but this
was likely unintentional, or at least did not take into consideration
the problem with sharing parts of the objects directory with symbolic
links at the time. Update this test to reflect which options are and
aren't supported.

Helped-by: Johannes Schindelin <Johannes.Schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
2022-10-01 00:23:38 -04:00
5b1c746c35 Git 2.31.4
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
2022-06-23 12:35:25 +02:00
2f8809f9a1 Sync with 2.30.5
* maint-2.30:
  Git 2.30.5
  setup: tighten ownership checks post CVE-2022-24765
  git-compat-util: allow root to access both SUDO_UID and root owned
  t0034: add negative tests and allow git init to mostly work under sudo
  git-compat-util: avoid failing dir ownership checks if running privileged
  t: regression git needs safe.directory when using sudo
2022-06-23 12:35:23 +02:00
88b7be68a4 Git 2.30.5
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
2022-06-23 12:31:05 +02:00
3b0bf27049 setup: tighten ownership checks post CVE-2022-24765
8959555cee (setup_git_directory(): add an owner check for the top-level
directory, 2022-03-02), adds a function to check for ownership of
repositories using a directory that is representative of it, and ways to
add exempt a specific repository from said check if needed, but that
check didn't account for owership of the gitdir, or (when used) the
gitfile that points to that gitdir.

An attacker could create a git repository in a directory that they can
write into but that is owned by the victim to work around the fix that
was introduced with CVE-2022-24765 to potentially run code as the
victim.

An example that could result in privilege escalation to root in *NIX would
be to set a repository in a shared tmp directory by doing (for example):

  $ git -C /tmp init

To avoid that, extend the ensure_valid_ownership function to be able to
check for all three paths.

This will have the side effect of tripling the number of stat() calls
when a repository is detected, but the effect is expected to be likely
minimal, as it is done only once during the directory walk in which Git
looks for a repository.

Additionally make sure to resolve the gitfile (if one was used) to find
the relevant gitdir for checking.

While at it change the message printed on failure so it is clear we are
referring to the repository by its worktree (or gitdir if it is bare) and
not to a specific directory.

Helped-by: Junio C Hamano <junio@pobox.com>
Helped-by: Johannes Schindelin <Johannes.Schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón <carenas@gmail.com>
2022-06-23 12:31:05 +02:00
b779214eaf Merge branch 'cb/path-owner-check-with-sudo'
With a recent update to refuse access to repositories of other
people by default, "sudo make install" and "sudo git describe"
stopped working.  This series intends to loosen it while keeping
the safety.

* cb/path-owner-check-with-sudo:
  t0034: add negative tests and allow git init to mostly work under sudo
  git-compat-util: avoid failing dir ownership checks if running privileged
  t: regression git needs safe.directory when using sudo

Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
2022-06-23 12:31:04 +02:00
6b11e3d52e git-compat-util: allow root to access both SUDO_UID and root owned
Previous changes introduced a regression which will prevent root for
accessing repositories owned by thyself if using sudo because SUDO_UID
takes precedence.

Loosen that restriction by allowing root to access repositories owned
by both uid by default and without having to add a safe.directory
exception.

A previous workaround that was documented in the tests is no longer
needed so it has been removed together with its specially crafted
prerequisite.

Helped-by: Johanness Schindelin <Johannes.Schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón <carenas@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2022-06-17 14:03:08 -07:00
b9063afda1 t0034: add negative tests and allow git init to mostly work under sudo
Add a support library that provides one function that can be used
to run a "scriplet" of commands through sudo and that helps invoking
sudo in the slightly awkward way that is required to ensure it doesn't
block the call (if shell was allowed as tested in the prerequisite)
and it doesn't run the command through a different shell than the one
we intended.

Add additional negative tests as suggested by Junio and that use a
new workspace that is owned by root.

Document a regression that was introduced by previous commits where
root won't be able anymore to access directories they own unless
SUDO_UID is removed from their environment.

The tests document additional ways that this new restriction could
be worked around and the documentation explains why it might be instead
considered a feature, but a "fix" is planned for a future change.

Helped-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Helped-by: Phillip Wood <phillip.wood123@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón <carenas@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2022-05-12 18:12:23 -07:00
ae9abbb63e git-compat-util: avoid failing dir ownership checks if running privileged
bdc77d1d68 (Add a function to determine whether a path is owned by the
current user, 2022-03-02) checks for the effective uid of the running
process using geteuid() but didn't account for cases where that user was
root (because git was invoked through sudo or a compatible tool) and the
original uid that repository trusted for its config was no longer known,
therefore failing the following otherwise safe call:

  guy@renard ~/Software/uncrustify $ sudo git describe --always --dirty
  [sudo] password for guy:
  fatal: unsafe repository ('/home/guy/Software/uncrustify' is owned by someone else)

Attempt to detect those cases by using the environment variables that
those tools create to keep track of the original user id, and do the
ownership check using that instead.

This assumes the environment the user is running on after going
privileged can't be tampered with, and also adds code to restrict that
the new behavior only applies if running as root, therefore keeping the
most common case, which runs unprivileged, from changing, but because of
that, it will miss cases where sudo (or an equivalent) was used to change
to another unprivileged user or where the equivalent tool used to raise
privileges didn't track the original id in a sudo compatible way.

Because of compatibility with sudo, the code assumes that uid_t is an
unsigned integer type (which is not required by the standard) but is used
that way in their codebase to generate SUDO_UID.  In systems where uid_t
is signed, sudo might be also patched to NOT be unsigned and that might
be able to trigger an edge case and a bug (as described in the code), but
it is considered unlikely to happen and even if it does, the code would
just mostly fail safely, so there was no attempt either to detect it or
prevent it by the code, which is something that might change in the future,
based on expected user feedback.

Reported-by: Guy Maurel <guy.j@maurel.de>
Helped-by: SZEDER Gábor <szeder.dev@gmail.com>
Helped-by: Randall Becker <rsbecker@nexbridge.com>
Helped-by: Phillip Wood <phillip.wood123@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Johannes Schindelin <Johannes.Schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón <carenas@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2022-05-12 18:12:23 -07:00
5f1a3fec8c t: regression git needs safe.directory when using sudo
Originally reported after release of v2.35.2 (and other maint branches)
for CVE-2022-24765 and blocking otherwise harmless commands that were
done using sudo in a repository that was owned by the user.

Add a new test script with very basic support to allow running git
commands through sudo, so a reproduction could be implemented and that
uses only `git status` as a proxy of the issue reported.

Note that because of the way sudo interacts with the system, a much
more complete integration with the test framework will require a lot
more work and that was therefore intentionally punted for now.

