
When asking the user interactively for credentials, we want to avoid misleading them e.g. via control sequences that pretend that the URL targets a trusted host when it does not. While Git learned, over the course of the preceding commits, to disallow URLs containing URL-encoded control characters by default, credential helpers are still allowed to specify values very freely (apart from Line Feed and NUL characters, anything is allowed), and this would allow, say, a username containing control characters to be specified that would then be displayed in the interactive terminal prompt asking the user for the password, potentially sending those control characters directly to the terminal. This is undesirable because control characters can be used to mislead users to divulge secret information to untrusted sites. To prevent such an attack vector, let's add a `git_prompt()` that forces the displayed text to be sanitized, i.e. displaying question marks instead of control characters. Note: While this commit's diff changes a lot of `user@host` strings to `user%40host`, which may look suspicious on the surface, there is a good reason for that: this string specifies a user name, not a <username>@<hostname> combination! In the context of t5541, the actual combination looks like this: `user%40@127.0.0.1:5541`. Therefore, these string replacements document a net improvement introduced by this commit, as `user@host@127.0.0.1` could have left readers wondering where the user name ends and where the host name begins. Hinted-at-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
539 lines
13 KiB
C
539 lines
13 KiB
C
#include "cache.h"
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#include "config.h"
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#include "credential.h"
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#include "string-list.h"
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#include "run-command.h"
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#include "url.h"
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#include "prompt.h"
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#include "sigchain.h"
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#include "urlmatch.h"
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#include "git-compat-util.h"
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void credential_init(struct credential *c)
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{
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struct credential blank = CREDENTIAL_INIT;
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memcpy(c, &blank, sizeof(*c));
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}
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void credential_clear(struct credential *c)
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{
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free(c->protocol);
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free(c->host);
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free(c->path);
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free(c->username);
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free(c->password);
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string_list_clear(&c->helpers, 0);
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credential_init(c);
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}
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int credential_match(const struct credential *want,
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const struct credential *have)
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{
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#define CHECK(x) (!want->x || (have->x && !strcmp(want->x, have->x)))
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return CHECK(protocol) &&
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CHECK(host) &&
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CHECK(path) &&
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CHECK(username);
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#undef CHECK
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}
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static int credential_from_potentially_partial_url(struct credential *c,
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const char *url);
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static int credential_config_callback(const char *var, const char *value,
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void *data)
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{
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struct credential *c = data;
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const char *key;
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if (!skip_prefix(var, "credential.", &key))
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return 0;
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if (!value)
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return config_error_nonbool(var);
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if (!strcmp(key, "helper")) {
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if (*value)
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string_list_append(&c->helpers, value);
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else
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string_list_clear(&c->helpers, 0);
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} else if (!strcmp(key, "username")) {
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if (!c->username_from_proto) {
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free(c->username);
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c->username = xstrdup(value);
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}
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}
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else if (!strcmp(key, "usehttppath"))
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c->use_http_path = git_config_bool(var, value);
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else if (!strcmp(key, "sanitizeprompt"))
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c->sanitize_prompt = git_config_bool(var, value);
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return 0;
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}
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static int proto_is_http(const char *s)
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{
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if (!s)
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return 0;
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return !strcmp(s, "https") || !strcmp(s, "http");
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}
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static void credential_describe(struct credential *c, struct strbuf *out);
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static void credential_format(struct credential *c, struct strbuf *out);
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static int select_all(const struct urlmatch_item *a,
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const struct urlmatch_item *b)
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{
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return 0;
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}
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static int match_partial_url(const char *url, void *cb)
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{
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struct credential *c = cb;
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struct credential want = CREDENTIAL_INIT;
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int matches = 0;
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if (credential_from_potentially_partial_url(&want, url) < 0)
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warning(_("skipping credential lookup for key: credential.%s"),
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url);
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else
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matches = credential_match(&want, c);
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credential_clear(&want);
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return matches;
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}
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static void credential_apply_config(struct credential *c)
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{
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char *normalized_url;
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struct urlmatch_config config = URLMATCH_CONFIG_INIT;
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struct strbuf url = STRBUF_INIT;
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if (!c->host)
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die(_("refusing to work with credential missing host field"));
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if (!c->protocol)
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die(_("refusing to work with credential missing protocol field"));
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if (c->configured)
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return;
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config.section = "credential";
