1f010d6bdf
We presently use the ".txt" extension for our AsciiDoc files. While not wrong, most editors do not associate this extension with AsciiDoc, meaning that contributors don't get automatic editor functionality that could be useful, such as syntax highlighting and prose linting. It is much more common to use the ".adoc" extension for AsciiDoc files, since this helps editors automatically detect files and also allows various forges to provide rich (HTML-like) rendering. Let's do that here, renaming all of the files and updating the includes where relevant. Adjust the various build scripts and makefiles to use the new extension as well. Note that this should not result in any user-visible changes to the documentation. Signed-off-by: brian m. carlson <sandals@crustytoothpaste.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
61 lines
2.2 KiB
Plaintext
61 lines
2.2 KiB
Plaintext
Git v2.30.6 Release Notes
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=========================
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This release addresses the security issues CVE-2022-39253 and
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CVE-2022-39260.
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Fixes since v2.30.5
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-------------------
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* CVE-2022-39253:
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When relying on the `--local` clone optimization, Git dereferences
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symbolic links in the source repository before creating hardlinks
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(or copies) of the dereferenced link in the destination repository.
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This can lead to surprising behavior where arbitrary files are
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present in a repository's `$GIT_DIR` when cloning from a malicious
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repository.
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Git will no longer dereference symbolic links via the `--local`
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clone mechanism, and will instead refuse to clone repositories that
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have symbolic links present in the `$GIT_DIR/objects` directory.
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Additionally, the value of `protocol.file.allow` is changed to be
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"user" by default.
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* CVE-2022-39260:
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An overly-long command string given to `git shell` can result in
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overflow in `split_cmdline()`, leading to arbitrary heap writes and
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remote code execution when `git shell` is exposed and the directory
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`$HOME/git-shell-commands` exists.
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`git shell` is taught to refuse interactive commands that are
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longer than 4MiB in size. `split_cmdline()` is hardened to reject
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inputs larger than 2GiB.
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Credit for finding CVE-2022-39253 goes to Cory Snider of Mirantis. The
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fix was authored by Taylor Blau, with help from Johannes Schindelin.
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Credit for finding CVE-2022-39260 goes to Kevin Backhouse of GitHub.
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The fix was authored by Kevin Backhouse, Jeff King, and Taylor Blau.
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Jeff King (2):
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shell: add basic tests
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shell: limit size of interactive commands
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Kevin Backhouse (1):
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alias.c: reject too-long cmdline strings in split_cmdline()
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Taylor Blau (11):
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builtin/clone.c: disallow `--local` clones with symlinks
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t/lib-submodule-update.sh: allow local submodules
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t/t1NNN: allow local submodules
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t/2NNNN: allow local submodules
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t/t3NNN: allow local submodules
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t/t4NNN: allow local submodules
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t/t5NNN: allow local submodules
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t/t6NNN: allow local submodules
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t/t7NNN: allow local submodules
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t/t9NNN: allow local submodules
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transport: make `protocol.file.allow` be "user" by default
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