The current implementation requires the execution of a special cleanup
function which should always be kept as the last "test" or otherwise
the standard cleanup functions will fail because they can't remove
the root owned directories that are used.  This also means that if
failures are found while running, the specifics of the failure might
not be kept for further debugging and if the test was interrupted, it
will be necessary to clean the working directory manually before
restarting by running:

  $ sudo rm -rf trash\ directory.t0034-root-safe-directory/

The test file also uses at least one initial "setup" test that creates
a parallel execution directory under the "root" sub directory, which
should be used as top level directory for all repositories that are
used in this test file.  Unlike all other tests the repository provided
by the test framework should go unused.

Special care should be taken when invoking commands through sudo, since
the environment is otherwise independent from what the test framework
setup and might have changed the values for HOME, SHELL and dropped
several relevant environment variables for your test.  Indeed `git status`
was used as a proxy because it doesn't even require commits in the
repository to work and usually doesn't require much from the environment
to run, but a future patch will add calls to `git init` and that will
fail to honor the default branch name, unless that setting is NOT
provided through an environment variable (which means even a CI run
could fail that test if enabled incorrectly).

A new SUDO prerequisite is provided that does some sanity checking
to make sure the sudo command that will be used allows for passwordless
execution as root without restrictions and doesn't mess with git's
execution path.  This matches what is provided by the macOS agents that
are used as part of GitHub actions and probably nowhere else.

Most of those characteristics make this test mostly only suitable for
CI, but it might be executed locally if special care is taken to provide
for all of them in the local configuration and maybe making use of the
sudo credential cache by first invoking sudo, entering your password if
needed, and then invoking the test with:

  $ GIT_TEST_ALLOW_SUDO=YES ./t0034-root-safe-directory.sh

If it fails to run, then it means your local setup wouldn't work for the
test because of the configuration sudo has or other system settings, and
things that might help are to comment out sudo's secure_path config, and
make sure that the account you are using has no restrictions on the
commands it can run through sudo, just like is provided for the user in
the CI.

For example (assuming a username of marta for you) something probably
similar to the following entry in your /etc/sudoers (or equivalent) file:

  marta	ALL=(ALL:ALL) NOPASSWD: ALL

Reported-by: SZEDER Gábor <szeder.dev@gmail.com>
Helped-by: Phillip Wood <phillip.wood123@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón <carenas@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2022-05-12 18:12:23 -07:00
69 changed files with 540 additions and 74 deletions

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@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
Git v2.30.5 Release Notes
=========================
This release contains minor fix-ups for the changes that went into
Git 2.30.3 and 2.30.4, addressing CVE-2022-29187.
* The safety check that verifies a safe ownership of the Git
worktree is now extended to also cover the ownership of the Git
directory (and the `.git` file, if there is any).
Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón (1):
setup: tighten ownership checks post CVE-2022-24765

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@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
Git v2.30.6 Release Notes
=========================
This release addresses the security issues CVE-2022-39253 and
CVE-2022-39260.
Fixes since v2.30.5
-------------------
* CVE-2022-39253:
When relying on the `--local` clone optimization, Git dereferences
symbolic links in the source repository before creating hardlinks
(or copies) of the dereferenced link in the destination repository.
This can lead to surprising behavior where arbitrary files are
present in a repository's `$GIT_DIR` when cloning from a malicious
repository.
Git will no longer dereference symbolic links via the `--local`
clone mechanism, and will instead refuse to clone repositories that
have symbolic links present in the `$GIT_DIR/objects` directory.
Additionally, the value of `protocol.file.allow` is changed to be
"user" by default.
* CVE-2022-39260:
An overly-long command string given to `git shell` can result in
overflow in `split_cmdline()`, leading to arbitrary heap writes and
remote code execution when `git shell` is exposed and the directory
`$HOME/git-shell-commands` exists.
`git shell` is taught to refuse interactive commands that are
longer than 4MiB in size. `split_cmdline()` is hardened to reject
inputs larger than 2GiB.
Credit for finding CVE-2022-39253 goes to Cory Snider of Mirantis. The
fix was authored by Taylor Blau, with help from Johannes Schindelin.
Credit for finding CVE-2022-39260 goes to Kevin Backhouse of GitHub.
The fix was authored by Kevin Backhouse, Jeff King, and Taylor Blau.
Jeff King (2):
shell: add basic tests
shell: limit size of interactive commands
Kevin Backhouse (1):
alias.c: reject too-long cmdline strings in split_cmdline()
Taylor Blau (11):
builtin/clone.c: disallow `--local` clones with symlinks
t/lib-submodule-update.sh: allow local submodules
t/t1NNN: allow local submodules
t/2NNNN: allow local submodules
t/t3NNN: allow local submodules
t/t4NNN: allow local submodules
t/t5NNN: allow local submodules
t/t6NNN: allow local submodules
t/t7NNN: allow local submodules
t/t9NNN: allow local submodules
transport: make `protocol.file.allow` be "user" by default

View File

@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
Git v2.31.4 Release Notes
=========================
This release merges up the fixes that appear in v2.30.5 to address
the security issue CVE-2022-29187; see the release notes for that
version for details.

View File

@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
Git v2.31.5 Release Notes
=========================
This release merges the security fix that appears in v2.30.6; see
the release notes for that version for details.

View File

@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
protocol.allow::
If set, provide a user defined default policy for all protocols which
don't explicitly have a policy (`protocol.<name>.allow`). By default,
if unset, known-safe protocols (http, https, git, ssh, file) have a
if unset, known-safe protocols (http, https, git, ssh) have a
default policy of `always`, known-dangerous protocols (ext) have a
default policy of `never`, and all other protocols have a default
policy of `user`. Supported policies:
default policy of `never`, and all other protocols (including file)
have a default policy of `user`. Supported policies:
+
--

View File

@ -26,3 +26,17 @@ directory was listed in the `safe.directory` list. If `safe.directory=*`
is set in system config and you want to re-enable this protection, then
initialize your list with an empty value before listing the repositories
that you deem safe.
+
As explained, Git only allows you to access repositories owned by
yourself, i.e. the user who is running Git, by default. When Git
is running as 'root' in a non Windows platform that provides sudo,
however, git checks the SUDO_UID environment variable that sudo creates
and will allow access to the uid recorded as its value in addition to
the id from 'root'.
This is to make it easy to perform a common sequence during installation
"make && sudo make install". A git process running under 'sudo' runs as
'root' but the 'sudo' command exports the environment variable to record
which id the original user has.
If that is not what you would prefer and want git to only trust
repositories that are owned by root instead, then you can remove
the `SUDO_UID` variable from root's environment before invoking git.

