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Author SHA1 Message Date
21a3e5016b Git 2.18.3
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2020-03-17 13:34:12 -07:00
c42c0f1297 Git 2.17.4
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2020-03-17 13:25:33 -07:00
07259e74ec fsck: detect gitmodules URLs with embedded newlines
The credential protocol can't handle values with newlines. We already
detect and block any such URLs from being used with credential helpers,
but let's also add an fsck check to detect and block gitmodules files
with such URLs. That will let us notice the problem earlier when
transfer.fsckObjects is turned on. And in particular it will prevent bad
objects from spreading, which may protect downstream users running older
versions of Git.

We'll file this under the existing gitmodulesUrl flag, which covers URLs
with option injection. There's really no need to distinguish the exact
flaw in the URL in this context. Likewise, I've expanded the description
of t7416 to cover all types of bogus URLs.
2020-03-12 02:56:50 -04:00
c716fe4bd9 credential: detect unrepresentable values when parsing urls
The credential protocol can't represent newlines in values, but URLs can
embed percent-encoded newlines in various components. A previous commit
taught the low-level writing routines to die() when encountering this,
but we can be a little friendlier to the user by detecting them earlier
and handling them gracefully.

This patch teaches credential_from_url() to notice such components,
issue a warning, and blank the credential (which will generally result
in prompting the user for a username and password). We blank the whole
credential in this case. Another option would be to blank only the
invalid component. However, we're probably better off not feeding a
partially-parsed URL result to a credential helper. We don't know how a
given helper would handle it, so we're better off to err on the side of
matching nothing rather than something unexpected.

The die() call in credential_write() is _probably_ impossible to reach
after this patch. Values should end up in credential structs only by URL
parsing (which is covered here), or by reading credential protocol input
(which by definition cannot read a newline into a value). But we should
definitely keep the low-level check, as it's our final and most accurate
line of defense against protocol injection attacks. Arguably it could
become a BUG(), but it probably doesn't matter much either way.

Note that the public interface of credential_from_url() grows a little
more than we need here. We'll use the extra flexibility in a future
patch to help fsck catch these cases.
2020-03-12 02:55:24 -04:00
17f1c0b8c7 t/lib-credential: use test_i18ncmp to check stderr
The credential tests have a "check" function which feeds some input to
git-credential and checks the stdout and stderr. We look for exact
matches in the output. For stdout, this makes sense; the output is
the credential protocol. But for stderr, we may be showing various
diagnostic messages, or the prompts fed to the askpass program, which
could be translated. Let's mark them as such.
2020-03-12 02:55:17 -04:00
9a6bbee800 credential: avoid writing values with newlines
The credential protocol that we use to speak to helpers can't represent
values with newlines in them. This was an intentional design choice to
keep the protocol simple, since none of the values we pass should
generally have newlines.

However, if we _do_ encounter a newline in a value, we blindly transmit
it in credential_write(). Such values may break the protocol syntax, or
worse, inject new valid lines into the protocol stream.

The most likely way for a newline to end up in a credential struct is by
decoding a URL with a percent-encoded newline. However, since the bug
occurs at the moment we write the value to the protocol, we'll catch it
there. That should leave no possibility of accidentally missing a code
path that can trigger the problem.

At this level of the code we have little choice but to die(). However,
since we'd not ever expect to see this case outside of a malicious URL,
that's an acceptable outcome.

Reported-by: Felix Wilhelm <fwilhelm@google.com>
2020-03-12 02:55:16 -04:00
10 changed files with 122 additions and 7 deletions

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@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
Git v2.17.4 Release Notes
=========================
This release is to address the security issue: CVE-2020-5260
Fixes since v2.17.3
-------------------
* With a crafted URL that contains a newline in it, the credential
helper machinery can be fooled to give credential information for
a wrong host. The attack has been made impossible by forbidding
a newline character in any value passed via the credential
protocol.
Credit for finding the vulnerability goes to Felix Wilhelm of Google
Project Zero.

View File

@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
Git v2.18.3 Release Notes
=========================
This release merges the security fix that appears in v2.17.4; see
the release notes for that version for details.

View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
#!/bin/sh
GVF=GIT-VERSION-FILE
DEF_VER=v2.18.2
DEF_VER=v2.18.3
LF='
'

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@ -1 +1 @@
Documentation/RelNotes/2.18.2.txt
Documentation/RelNotes/2.18.3.txt