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config.key = NULL;
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config.collect_fn = credential_config_callback;
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config.cascade_fn = NULL;
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config.select_fn = select_all;
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config.fallback_match_fn = match_partial_url;
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config.cb = c;
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credential_format(c, &url);
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normalized_url = url_normalize(url.buf, &config.url);
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git_config(urlmatch_config_entry, &config);
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string_list_clear(&config.vars, 1);
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free(normalized_url);
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urlmatch_config_release(&config);
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strbuf_release(&url);
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c->configured = 1;
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if (!c->use_http_path && proto_is_http(c->protocol)) {
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FREE_AND_NULL(c->path);
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}
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}
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static void credential_describe(struct credential *c, struct strbuf *out)
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{
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if (!c->protocol)
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return;
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strbuf_addf(out, "%s://", c->protocol);
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if (c->username && *c->username)
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strbuf_addf(out, "%s@", c->username);
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if (c->host)
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strbuf_addstr(out, c->host);
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if (c->path)
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strbuf_addf(out, "/%s", c->path);
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}
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static void credential_format(struct credential *c, struct strbuf *out)
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{
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if (!c->protocol)
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return;
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strbuf_addf(out, "%s://", c->protocol);
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if (c->username && *c->username) {
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strbuf_add_percentencode(out, c->username, STRBUF_ENCODE_SLASH);
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strbuf_addch(out, '@');
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}
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if (c->host)
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strbuf_add_percentencode(out, c->host,
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STRBUF_ENCODE_HOST_AND_PORT);
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if (c->path) {
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strbuf_addch(out, '/');
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strbuf_add_percentencode(out, c->path, 0);
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}
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}
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static char *credential_ask_one(const char *what, struct credential *c,
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int flags)
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{
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struct strbuf desc = STRBUF_INIT;
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struct strbuf prompt = STRBUF_INIT;
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char *r;
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if (c->sanitize_prompt)
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credential_format(c, &desc);
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else
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credential_describe(c, &desc);
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if (desc.len)
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strbuf_addf(&prompt, "%s for '%s': ", what, desc.buf);
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else
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strbuf_addf(&prompt, "%s: ", what);
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r = git_prompt(prompt.buf, flags);
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strbuf_release(&desc);
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strbuf_release(&prompt);
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return xstrdup(r);
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}
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static void credential_getpass(struct credential *c)
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{
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if (!c->username)
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c->username = credential_ask_one("Username", c,
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PROMPT_ASKPASS|PROMPT_ECHO);
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if (!c->password)
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c->password = credential_ask_one("Password", c,
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PROMPT_ASKPASS);
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}
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int credential_read(struct credential *c, FILE *fp)
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{
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struct strbuf line = STRBUF_INIT;
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while (strbuf_getline(&line, fp) != EOF) {
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char *key = line.buf;
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char *value = strchr(key, '=');
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if (!line.len)
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break;
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if (!value) {
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warning("invalid credential line: %s", key);
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strbuf_release(&line);
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return -1;
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}
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*value++ = '\0';
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if (!strcmp(key, "username")) {
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free(c->username);
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c->username = xstrdup(value);
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c->username_from_proto = 1;
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} else if (!strcmp(key, "password")) {
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free(c->password);
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c->password = xstrdup(value);
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} else if (!strcmp(key, "protocol")) {
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free(c->protocol);
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c->protocol = xstrdup(value);
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} else if (!strcmp(key, "host")) {
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free(c->host);
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c->host = xstrdup(value);
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} else if (!strcmp(key, "path")) {
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free(c->path);
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c->path = xstrdup(value);
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} else if (!strcmp(key, "password_expiry_utc")) {
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errno = 0;
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c->password_expiry_utc = parse_timestamp(value, NULL, 10);
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if (c->password_expiry_utc == 0 || errno == ERANGE)
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c->password_expiry_utc = TIME_MAX;
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} else if (!strcmp(key, "url")) {
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credential_from_url(c, value);
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} else if (!strcmp(key, "quit")) {
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c->quit = !!git_config_bool("quit", value);
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}
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/*
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* Ignore other lines; we don't know what they mean, but
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* this future-proofs us when later versions of git do
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* learn new lines, and the helpers are updated to match.