View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
#!/bin/sh
GVF=GIT-VERSION-FILE
DEF_VER=v2.31.3
DEF_VER=v2.31.5
LF='
'

View File

@ -1 +1 @@
Documentation/RelNotes/2.31.3.txt
Documentation/RelNotes/2.31.5.txt

11
alias.c
View File

@ -46,14 +46,16 @@ void list_aliases(struct string_list *list)
#define SPLIT_CMDLINE_BAD_ENDING 1
#define SPLIT_CMDLINE_UNCLOSED_QUOTE 2
#define SPLIT_CMDLINE_ARGC_OVERFLOW 3
static const char *split_cmdline_errors[] = {
N_("cmdline ends with \\"),
N_("unclosed quote")
N_("unclosed quote"),
N_("too many arguments"),
};
int split_cmdline(char *cmdline, const char ***argv)
{
int src, dst, count = 0, size = 16;
size_t src, dst, count = 0, size = 16;
char quoted = 0;
ALLOC_ARRAY(*argv, size);
@ -96,6 +98,11 @@ int split_cmdline(char *cmdline, const char ***argv)
return -SPLIT_CMDLINE_UNCLOSED_QUOTE;
}
if (count >= INT_MAX) {
FREE_AND_NULL(*argv);
return -SPLIT_CMDLINE_ARGC_OVERFLOW;
}
ALLOC_GROW(*argv, count + 1, size);
(*argv)[count] = NULL;

View File

@ -420,13 +420,11 @@ static void copy_or_link_directory(struct strbuf *src, struct strbuf *dest,
int src_len, dest_len;
struct dir_iterator *iter;
int iter_status;
unsigned int flags;
struct strbuf realpath = STRBUF_INIT;
mkdir_if_missing(dest->buf, 0777);
flags = DIR_ITERATOR_PEDANTIC | DIR_ITERATOR_FOLLOW_SYMLINKS;
iter = dir_iterator_begin(src->buf, flags);
iter = dir_iterator_begin(src->buf, DIR_ITERATOR_PEDANTIC);
if (!iter)
die_errno(_("failed to start iterator over '%s'"), src->buf);
@ -442,6 +440,10 @@ static void copy_or_link_directory(struct strbuf *src, struct strbuf *dest,
strbuf_setlen(dest, dest_len);
strbuf_addstr(dest, iter->relative_path);
if (S_ISLNK(iter->st.st_mode))
die(_("symlink '%s' exists, refusing to clone with --local"),
iter->relative_path);
if (S_ISDIR(iter->st.st_mode)) {
mkdir_if_missing(dest->buf, 0777);
continue;

View File

@ -393,12 +393,68 @@ static inline int git_offset_1st_component(const char *path)
#endif
#ifndef is_path_owned_by_current_user
#ifdef __TANDEM
#define ROOT_UID 65535
#else
#define ROOT_UID 0
#endif
/*
* Do not use this function when
* (1) geteuid() did not say we are running as 'root', or
* (2) using this function will compromise the system.
*
* PORTABILITY WARNING:
* This code assumes uid_t is unsigned because that is what sudo does.
* If your uid_t type is signed and all your ids are positive then it
* should all work fine.
* If your version of sudo uses negative values for uid_t or it is
* buggy and return an overflowed value in SUDO_UID, then git might
* fail to grant access to your repository properly or even mistakenly
* grant access to someone else.
* In the unlikely scenario this happened to you, and that is how you
* got to this message, we would like to know about it; so sent us an
* email to git@vger.kernel.org indicating which platform you are
* using and which version of sudo, so we can improve this logic and
* maybe provide you with a patch that would prevent this issue again
* in the future.
*/
static inline void extract_id_from_env(const char *env, uid_t *id)
{
const char *real_uid = getenv(env);
/* discard anything empty to avoid a more complex check below */
if (real_uid && *real_uid) {
char *endptr = NULL;
unsigned long env_id;
errno = 0;
/* silent overflow errors could trigger a bug here */
env_id = strtoul(real_uid, &endptr, 10);
if (!*endptr && !errno)
*id = env_id;
}
}
static inline int is_path_owned_by_current_uid(const char *path)
{
struct stat st;
uid_t euid;
if (lstat(path, &st))
return 0;
return st.st_uid == geteuid();
euid = geteuid();
if (euid == ROOT_UID)
{
if (st.st_uid == ROOT_UID)
return 1;
else
extract_id_from_env("SUDO_UID", &euid);
}
return st.st_uid == euid;
}
#define is_path_owned_by_current_user is_path_owned_by_current_uid

69
setup.c
View File

@ -1054,14 +1054,32 @@ static int safe_directory_cb(const char *key, const char *value, void *d)
return 0;
}
static int ensure_valid_ownership(const char *path)
/*
* Check if a repository is safe, by verifying the ownership of the
* worktree (if any), the git directory, and the gitfile (if any).
*
* Exemptions for known-safe repositories can be added via `safe.directory`
* config settings; for non-bare repositories, their worktree needs to be
* added, for bare ones their git directory.
*/
static int ensure_valid_ownership(const char *gitfile,
const char *worktree, const char *gitdir)
{
struct safe_directory_data data = { .path = path };
struct safe_directory_data data = {
.path = worktree ? worktree : gitdir
};
if (!git_env_bool("GIT_TEST_ASSUME_DIFFERENT_OWNER", 0) &&
is_path_owned_by_current_user(path))
(!gitfile || is_path_owned_by_current_user(gitfile)) &&
(!worktree || is_path_owned_by_current_user(worktree)) &&
(!gitdir || is_path_owned_by_current_user(gitdir)))
return 1;
/*
* data.path is the "path" that identifies the repository and it is
* constant regardless of what failed above. data.is_safe should be
* initialized to false, and might be changed by the callback.
*/
read_very_early_config(safe_directory_cb, &data);
return data.is_safe;
@ -1149,6 +1167,8 @@ static enum discovery_result setup_git_directory_gently_1(struct strbuf *dir,
current_device = get_device_or_die(dir->buf, NULL, 0);
for (;;) {
int offset = dir->len, error_code = 0;
char *gitdir_path = NULL;
char *gitfile = NULL;
if (offset > min_offset)
strbuf_addch(dir, '/');
@ -1159,21 +1179,50 @@ static enum discovery_result setup_git_directory_gently_1(struct strbuf *dir,
if (die_on_error ||
error_code == READ_GITFILE_ERR_NOT_A_FILE) {
/* NEEDSWORK: fail if .git is not file nor dir */
if (is_git_directory(dir->buf))
if (is_git_directory(dir->buf)) {
gitdirenv = DEFAULT_GIT_DIR_ENVIRONMENT;
gitdir_path = xstrdup(dir->buf);
}
} else if (error_code != READ_GITFILE_ERR_STAT_FAILED)
return GIT_DIR_INVALID_GITFILE;
}
} else
gitfile = xstrdup(dir->buf);
/*
* Earlier, we tentatively added DEFAULT_GIT_DIR_ENVIRONMENT
* to check that directory for a repository.
* Now trim that tentative addition away, because we want to
* focus on the real directory we are in.
*/
strbuf_setlen(dir, offset);
if (gitdirenv) {
if (!ensure_valid_ownership(dir->buf))
return GIT_DIR_INVALID_OWNERSHIP;
enum discovery_result ret;
if (ensure_valid_ownership(gitfile,
dir->buf,
(gitdir_path ? gitdir_path : gitdirenv))) {
strbuf_addstr(gitdir, gitdirenv);
return GIT_DIR_DISCOVERED;
ret = GIT_DIR_DISCOVERED;
} else
ret = GIT_DIR_INVALID_OWNERSHIP;
/*
* Earlier, during discovery, we might have allocated
* string copies for gitdir_path or gitfile so make
* sure we don't leak by freeing them now, before
* leaving the loop and function.
*
* Note: gitdirenv will be non-NULL whenever these are
* allocated, therefore we need not take care of releasing
* them outside of this conditional block.
*/
free(gitdir_path);
free(gitfile);
return ret;
}
if (is_git_directory(dir->buf)) {
if (!ensure_valid_ownership(dir->buf))
if (!ensure_valid_ownership(NULL, NULL, dir->buf))
return GIT_DIR_INVALID_OWNERSHIP;
strbuf_addstr(gitdir, ".");
return GIT_DIR_BARE;
@ -1306,7 +1355,7 @@ const char *setup_git_directory_gently(int *nongit_ok)
struct strbuf quoted = STRBUF_INIT;
sq_quote_buf_pretty(&quoted, dir.buf);
die(_("unsafe repository ('%s' is owned by someone else)\n"
die(_("detected dubious ownership in repository at '%s'\n"
"To add an exception for this directory, call:\n"
"\n"
"\tgit config --global --add safe.directory %s"),

