
We presently use the ".txt" extension for our AsciiDoc files. While not wrong, most editors do not associate this extension with AsciiDoc, meaning that contributors don't get automatic editor functionality that could be useful, such as syntax highlighting and prose linting. It is much more common to use the ".adoc" extension for AsciiDoc files, since this helps editors automatically detect files and also allows various forges to provide rich (HTML-like) rendering. Let's do that here, renaming all of the files and updating the includes where relevant. Adjust the various build scripts and makefiles to use the new extension as well. Note that this should not result in any user-visible changes to the documentation. Signed-off-by: brian m. carlson <sandals@crustytoothpaste.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
31 lines
1.7 KiB
Plaintext
31 lines
1.7 KiB
Plaintext
SECURITY
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--------
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The fetch and push protocols are not designed to prevent one side from
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stealing data from the other repository that was not intended to be
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shared. If you have private data that you need to protect from a malicious
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peer, your best option is to store it in another repository. This applies
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to both clients and servers. In particular, namespaces on a server are not
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effective for read access control; you should only grant read access to a
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namespace to clients that you would trust with read access to the entire
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repository.
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The known attack vectors are as follows:
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. The victim sends "have" lines advertising the IDs of objects it has that
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are not explicitly intended to be shared but can be used to optimize the
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transfer if the peer also has them. The attacker chooses an object ID X
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to steal and sends a ref to X, but isn't required to send the content of
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X because the victim already has it. Now the victim believes that the
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attacker has X, and it sends the content of X back to the attacker
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later. (This attack is most straightforward for a client to perform on a
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server, by creating a ref to X in the namespace the client has access
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to and then fetching it. The most likely way for a server to perform it
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on a client is to "merge" X into a public branch and hope that the user
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does additional work on this branch and pushes it back to the server
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without noticing the merge.)
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. As in #1, the attacker chooses an object ID X to steal. The victim sends
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an object Y that the attacker already has, and the attacker falsely
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claims to have X and not Y, so the victim sends Y as a delta against X.
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The delta reveals regions of X that are similar to Y to the attacker.
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