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*/
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}
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strbuf_release(&line);
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return 0;
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}
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static void credential_write_item(FILE *fp, const char *key, const char *value,
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int required)
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{
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if (!value && required)
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BUG("credential value for %s is missing", key);
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if (!value)
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return;
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if (strchr(value, '\n'))
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die("credential value for %s contains newline", key);
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fprintf(fp, "%s=%s\n", key, value);
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}
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void credential_write(const struct credential *c, FILE *fp)
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{
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credential_write_item(fp, "protocol", c->protocol, 1);
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credential_write_item(fp, "host", c->host, 1);
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credential_write_item(fp, "path", c->path, 0);
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credential_write_item(fp, "username", c->username, 0);
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credential_write_item(fp, "password", c->password, 0);
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if (c->password_expiry_utc != TIME_MAX) {
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char *s = xstrfmt("%"PRItime, c->password_expiry_utc);
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credential_write_item(fp, "password_expiry_utc", s, 0);
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free(s);
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}
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}
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static int run_credential_helper(struct credential *c,
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const char *cmd,
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int want_output)
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{
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struct child_process helper = CHILD_PROCESS_INIT;
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FILE *fp;
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strvec_push(&helper.args, cmd);
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helper.use_shell = 1;
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helper.in = -1;
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if (want_output)
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helper.out = -1;
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else
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helper.no_stdout = 1;
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if (start_command(&helper) < 0)
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return -1;
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fp = xfdopen(helper.in, "w");
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sigchain_push(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
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credential_write(c, fp);
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fclose(fp);
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sigchain_pop(SIGPIPE);
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if (want_output) {
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int r;
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fp = xfdopen(helper.out, "r");
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r = credential_read(c, fp);
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fclose(fp);
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if (r < 0) {
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finish_command(&helper);
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return -1;
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}
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}
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if (finish_command(&helper))
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return -1;
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return 0;
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}
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static int credential_do(struct credential *c, const char *helper,
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const char *operation)
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{
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struct strbuf cmd = STRBUF_INIT;
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int r;
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if (helper[0] == '!')
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strbuf_addstr(&cmd, helper + 1);
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else if (is_absolute_path(helper))
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strbuf_addstr(&cmd, helper);
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else
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strbuf_addf(&cmd, "git credential-%s", helper);
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strbuf_addf(&cmd, " %s", operation);
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r = run_credential_helper(c, cmd.buf, !strcmp(operation, "get"));
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strbuf_release(&cmd);
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return r;
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}
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void credential_fill(struct credential *c)
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{
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int i;
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if (c->username && c->password)
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return;
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credential_apply_config(c);
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for (i = 0; i < c->helpers.nr; i++) {
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credential_do(c, c->helpers.items[i].string, "get");
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if (c->password_expiry_utc < time(NULL)) {
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/* Discard expired password */
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FREE_AND_NULL(c->password);
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/* Reset expiry to maintain consistency */
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c->password_expiry_utc = TIME_MAX;
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}
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if (c->username && c->password)
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return;
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if (c->quit)
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die("credential helper '%s' told us to quit",
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c->helpers.items[i].string);
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}
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credential_getpass(c);
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if (!c->username && !c->password)
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die("unable to get password from user");
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}
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void credential_approve(struct credential *c)
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{
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int i;
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if (c->approved)
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return;
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if (!c->username || !c->password || c->password_expiry_utc < time(NULL))
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return;
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credential_apply_config(c);
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for (i = 0; i < c->helpers.nr; i++)
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credential_do(c, c->helpers.items[i].string, "store");
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c->approved = 1;
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}
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void credential_reject(struct credential *c)
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{
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int i;
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credential_apply_config(c);
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for (i = 0; i < c->helpers.nr; i++)
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credential_do(c, c->helpers.items[i].string, "erase");
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FREE_AND_NULL(c->username);
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FREE_AND_NULL(c->password);
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c->password_expiry_utc = TIME_MAX;
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c->approved = 0;
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}
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static int check_url_component(const char *url, int quiet,
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const char *name, const char *value)
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{
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if (!value)
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return 0;
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if (!strchr(value, '\n'))
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return 0;
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if (!quiet)
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warning(_("url contains a newline in its %s component: %s"),
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name, url);
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return -1;
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}
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/*
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* Potentially-partial URLs can, but do not have to, contain
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*
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* - a protocol (or scheme) of the form "<protocol>://"
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*
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* - a host name (the part after the protocol and before the first slash after
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* that, if any)
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*
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* - a user name and potentially a password (as "<user>[:<password>]@" part of
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* the host name)
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*
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* - a path (the part after the host name, if any, starting with the slash)
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*
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* Missing parts will be left unset in `struct credential`. Thus, `https://`
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* will have only the `protocol` set, `example.com` only the host name, and
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* `/git` only the path.