34
shell.c
View File

@ -47,6 +47,8 @@ static void cd_to_homedir(void)
die("could not chdir to user's home directory");
}
#define MAX_INTERACTIVE_COMMAND (4*1024*1024)
static void run_shell(void)
{
int done = 0;
@ -67,22 +69,46 @@ static void run_shell(void)
run_command_v_opt(help_argv, RUN_SILENT_EXEC_FAILURE);
do {
struct strbuf line = STRBUF_INIT;
const char *prog;
char *full_cmd;
char *rawargs;
size_t len;
char *split_args;
const char **argv;
int code;
int count;
fprintf(stderr, "git> ");
if (git_read_line_interactively(&line) == EOF) {
/*
* Avoid using a strbuf or git_read_line_interactively() here.
* We don't want to allocate arbitrary amounts of memory on
* behalf of a possibly untrusted client, and we're subject to
* OS limits on command length anyway.
*/
fflush(stdout);
rawargs = xmalloc(MAX_INTERACTIVE_COMMAND);
if (!fgets(rawargs, MAX_INTERACTIVE_COMMAND, stdin)) {
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
strbuf_release(&line);
free(rawargs);
break;
}
rawargs = strbuf_detach(&line, NULL);
len = strlen(rawargs);
/*
* If we truncated due to our input buffer size, reject the
* command. That's better than running bogus input, and
* there's a good chance it's just malicious garbage anyway.
*/
if (len >= MAX_INTERACTIVE_COMMAND - 1)
die("invalid command format: input too long");
if (len > 0 && rawargs[len - 1] == '\n') {
if (--len > 0 && rawargs[len - 1] == '\r')
--len;
rawargs[len] = '\0';
}
split_args = xstrdup(rawargs);
count = split_cmdline(split_args, &argv);
if (count < 0) {

View File

@ -196,6 +196,7 @@ test_git_directory_exists () {
# the submodule repo if it doesn't exist and configures the most problematic
# settings for diff.ignoreSubmodules.
prolog () {
test_config_global protocol.file.allow always &&
(test -d submodule_update_repo || create_lib_submodule_repo) &&
test_config_global diff.ignoreSubmodules all &&
test_config diff.ignoreSubmodules all

15
t/lib-sudo.sh Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
# Helpers for running git commands under sudo.
# Runs a scriplet passed through stdin under sudo.
run_with_sudo () {
local ret
local RUN="$TEST_DIRECTORY/$$.sh"
write_script "$RUN" "$TEST_SHELL_PATH"
# avoid calling "$RUN" directly so sudo doesn't get a chance to
# override the shell, add aditional restrictions or even reject
# running the script because its security policy deem it unsafe
sudo "$TEST_SHELL_PATH" -c "\"$RUN\""
ret=$?
rm -f "$RUN"
return $ret
}

93
t/t0034-root-safe-directory.sh Executable file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
#!/bin/sh
test_description='verify safe.directory checks while running as root'
. ./test-lib.sh
. "$TEST_DIRECTORY"/lib-sudo.sh
if [ "$GIT_TEST_ALLOW_SUDO" != "YES" ]
then
skip_all="You must set env var GIT_TEST_ALLOW_SUDO=YES in order to run this test"
test_done
fi
if ! test_have_prereq NOT_ROOT
then
skip_all="These tests do not support running as root"
test_done
fi
test_lazy_prereq SUDO '
sudo -n id -u >u &&
id -u root >r &&
test_cmp u r &&
command -v git >u &&
sudo command -v git >r &&
test_cmp u r
'
if ! test_have_prereq SUDO
then
skip_all="Your sudo/system configuration is either too strict or unsupported"
test_done
fi
test_expect_success SUDO 'setup' '
sudo rm -rf root &&
mkdir -p root/r &&
(
cd root/r &&
git init
)
'
test_expect_success SUDO 'sudo git status as original owner' '
(
cd root/r &&
git status &&
sudo git status
)
'
test_expect_success SUDO 'setup root owned repository' '
sudo mkdir -p root/p &&
sudo git init root/p
'
test_expect_success 'cannot access if owned by root' '
(
cd root/p &&
test_must_fail git status
)
'
test_expect_success 'can access if addressed explicitly' '
(
cd root/p &&
GIT_DIR=.git GIT_WORK_TREE=. git status
)
'
test_expect_success SUDO 'can access with sudo if root' '
(
cd root/p &&
sudo git status
)
'
test_expect_success SUDO 'can access with sudo if root by removing SUDO_UID' '
(
cd root/p &&
run_with_sudo <<-END
unset SUDO_UID &&
git status
END
)
'
# this MUST be always the last test
test_expect_success SUDO 'cleanup' '
sudo rm -rf root
'
test_done

