 d79374c7b5
			
		
	
	d79374c7b5
	
	
	
		
			
			The whitelist of git-daemon is checked against return value from enter_repo(), and enter_repo() used to return the value obtained from getcwd() to avoid directory aliasing issues as discussed earier (mid October 2005). Unfortunately, it did not go well as we hoped. For example, /pub on a kernel.org public machine is a symlink to its real mountpoint, and it is understandable that the administrator does not want to adjust the whitelist every time /pub needs to point at a different partition for storage allcation or whatever reasons. Being able to keep using /pub/scm as the whitelist is a desirable property. So this version of enter_repo() reports what it used to chdir() and validate, but does not use getcwd() to canonicalize the directory name. When it sees a user relative path ~user/path, it internally resolves it to try chdir() there, but it still reports ~user/path (possibly after appending .git if allowed to do so, in which case it would report ~user/path.git). What this means is that if a whitelist wants to allow a user relative path, it needs to say "~" (for all users) or list user home directories like "~alice" "~bob". And no, you cannot say /home if the advertised way to access user home directories are ~alice,~bob, etc. The whole point of this is to avoid unnecessary aliasing issues. Anyway, because of this, daemon needs to do a bit more work to guard itself. Namely, it needs to make sure that the accessor does not try to exploit its leading path match rule by inserting /../ in the middle or hanging /.. at the end. I resurrected the belts and suspender paranoia code HPA did for this purpose. This check cannot be done in the enter_repo() unconditionally, because there are valid callers of enter_repo() that want to honor /../; authorized users coming over ssh to run send-pack and fetch-pack should be allowed to do so. Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <junkio@cox.net>
		
			
				
	
	
		
			253 lines
		
	
	
		
			5.3 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			C
		
	
	
	
	
	
			
		
		
	
	
			253 lines
		
	
	
		
			5.3 KiB
		
	
	
	
		
			C
		
	
	
	
	