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@ -195,6 +195,8 @@ static void credential_write_item(FILE *fp, const char *key, const char *value)
{
if (!value)
return;
if (strchr(value, '\n'))
die("credential value for %s contains newline", key);
fprintf(fp, "%s=%s\n", key, value);
}
@ -322,7 +324,22 @@ void credential_reject(struct credential *c)
c->approved = 0;
}
void credential_from_url(struct credential *c, const char *url)
static int check_url_component(const char *url, int quiet,
const char *name, const char *value)
{
if (!value)
return 0;
if (!strchr(value, '\n'))
return 0;
if (!quiet)
warning(_("url contains a newline in its %s component: %s"),
name, url);
return -1;
}
int credential_from_url_gently(struct credential *c, const char *url,
int quiet)
{
const char *at, *colon, *cp, *slash, *host, *proto_end;
@ -336,7 +353,7 @@ void credential_from_url(struct credential *c, const char *url)
*/
proto_end = strstr(url, "://");
if (!proto_end)
return;
return 0;
cp = proto_end + 3;
at = strchr(cp, '@');
colon = strchr(cp, ':');
@ -371,4 +388,21 @@ void credential_from_url(struct credential *c, const char *url)
while (p > c->path && *p == '/')
*p-- = '\0';
}
if (check_url_component(url, quiet, "username", c->username) < 0 ||
check_url_component(url, quiet, "password", c->password) < 0 ||
check_url_component(url, quiet, "protocol", c->protocol) < 0 ||
check_url_component(url, quiet, "host", c->host) < 0 ||
check_url_component(url, quiet, "path", c->path) < 0)
return -1;
return 0;
}
void credential_from_url(struct credential *c, const char *url)
{
if (credential_from_url_gently(c, url, 0) < 0) {
warning(_("skipping credential lookup for url: %s"), url);
credential_clear(c);
}
}

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@ -28,7 +28,23 @@ void credential_reject(struct credential *);
int credential_read(struct credential *, FILE *);
void credential_write(const struct credential *, FILE *);
/*
* Parse a url into a credential struct, replacing any existing contents.
*
* Ifthe url can't be parsed (e.g., a missing "proto://" component), the
* resulting credential will be empty but we'll still return success from the
* "gently" form.
*
* If we encounter a component which cannot be represented as a credential
* value (e.g., because it contains a newline), the "gently" form will return
* an error but leave the broken state in the credential object for further
* examination. The non-gentle form will issue a warning to stderr and return
* an empty credential.
*/
void credential_from_url(struct credential *, const char *url);
int credential_from_url_gently(struct credential *, const char *url, int quiet);
int credential_match(const struct credential *have,
const struct credential *want);

16
fsck.c
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@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
#include "packfile.h"
#include "submodule-config.h"
#include "config.h"
#include "credential.h"
static struct oidset gitmodules_found = OIDSET_INIT;
static struct oidset gitmodules_done = OIDSET_INIT;
@ -945,6 +946,19 @@ static int fsck_tag(struct tag *tag, const char *data,
return fsck_tag_buffer(tag, data, size, options);
}
static int check_submodule_url(const char *url)
{
struct credential c = CREDENTIAL_INIT;
int ret;
if (looks_like_command_line_option(url))
return -1;
ret = credential_from_url_gently(&c, url, 1);
credential_clear(&c);
return ret;
}
struct fsck_gitmodules_data {
struct object *obj;
struct fsck_options *options;
@ -969,7 +983,7 @@ static int fsck_gitmodules_fn(const char *var, const char *value, void *vdata)
"disallowed submodule name: %s",
name);
if (!strcmp(key, "url") && value &&
looks_like_command_line_option(value))
check_submodule_url(value) < 0)
data->ret |= report(data->options, data->obj,
FSCK_MSG_GITMODULES_URL,
"disallowed submodule url: %s",

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@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ check() {
false
fi &&
test_cmp expect-stdout stdout &&
test_cmp expect-stderr stderr
test_i18ncmp expect-stderr stderr
}
read_chunk() {

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@ -309,4 +309,18 @@ test_expect_success 'empty helper spec resets helper list' '
EOF
'
test_expect_success 'url parser ignores embedded newlines' '
check fill <<-EOF
url=https://one.example.com?%0ahost=two.example.com/
--
username=askpass-username
password=askpass-password
--
warning: url contains a newline in its host component: https://one.example.com?%0ahost=two.example.com/
warning: skipping credential lookup for url: https://one.example.com?%0ahost=two.example.com/
askpass: Username:
askpass: Password:
EOF
'
test_done

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@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
#!/bin/sh
test_description='check handling of .gitmodule url with dash'
test_description='check handling of disallowed .gitmodule urls'
. ./test-lib.sh
test_expect_success 'create submodule with protected dash in url' '
@ -60,4 +60,20 @@ test_expect_success 'trailing backslash is handled correctly' '
test_i18ngrep ! "unknown option" err
'
test_expect_success 'fsck rejects embedded newline in url' '
# create an orphan branch to avoid existing .gitmodules objects
git checkout --orphan newline &&
cat >.gitmodules <<-\EOF &&
[submodule "foo"]
url = "https://one.example.com?%0ahost=two.example.com/foo.git"
EOF
git add .gitmodules &&
git commit -m "gitmodules with newline" &&
test_when_finished "rm -rf dst" &&
git init --bare dst &&
git -C dst config transfer.fsckObjects true &&
test_must_fail git push dst HEAD 2>err &&
grep gitmodulesUrl err
'
test_done