View File

@ -452,7 +452,8 @@ test_expect_success 'interaction with submodules' '
(
cd super &&
mkdir modules &&
git submodule add ../repo modules/child &&
git -c protocol.file.allow=always \
submodule add ../repo modules/child &&
git add . &&
git commit -m "add submodule" &&
git sparse-checkout init --cone &&

View File

@ -221,7 +221,8 @@ test_expect_success 'showing the superproject correctly' '
test_commit -C super test_commit &&
test_create_repo sub &&
test_commit -C sub test_commit &&
git -C super submodule add ../sub dir/sub &&
git -c protocol.file.allow=always \
-C super submodule add ../sub dir/sub &&
echo $(pwd)/super >expect &&
git -C super/dir/sub rev-parse --show-superproject-working-tree >out &&
test_cmp expect out &&

View File

@ -600,6 +600,7 @@ test_expect_success '"add" should not fail because of another bad worktree' '
'
test_expect_success '"add" with uninitialized submodule, with submodule.recurse unset' '
test_config_global protocol.file.allow always &&
test_create_repo submodule &&
test_commit -C submodule first &&
test_create_repo project &&
@ -615,6 +616,7 @@ test_expect_success '"add" with uninitialized submodule, with submodule.recurse
'
test_expect_success '"add" with initialized submodule, with submodule.recurse unset' '
test_config_global protocol.file.allow always &&
git -C project-clone submodule update --init &&
git -C project-clone worktree add ../project-4
'

View File

@ -138,7 +138,8 @@ test_expect_success 'move a repo with uninitialized submodule' '
(
cd withsub &&
test_commit initial &&
git submodule add "$PWD"/.git sub &&
git -c protocol.file.allow=always \
submodule add "$PWD"/.git sub &&
git commit -m withsub &&
git worktree add second HEAD &&
git worktree move second third
@ -148,7 +149,7 @@ test_expect_success 'move a repo with uninitialized submodule' '
test_expect_success 'not move a repo with initialized submodule' '
(
cd withsub &&
git -C third submodule update &&
git -c protocol.file.allow=always -C third submodule update &&
test_must_fail git worktree move third forth
)
'
@ -227,6 +228,7 @@ test_expect_success 'remove cleans up .git/worktrees when empty' '
'
test_expect_success 'remove a repo with uninitialized submodule' '
test_config_global protocol.file.allow always &&
(
cd withsub &&
git worktree add to-remove HEAD &&
@ -235,6 +237,7 @@ test_expect_success 'remove a repo with uninitialized submodule' '
'
test_expect_success 'not remove a repo with initialized submodule' '
test_config_global protocol.file.allow always &&
(
cd withsub &&
git worktree add to-remove HEAD &&

View File

@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ export GIT_TEST_DEFAULT_INITIAL_BRANCH_NAME
base_path=$(pwd -P)
test_expect_success 'setup: create origin repos' '
git config --global protocol.file.allow always &&
git init origin/sub &&
test_commit -C origin/sub file1 &&
git init origin/main &&

View File

@ -282,6 +282,7 @@ test_expect_success 'deleting checked-out branch from repo that is a submodule'
git init repo1 &&
git init repo1/sub &&
test_commit -C repo1/sub x &&
test_config_global protocol.file.allow always &&
git -C repo1 submodule add ./sub &&
git -C repo1 commit -m "adding sub" &&

View File

@ -310,7 +310,7 @@ test_expect_success 'autostash is saved on editor failure with conflict' '
test_expect_success 'autostash with dirty submodules' '
test_when_finished "git reset --hard && git checkout main" &&
git checkout -b with-submodule &&
git submodule add ./ sub &&
git -c protocol.file.allow=always submodule add ./ sub &&
test_tick &&
git commit -m add-submodule &&
echo changed >sub/file0 &&

View File

@ -47,7 +47,8 @@ test_expect_success 'rebase interactive ignores modified submodules' '
git init sub &&
git -C sub commit --allow-empty -m "Initial commit" &&
git init super &&
git -C super submodule add ../sub &&
git -c protocol.file.allow=always \
-C super submodule add ../sub &&
git -C super config submodule.sub.ignore dirty &&
>super/foo &&
git -C super add foo &&

View File

@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ KNOWN_FAILURE_NOFF_MERGE_ATTEMPTS_TO_MERGE_REMOVED_SUBMODULE_FILES=1
test_submodule_switch "cherry-pick"
test_expect_success 'unrelated submodule/file conflict is ignored' '
test_config_global protocol.file.allow always &&
test_create_repo sub &&
touch sub/file &&

View File

@ -336,7 +336,7 @@ test_expect_success 'rm removes empty submodules from work tree' '
test_expect_success 'rm removes removed submodule from index and .gitmodules' '
git reset --hard &&
git submodule update &&
git -c protocol.file.allow=always submodule update &&
rm -rf submod &&
git rm submod &&
git status -s -uno --ignore-submodules=none >actual &&
@ -642,6 +642,7 @@ cat >expect.deepmodified <<EOF
EOF
test_expect_success 'setup subsubmodule' '
test_config_global protocol.file.allow always &&
git reset --hard &&
git submodule update &&
(

View File

@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ setup_basic () {
git init main &&
(
cd main &&
git submodule add ../sub &&
git -c protocol.file.allow=always submodule add ../sub &&
test_commit main_file
)
}

View File

@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ test_expect_success 'setup - submodules' '
'
test_expect_success 'setup - git submodule add' '
git submodule add ./sm2 sm1 &&
git -c protocol.file.allow=always submodule add ./sm2 sm1 &&
commit_file sm1 .gitmodules &&
git diff-tree -p --no-commit-id --submodule=log HEAD -- sm1 >actual &&
cat >expected <<-EOF &&

View File

@ -759,9 +759,9 @@ test_expect_success 'diff --submodule=diff with .git file' '
'
test_expect_success 'setup nested submodule' '
git submodule add -f ./sm2 &&
git -c protocol.file.allow=always submodule add -f ./sm2 &&
git commit -a -m "add sm2" &&
git -C sm2 submodule add ../sm2 nested &&
git -c protocol.file.allow=always -C sm2 submodule add ../sm2 nested &&
git -C sm2 commit -a -m "nested sub" &&
head10=$(git -C sm2 rev-parse --short --verify HEAD)
'

View File

@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ test_expect_success 'diff skips same-OID blobs' '
test_expect_success 'when fetching missing objects, diff skips GITLINKs' '
test_when_finished "rm -rf sub server client trace" &&
test_config_global protocol.file.allow always &&
test_create_repo sub &&
test_commit -C sub first &&

View File

@ -124,6 +124,7 @@ test_expect_success 'command line pathspec parsing for "git log"' '
test_expect_success 'tree_entry_interesting does not match past submodule boundaries' '
test_when_finished "rm -rf repo submodule" &&
test_config_global protocol.file.allow always &&
git init submodule &&
test_commit -C submodule initial &&
git init repo &&