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*
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* Note that an empty host name in an otherwise fully-qualified URL (e.g.
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* `cert:///path/to/cert.pem`) will be treated as unset if we expect the URL to
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* be potentially partial, and only then (otherwise, the empty string is used).
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*
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* The credential_from_url() function does not allow partial URLs.
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*/
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static int credential_from_url_1(struct credential *c, const char *url,
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int allow_partial_url, int quiet)
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{
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const char *at, *colon, *cp, *slash, *host, *proto_end;
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credential_clear(c);
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/*
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* Match one of:
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* (1) proto://<host>/...
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* (2) proto://<user>@<host>/...
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* (3) proto://<user>:<pass>@<host>/...
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*/
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proto_end = strstr(url, "://");
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if (!allow_partial_url && (!proto_end || proto_end == url)) {
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if (!quiet)
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warning(_("url has no scheme: %s"), url);
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return -1;
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}
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cp = proto_end ? proto_end + 3 : url;
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at = strchr(cp, '@');
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colon = strchr(cp, ':');
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/*
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* A query or fragment marker before the slash ends the host portion.
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* We'll just continue to call this "slash" for simplicity. Notably our
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* "trim leading slashes" part won't skip over this part of the path,
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* but that's what we'd want.
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*/
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slash = cp + strcspn(cp, "/?#");
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if (!at || slash <= at) {
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/* Case (1) */
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host = cp;
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}
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else if (!colon || at <= colon) {
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/* Case (2) */
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c->username = url_decode_mem(cp, at - cp);
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if (c->username && *c->username)
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c->username_from_proto = 1;
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host = at + 1;
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} else {
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/* Case (3) */
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c->username = url_decode_mem(cp, colon - cp);
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if (c->username && *c->username)
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c->username_from_proto = 1;
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c->password = url_decode_mem(colon + 1, at - (colon + 1));
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host = at + 1;
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}
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if (proto_end && proto_end - url > 0)
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c->protocol = xmemdupz(url, proto_end - url);
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if (!allow_partial_url || slash - host > 0)
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c->host = url_decode_mem(host, slash - host);
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/* Trim leading and trailing slashes from path */
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while (*slash == '/')
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slash++;
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if (*slash) {
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char *p;
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c->path = url_decode(slash);
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p = c->path + strlen(c->path) - 1;
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while (p > c->path && *p == '/')
|
|
*p-- = '\0';
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (check_url_component(url, quiet, "username", c->username) < 0 ||
|
|
check_url_component(url, quiet, "password", c->password) < 0 ||
|
|
check_url_component(url, quiet, "protocol", c->protocol) < 0 ||
|
|
check_url_component(url, quiet, "host", c->host) < 0 ||
|
|
check_url_component(url, quiet, "path", c->path) < 0)
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static int credential_from_potentially_partial_url(struct credential *c,
|
|
const char *url)
|
|
{
|
|
return credential_from_url_1(c, url, 1, 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int credential_from_url_gently(struct credential *c, const char *url, int quiet)
|
|
{
|
|
return credential_from_url_1(c, url, 0, quiet);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void credential_from_url(struct credential *c, const char *url)
|
|
{
|
|
if (credential_from_url_gently(c, url, 0) < 0)
|
|
die(_("credential url cannot be parsed: %s"), url);
|
|
}
|