	
| /*
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|  * I'm tired of doing "vsnprintf()" etc just to open a
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|  * file, so here's a "return static buffer with printf"
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|  * interface for paths.
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|  *
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|  * It's obviously not thread-safe. Sue me. But it's quite
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|  * useful for doing things like
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|  *
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|  *   f = open(mkpath("%s/%s.git", base, name), O_RDONLY);
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|  *
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|  * which is what it's designed for.
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|  */
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| #include "cache.h"
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| #include <pwd.h>
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| 
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| static char pathname[PATH_MAX];
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| static char bad_path[] = "/bad-path/";
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| 
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| static char *cleanup_path(char *path)
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| {
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| 	/* Clean it up */
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| 	if (!memcmp(path, "./", 2)) {
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| 		path += 2;
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| 		while (*path == '/')
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| 			path++;
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| 	}
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| 	return path;
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| }
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| 
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| char *mkpath(const char *fmt, ...)
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| {
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| 	va_list args;
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| 	unsigned len;
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| 
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| 	va_start(args, fmt);
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| 	len = vsnprintf(pathname, PATH_MAX, fmt, args);
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| 	va_end(args);
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| 	if (len >= PATH_MAX)
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| 		return bad_path;
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| 	return cleanup_path(pathname);
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| }
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| 
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| char *git_path(const char *fmt, ...)
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| {
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| 	const char *git_dir = get_git_dir();
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| 	va_list args;
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| 	unsigned len;
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| 
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| 	len = strlen(git_dir);
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| 	if (len > PATH_MAX-100)
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| 		return bad_path;
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| 	memcpy(pathname, git_dir, len);
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| 	if (len && git_dir[len-1] != '/')
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| 		pathname[len++] = '/';
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| 	va_start(args, fmt);
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| 	len += vsnprintf(pathname + len, PATH_MAX - len, fmt, args);
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| 	va_end(args);
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| 	if (len >= PATH_MAX)
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| 		return bad_path;
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| 	return cleanup_path(pathname);
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| }
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| 
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| 
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| /* git_mkstemp() - create tmp file honoring TMPDIR variable */
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| int git_mkstemp(char *path, size_t len, const char *template)
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| {
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| 	char *env, *pch = path;
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| 
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| 	if ((env = getenv("TMPDIR")) == NULL) {
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| 		strcpy(pch, "/tmp/");
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| 		len -= 5;
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| 		pch += 5;
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| 	} else {
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| 		size_t n = snprintf(pch, len, "%s/", env);
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| 
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| 		len -= n;
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| 		pch += n;
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| 	}
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| 
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| 	safe_strncpy(pch, template, len);
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| 
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| 	return mkstemp(path);
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| }
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| 
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| 
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| char *safe_strncpy(char *dest, const char *src, size_t n)
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| {
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| 	strncpy(dest, src, n);
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| 	dest[n - 1] = '\0';
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| 
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| 	return dest;
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| }
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| 
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| int validate_symref(const char *path)
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| {
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| 	struct stat st;
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| 	char *buf, buffer[256];
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| 	int len, fd;
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| 
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| 	if (lstat(path, &st) < 0)
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| 		return -1;
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| 
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| 	/* Make sure it is a "refs/.." symlink */
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| 	if (S_ISLNK(st.st_mode)) {
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| 		len = readlink(path, buffer, sizeof(buffer)-1);
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| 		if (len >= 5 && !memcmp("refs/", buffer, 5))
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| 			return 0;
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| 		return -1;
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| 	}
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| 
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| 	/*
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| 	 * Anything else, just open it and try to see if it is a symbolic ref.
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| 	 */
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| 	fd = open(path, O_RDONLY);
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| 	if (fd < 0)
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| 		return -1;
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| 	len = read(fd, buffer, sizeof(buffer)-1);
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| 	close(fd);
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| 
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| 	/*
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| 	 * Is it a symbolic ref?
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| 	 */
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| 	if (len < 4 || memcmp("ref:", buffer, 4))
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| 		return -1;
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| 	buf = buffer + 4;
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| 	len -= 4;
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| 	while (len && isspace(*buf))
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| 		buf++, len--;
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| 	if (len >= 5 && !memcmp("refs/", buf, 5))
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| 		return 0;
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| 	return -1;
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| }
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| 
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| static char *user_path(char *buf, char *path, int sz)
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| {
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| 	struct passwd *pw;
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| 	char *slash;
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| 	int len, baselen;
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| 
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| 	if (!path || path[0] != '~')
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| 		return NULL;
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| 	path++;
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| 	slash = strchr(path, '/');
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| 	if (path[0] == '/' || !path[0]) {
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| 		pw = getpwuid(getuid());
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| 	}
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| 	else {
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| 		if (slash) {
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| 			*slash = 0;
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| 			pw = getpwnam(path);
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| 			*slash = '/';
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| 		}
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| 		else
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| 			pw = getpwnam(path);
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| 	}
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| 	if (!pw || !pw->pw_dir || sz <= strlen(pw->pw_dir))
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| 		return NULL;
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| 	baselen = strlen(pw->pw_dir);
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| 	memcpy(buf, pw->pw_dir, baselen);
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| 	while ((1 < baselen) && (buf[baselen-1] == '/')) {
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| 		buf[baselen-1] = 0;
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| 		baselen--;
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| 	}
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| 	if (slash && slash[1]) {
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| 		len = strlen(slash);
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| 		if (sz <= baselen + len)
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| 			return NULL;
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| 		memcpy(buf + baselen, slash, len + 1);
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| 	}
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| 	return buf;
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| }
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| 
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| /*
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|  * First, one directory to try is determined by the following algorithm.
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|  *
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|  * (0) If "strict" is given, the path is used as given and no DWIM is
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|  *     done. Otherwise:
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|  * (1) "~/path" to mean path under the running user's home directory;
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|  * (2) "~user/path" to mean path under named user's home directory;
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|  * (3) "relative/path" to mean cwd relative directory; or
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|  * (4) "/absolute/path" to mean absolute directory.
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|  *
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|  * Unless "strict" is given, we try access() for existence of "%s.git/.git",
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|  * "%s/.git", "%s.git", "%s" in this order.  The first one that exists is
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|  * what we try.
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|  *
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|  * Second, we try chdir() to that.  Upon failure, we return NULL.
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|  *
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|  * Then, we try if the current directory is a valid git repository.
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|  * Upon failure, we return NULL.
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|  *
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|  * If all goes well, we return the directory we used to chdir() (but
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|  * before ~user is expanded), avoiding getcwd() resolving symbolic
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|  * links.  User relative paths are also returned as they are given,
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|  * except DWIM suffixing.
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|  */
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| char *enter_repo(char *path, int strict)
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| {
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| 	static char used_path[PATH_MAX];
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| 	static char validated_path[PATH_MAX];
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| 
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| 	if (!path)
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| 		return NULL;
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| 
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| 	if (!strict) {
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| 		static const char *suffix[] = {
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| 			".git/.git", "/.git", ".git", "", NULL,
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| 		};
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| 		int len = strlen(path);
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| 		int i;
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| 		while ((1 < len) && (path[len-1] == '/')) {
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| 			path[len-1] = 0;
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| 			len--;
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| 		}
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| 		if (PATH_MAX <= len)
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| 			return NULL;
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| 		if (path[0] == '~') {
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| 			if (!user_path(used_path, path, PATH_MAX))
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| 				return NULL;
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| 			strcpy(validated_path, path);
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| 			path = used_path;
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| 		}
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| 		else if (PATH_MAX - 10 < len)
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| 			return NULL;
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| 		else {
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| 			path = strcpy(used_path, path);
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| 			strcpy(validated_path, path);
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| 		}
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| 		len = strlen(path);
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| 		for (i = 0; suffix[i]; i++) {
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| 			strcpy(path + len, suffix[i]);
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| 			if (!access(path, F_OK)) {
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| 				strcat(validated_path, suffix[i]);
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| 				break;
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| 			}
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| 		}
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| 		if (!suffix[i] || chdir(path))
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| 			return NULL;
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| 		path = validated_path;
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| 	}
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| 	else if (chdir(path))
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| 		return NULL;
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| 
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| 	if (access("objects", X_OK) == 0 && access("refs", X_OK) == 0 &&
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| 	    validate_symref("HEAD") == 0) {
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| 		putenv("GIT_DIR=.");
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| 		check_repository_format();
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| 		return path;
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| 	}
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| 
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| 	return NULL;
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| }
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