View File

@ -782,6 +782,7 @@ test_expect_success 'fetch.writeCommitGraph' '
'
test_expect_success 'fetch.writeCommitGraph with submodules' '
test_config_global protocol.file.allow always &&
git clone dups super &&
(
cd super &&

View File

@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ add_upstream_commit() {
}
test_expect_success setup '
git config --global protocol.file.allow always &&
mkdir deepsubmodule &&
(
cd deepsubmodule &&

View File

@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ test_expect_success 'push options and submodules' '
test_commit -C parent one &&
git -C parent push --mirror up &&
test_config_global protocol.file.allow always &&
git -C parent submodule add ../upstream workbench &&
git -C parent/workbench remote add up ../../upstream &&
git -C parent commit -m "add submodule" &&

View File

@ -46,6 +46,10 @@ KNOWN_FAILURE_NOFF_MERGE_DOESNT_CREATE_EMPTY_SUBMODULE_DIR=1
KNOWN_FAILURE_NOFF_MERGE_ATTEMPTS_TO_MERGE_REMOVED_SUBMODULE_FILES=1
test_submodule_switch_func "git_pull_noff"
test_expect_success 'setup' '
git config --global protocol.file.allow always
'
test_expect_success 'pull --recurse-submodule setup' '
test_create_repo child &&
test_commit -C child bar &&

View File

@ -741,6 +741,7 @@ test_expect_success 'batch missing blob request does not inadvertently try to fe
echo aa >server/a &&
echo bb >server/b &&
# Also add a gitlink pointing to an arbitrary repository
test_config_global protocol.file.allow always &&
git -C server submodule add "$(pwd)/repo_for_submodule" c &&
git -C server add a b c &&
git -C server commit -m x &&

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@ -303,8 +303,6 @@ test_expect_success SYMLINKS 'setup repo with manually symlinked or unknown file
ln -s ../an-object $obj &&
cd ../ &&
find . -type f | sort >../../../T.objects-files.raw &&
find . -type l | sort >../../../T.objects-symlinks.raw &&
echo unknown_content >unknown_file
) &&
git -C T fsck &&
@ -313,19 +311,27 @@ test_expect_success SYMLINKS 'setup repo with manually symlinked or unknown file
test_expect_success SYMLINKS 'clone repo with symlinked or unknown files at objects/' '
for option in --local --no-hardlinks --shared --dissociate
# None of these options work when cloning locally, since T has
# symlinks in its `$GIT_DIR/objects` directory
for option in --local --no-hardlinks --dissociate
do
git clone $option T T$option || return 1 &&
git -C T$option fsck || return 1 &&
git -C T$option rev-list --all --objects >T$option.objects &&
test_cmp T.objects T$option.objects &&
(
cd T$option/.git/objects &&
find . -type f | sort >../../../T$option.objects-files.raw &&
find . -type l | sort >../../../T$option.objects-symlinks.raw
)
test_must_fail git clone $option T T$option 2>err || return 1 &&
test_i18ngrep "symlink.*exists" err || return 1
done &&
# But `--shared` clones should still work, even when specifying
# a local path *and* that repository has symlinks present in its
# `$GIT_DIR/objects` directory.
git clone --shared T T--shared &&
git -C T--shared fsck &&
git -C T--shared rev-list --all --objects >T--shared.objects &&
test_cmp T.objects T--shared.objects &&
(
cd T--shared/.git/objects &&
find . -type f | sort >../../../T--shared.objects-files.raw &&
find . -type l | sort >../../../T--shared.objects-symlinks.raw
) &&
for raw in $(ls T*.raw)
do
sed -e "s!/../!/Y/!; s![0-9a-f]\{38,\}!Z!" -e "/commit-graph/d" \
@ -333,26 +339,6 @@ test_expect_success SYMLINKS 'clone repo with symlinked or unknown files at obje
sort $raw.de-sha-1 >$raw.de-sha || return 1
done &&
cat >expected-files <<-EOF &&
./Y/Z
./Y/Z
./Y/Z
./a-loose-dir/Z
./an-object
./info/packs
./pack/pack-Z.idx
./pack/pack-Z.pack
./packs/pack-Z.idx
./packs/pack-Z.pack
./unknown_file
EOF
for option in --local --no-hardlinks --dissociate
do
test_cmp expected-files T$option.objects-files.raw.de-sha || return 1 &&
test_must_be_empty T$option.objects-symlinks.raw.de-sha || return 1
done &&
echo ./info/alternates >expected-files &&
test_cmp expected-files T--shared.objects-files.raw &&
test_must_be_empty T--shared.objects-symlinks.raw

View File

@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ test_expect_success 'setup' '
test_expect_success 'nonshallow clone implies nonshallow submodule' '
test_when_finished "rm -rf super_clone" &&
test_config_global protocol.file.allow always &&
git clone --recurse-submodules "file://$pwd/." super_clone &&
git -C super_clone log --oneline >lines &&
test_line_count = 3 lines &&
@ -33,6 +34,7 @@ test_expect_success 'nonshallow clone implies nonshallow submodule' '
test_expect_success 'shallow clone with shallow submodule' '
test_when_finished "rm -rf super_clone" &&
test_config_global protocol.file.allow always &&
git clone --recurse-submodules --depth 2 --shallow-submodules "file://$pwd/." super_clone &&
git -C super_clone log --oneline >lines &&
test_line_count = 2 lines &&
@ -42,6 +44,7 @@ test_expect_success 'shallow clone with shallow submodule' '
test_expect_success 'shallow clone does not imply shallow submodule' '
test_when_finished "rm -rf super_clone" &&
test_config_global protocol.file.allow always &&
git clone --recurse-submodules --depth 2 "file://$pwd/." super_clone &&
git -C super_clone log --oneline >lines &&
test_line_count = 2 lines &&
@ -51,6 +54,7 @@ test_expect_success 'shallow clone does not imply shallow submodule' '
test_expect_success 'shallow clone with non shallow submodule' '
test_when_finished "rm -rf super_clone" &&
test_config_global protocol.file.allow always &&
git clone --recurse-submodules --depth 2 --no-shallow-submodules "file://$pwd/." super_clone &&
git -C super_clone log --oneline >lines &&
test_line_count = 2 lines &&
@ -60,6 +64,7 @@ test_expect_success 'shallow clone with non shallow submodule' '
test_expect_success 'non shallow clone with shallow submodule' '
test_when_finished "rm -rf super_clone" &&
test_config_global protocol.file.allow always &&
git clone --recurse-submodules --no-local --shallow-submodules "file://$pwd/." super_clone &&
git -C super_clone log --oneline >lines &&
test_line_count = 3 lines &&
@ -69,6 +74,7 @@ test_expect_success 'non shallow clone with shallow submodule' '
test_expect_success 'clone follows shallow recommendation' '
test_when_finished "rm -rf super_clone" &&
test_config_global protocol.file.allow always &&
git config -f .gitmodules submodule.sub.shallow true &&
git add .gitmodules &&
git commit -m "recommend shallow for sub" &&
@ -87,6 +93,7 @@ test_expect_success 'clone follows shallow recommendation' '
test_expect_success 'get unshallow recommended shallow submodule' '
test_when_finished "rm -rf super_clone" &&
test_config_global protocol.file.allow always &&
git clone --no-local "file://$pwd/." super_clone &&
(
cd super_clone &&
@ -103,6 +110,7 @@ test_expect_success 'get unshallow recommended shallow submodule' '
test_expect_success 'clone follows non shallow recommendation' '
test_when_finished "rm -rf super_clone" &&
test_config_global protocol.file.allow always &&
git config -f .gitmodules submodule.sub.shallow false &&
git add .gitmodules &&
git commit -m "recommend non shallow for sub" &&

View File

@ -174,6 +174,8 @@ test_expect_success 'partial clone with transfer.fsckobjects=1 works with submod
test_config -C src_with_sub uploadpack.allowfilter 1 &&
test_config -C src_with_sub uploadpack.allowanysha1inwant 1 &&
test_config_global protocol.file.allow always &&
git -C src_with_sub submodule add "file://$(pwd)/submodule" mysub &&
git -C src_with_sub commit -m "commit with submodule" &&

View File

@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ export GIT_TEST_DEFAULT_INITIAL_BRANCH_NAME
pwd=$(pwd)
test_expect_success 'setup' '
git config --global protocol.file.allow always &&
git checkout -b main &&
test_commit commit1 &&
mkdir sub &&

View File

@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ test_expect_success 'setup' '
: > super-file &&
git add super-file &&
git submodule add "$(pwd)" sub &&
git -c protocol.file.allow=always submodule add "$(pwd)" sub &&
git symbolic-ref HEAD refs/heads/super &&
test_tick &&
git commit -m super-initial &&

View File

@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ test_expect_success 'setup a submodule' '
: >pretzel/a &&
git -C pretzel add a &&
git -C pretzel commit -m "add a file" -- a &&
git submodule add ./pretzel sub &&
git -c protocol.file.allow=always submodule add ./pretzel sub &&
git commit -a -m "add submodule" &&
git submodule deinit --all
'

View File

@ -304,6 +304,7 @@ test_expect_success SYMLINKS 'check moved symlink' '
rm -f moved symlink
test_expect_success 'setup submodule' '
test_config_global protocol.file.allow always &&
git commit -m initial &&
git reset --hard &&
git submodule add ./. sub &&
@ -489,6 +490,7 @@ test_expect_success 'moving a submodule in nested directories' '
'
test_expect_success 'moving nested submodules' '
test_config_global protocol.file.allow always &&
git commit -am "cleanup commit" &&
mkdir sub_nested_nested &&
(

View File

@ -465,6 +465,7 @@ test_expect_success 'create and add submodule, submodule appears clean (A. S...)
git checkout initial-branch &&
git clone . sub_repo &&
git clone . super_repo &&
test_config_global protocol.file.allow always &&
( cd super_repo &&
git submodule add ../sub_repo sub1 &&

View File

@ -480,6 +480,7 @@ test_expect_success 'should not clean submodules' '
git init &&
test_commit msg hello.world
) &&
test_config_global protocol.file.allow always &&
git submodule add ./repo/.git sub1 &&
git commit -m "sub1" &&
git branch before_sub2 &&

View File

@ -14,6 +14,10 @@ export GIT_TEST_DEFAULT_INITIAL_BRANCH_NAME
. ./test-lib.sh
test_expect_success 'setup - enable local submodules' '
git config --global protocol.file.allow always
'
test_expect_success 'submodule deinit works on empty repository' '
git submodule deinit --all
'

View File

@ -14,6 +14,8 @@ export GIT_TEST_DEFAULT_INITIAL_BRANCH_NAME
. ./test-lib.sh
test_expect_success setup '
git config --global protocol.file.allow always &&
echo file >file &&
git add file &&
test_tick &&

View File

@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ compare_head()
test_expect_success 'setup a submodule tree' '
git config --global protocol.file.allow always &&
echo file > file &&
git add file &&
test_tick &&

View File

@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ export GIT_TEST_DEFAULT_INITIAL_BRANCH_NAME
test_expect_success 'setup a submodule tree' '
git config --global protocol.file.allow always &&
echo file > file &&
git add file &&
test_tick &&

View File

@ -17,6 +17,10 @@ test_alternate_is_used () {
test_cmp expect actual
}
test_expect_success 'setup' '
git config --global protocol.file.allow always
'
test_expect_success 'preparing first repository' '
test_create_repo A &&
(

View File

@ -15,6 +15,10 @@ export GIT_TEST_DEFAULT_INITIAL_BRANCH_NAME
. ./test-lib.sh
test_expect_success 'setup' '
git config --global protocol.file.allow always
'
test_expect_success 'submodule on detached working tree' '
git init --bare remote &&
test_create_repo bundle1 &&

View File

@ -12,6 +12,9 @@ from the database and from the worktree works.
TEST_NO_CREATE_REPO=1
. ./test-lib.sh
test_expect_success 'setup' '
git config --global protocol.file.allow always
'
test_expect_success 'submodule config cache setup' '
mkdir submodule &&
(cd submodule &&

View File

@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ submodules which are "active" and interesting to the user.
. ./test-lib.sh
test_expect_success 'setup' '
git config --global protocol.file.allow always &&
git init sub &&
test_commit -C sub initial &&
git init super &&

View File

@ -30,7 +30,8 @@ test_expect_success 'no warning when updating entry' '
test_expect_success 'submodule add does not warn' '
test_when_finished "git rm -rf submodule .gitmodules" &&
git submodule add ./embed submodule 2>stderr &&
git -c protocol.file.allow=always \
submodule add ./embed submodule 2>stderr &&
test_i18ngrep ! warning stderr
'

View File

@ -8,6 +8,10 @@ real-world setup that confirms we catch this in practice.
. ./test-lib.sh
. "$TEST_DIRECTORY"/lib-pack.sh
test_expect_success 'setup' '
git config --global protocol.file.allow always
'
test_expect_success 'check names' '
cat >expect <<-\EOF &&
valid

View File

@ -3,6 +3,10 @@
test_description='check handling of disallowed .gitmodule urls'
. ./test-lib.sh
test_expect_success 'setup' '
git config --global protocol.file.allow always
'
test_expect_success 'create submodule with protected dash in url' '
git init upstream &&
git -C upstream commit --allow-empty -m base &&

View File

@ -6,6 +6,10 @@ export GIT_TEST_DEFAULT_INITIAL_BRANCH_NAME
. ./test-lib.sh
test_expect_success 'setup' '
git config --global protocol.file.allow always
'
test_expect_success 'create submodule with dash in path' '
git init upstream &&
git -C upstream commit --allow-empty -m base &&

View File

@ -14,6 +14,10 @@ also by committing .gitmodules and then just removing it from the filesystem.
. ./test-lib.sh
test_expect_success 'setup' '
git config --global protocol.file.allow always
'
test_expect_success 'sparse checkout setup which hides .gitmodules' '
git init upstream &&
git init submodule &&

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@ -12,6 +12,10 @@ as expected.
TEST_NO_CREATE_REPO=1
. ./test-lib.sh
test_expect_success 'setup' '
git config --global protocol.file.allow always
'
test_expect_success 'submodule config cache setup' '
mkdir submodule &&
(cd submodule &&

View File

@ -12,6 +12,10 @@ as expected.
TEST_NO_CREATE_REPO=1
. ./test-lib.sh
test_expect_success 'setup' '
git config --global protocol.file.allow always
'
test_expect_success 'submodule config cache setup' '
mkdir submodule &&
(

View File

@ -12,6 +12,10 @@ while making sure to add submodules using `git submodule add` instead of
. ./test-lib.sh
test_expect_success 'setup' '
git config --global protocol.file.allow always
'
test_expect_success 'summary test environment setup' '
git init sm &&
test_commit -C sm "add file" file file-content file-tag &&

View File

@ -251,6 +251,7 @@ test_expect_success 'status with merge conflict in .gitmodules' '
test_create_repo_with_commit sub1 &&
test_tick &&
test_create_repo_with_commit sub2 &&
test_config_global protocol.file.allow always &&
(
cd super &&
prev=$(git rev-parse HEAD) &&
@ -326,6 +327,7 @@ test_expect_success 'diff --submodule with merge conflict in .gitmodules' '
# sub2 will have an untracked file
# sub3 will have an untracked repository
test_expect_success 'setup superproject with untracked file in nested submodule' '
test_config_global protocol.file.allow always &&
(
cd super &&
git clean -dfx &&

View File

@ -74,6 +74,7 @@ test_expect_success 'diff in message is retained with -v' '
test_expect_success 'submodule log is stripped out too with -v' '
git config diff.submodule log &&
test_config_global protocol.file.allow always &&
git submodule add ./. sub &&
git commit -m "sub added" &&
(

View File

@ -629,6 +629,7 @@ test_expect_success 'difftool --no-symlinks detects conflict ' '
test_expect_success 'difftool properly honors gitlink and core.worktree' '
test_when_finished rm -rf submod/ule &&
test_config_global protocol.file.allow always &&
git submodule add ./. submod/ule &&
test_config -C submod/ule diff.tool checktrees &&
test_config -C submod/ule difftool.checktrees.cmd '\''

View File

@ -193,6 +193,7 @@ test_expect_success !MINGW 'grep recurse submodule colon in name' '
git -C "su:b" commit -m "add fi:le" &&
test_tick &&
test_config_global protocol.file.allow always &&
git -C parent submodule add "../su:b" "su:b" &&
git -C parent commit -m "add submodule" &&
test_tick &&
@ -227,6 +228,7 @@ test_expect_success 'grep history with moved submoules' '
git -C sub commit -m "add file" &&
test_tick &&
test_config_global protocol.file.allow always &&
git -C parent submodule add ../sub dir/sub &&
git -C parent commit -m "add submodule" &&
test_tick &&
@ -271,6 +273,7 @@ test_expect_success 'grep using relative path' '
mkdir parent/src &&
echo "(1|2)d(3|4)" >parent/src/file2 &&
git -C parent add src/file2 &&
test_config_global protocol.file.allow always &&
git -C parent submodule add ../sub &&
git -C parent commit -m "add files and submodule" &&
test_tick &&
@ -313,6 +316,7 @@ test_expect_success 'grep from a subdir' '
mkdir parent/src &&
echo "(1|2)d(3|4)" >parent/src/file &&
git -C parent add src/file &&
test_config_global protocol.file.allow always &&
git -C parent submodule add ../sub src/sub &&
git -C parent submodule add ../sub sub &&
git -C parent commit -m "add files and submodules" &&

View File

@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ test_expect_success 'import with large marks file' '
'
test_expect_success 'setup dump with submodule' '
test_config_global protocol.file.allow always &&
git submodule add "$PWD" sub &&
git commit -m "add submodule" &&
git fast-export HEAD >dump

View File

@ -268,6 +268,7 @@ test_expect_success 'signed-tags=warn-strip' '
test_expect_success 'setup submodule' '
test_config_global protocol.file.allow always &&
git checkout -f main &&
mkdir sub &&
(
@ -293,6 +294,7 @@ test_expect_success 'setup submodule' '
test_expect_success 'submodule fast-export | fast-import' '
test_config_global protocol.file.allow always &&
SUBENT1=$(git ls-tree main^ sub) &&
SUBENT2=$(git ls-tree main sub) &&
rm -rf new &&

37
t/t9850-shell.sh Executable file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
#!/bin/sh
test_description='git shell tests'
. ./test-lib.sh
test_expect_success 'shell allows upload-pack' '
printf 0000 >input &&
git upload-pack . <input >expect &&
git shell -c "git-upload-pack $SQ.$SQ" <input >actual &&
test_cmp expect actual
'
test_expect_success 'shell forbids other commands' '
test_must_fail git shell -c "git config foo.bar baz"
'
test_expect_success 'shell forbids interactive use by default' '
test_must_fail git shell
'
test_expect_success 'shell allows interactive command' '
mkdir git-shell-commands &&
write_script git-shell-commands/ping <<-\EOF &&
echo pong
EOF
echo pong >expect &&
echo ping | git shell >actual &&
test_cmp expect actual
'
test_expect_success 'shell complains of overlong commands' '
perl -e "print \"a\" x 2**12 for (0..2**19)" |
test_must_fail git shell 2>err &&
grep "too long" err
'
test_done

View File

@ -964,8 +964,7 @@ static enum protocol_allow_config get_protocol_config(const char *type)
if (!strcmp(type, "http") ||
!strcmp(type, "https") ||
!strcmp(type, "git") ||
!strcmp(type, "ssh") ||
!strcmp(type, "file"))
!strcmp(type, "ssh"))
return PROTOCOL_ALLOW_ALWAYS;
/* known scary; err on the side of caution */