The old version we currently use runs in node.js v12.x, which is being
deprecated in GitHub Actions. The new version uses node.js v16.x.
Incidentally, this also avoids the warning about the deprecated
`::set-output::` workflow command because the newer version of the
`github-script` Action uses the recommended new way to specify outputs.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
Adjust the GitHub CI to newer ubuntu release.
* jx/ci-ubuntu-fix:
ci: install python on ubuntu
ci: use the same version of p4 on both Linux and macOS
ci: remove the pipe after "p4 -V" to catch errors
github-actions: run gcc-8 on ubuntu-20.04 image
Update GitHub CI to use actions/checkout@v3; use of the older
checkout@v2 gets annoying deprecation notices.
* od/ci-use-checkout-v3-when-applicable:
ci(main): upgrade actions/checkout to v3
In b3b1a21d1a (sequencer: rewrite update-refs as user edits todo list,
2022-07-19), the 'todo_list_filter_update_refs()' step was added to handle
the removal of 'update-ref' lines from a 'rebase-todo'. Specifically, it
removes potential ref updates from the "update refs state" if a ref does not
have a corresponding 'update-ref' line.
However, because 'write_update_refs_state()' will not update the state if
the 'refs_to_oids' list was empty, removing *all* 'update-ref' lines will
result in the state remaining unchanged from how it was initialized (with
all refs' "after" OID being null). Then, when the ref update is applied, all
refs will be updated to null and consequently deleted.
To fix this, delete the 'update-refs' state file when 'refs_to_oids' is
empty. Additionally, add a tests covering "all update-ref lines removed"
cases.
Reported-by: herr.kaste <herr.kaste@gmail.com>
Helped-by: Phillip Wood <phillip.wood@dunelm.org.uk>
Helped-by: Derrick Stolee <derrickstolee@github.com>
Signed-off-by: Victoria Dye <vdye@github.com>
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
Recently, a vulnerability was reported that can lead to an out-of-bounds
write when reading an unreasonably large gitattributes file. The root
cause of this error are multiple integer overflows in different parts of
the code when there are either too many lines, when paths are too long,
when attribute names are too long, or when there are too many attributes
declared for a pattern.
As all of these are related to size, it seems reasonable to restrict the
size of the gitattributes file via git-fsck(1). This allows us to both
stop distributing known-vulnerable objects via common hosting platforms
that have fsck enabled, and users to protect themselves by enabling the
`fetch.fsckObjects` config.
There are basically two checks:
1. We verify that size of the gitattributes file is smaller than
100MB.
2. We verify that the maximum line length does not exceed 2048
bytes.
With the preceding commits, both of these conditions would cause us to
either ignore the complete gitattributes file or blob in the first case,
or the specific line in the second case. Now with these consistency
checks added, we also grow the ability to stop distributing such files
in the first place when `receive.fsckObjects` is enabled.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Move the checks for gitattributes so that they can be extended more
readily.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
In `fsck_finish()` we check all blobs for consistency that we have found
during the tree walk, but that haven't yet been checked. This is only
required for gitmodules right now, but will also be required for a new
check for gitattributes.
Pull out a function `fsck_blobs()` that allows the caller to check a set
of blobs for consistency.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
In general, we don't need to validate blob contents as they are opaque
blobs about whose content Git doesn't need to care about. There are some
exceptions though when blobs are linked into trees so that they would be
interpreted by Git. We only have a single such check right now though,
which is the one for gitmodules that has been added in the context of
CVE-2018-11235.
Now we have found another vulnerability with gitattributes that can lead
to out-of-bounds writes and reads. So let's refactor `fsck_blob()` so
that it is more extensible and can check different types of blobs.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Both the padding and wrapping formatting directives allow the caller to
specify an integer that ultimately leads to us adding this many chars to
the result buffer. As a consequence, it is trivial to e.g. allocate 2GB
of RAM via a single formatting directive and cause resource exhaustion
on the machine executing this logic. Furthermore, it is debatable
whether there are any sane usecases that require the user to pad data to
2GB boundaries or to indent wrapped data by 2GB.
Restrict the input sizes to 16 kilobytes at a maximum to limit the
amount of bytes that can be requested by the user. This is not meant
as a fix because there are ways to trivially amplify the amount of
data we generate via formatting directives; the real protection is
achieved by the changes in previous steps to catch and avoid integer
wraparound that causes us to under-allocate and access beyond the
end of allocated memory reagions. But having such a limit
significantly helps fuzzing the pretty format, because the fuzzer is
otherwise quite fast to run out-of-memory as it discovers these
formatters.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
In `strbuf_utf8_replace`, we preallocate the destination buffer and then
use `memcpy` to copy bytes into it at computed offsets. This feels
rather fragile and is hard to understand at times. Refactor the code to
instead use `strbuf_add` and `strbuf_addstr` so that we can be sure that
there is no possibility to perform an out-of-bounds write.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
In `strbuf_utf8_replace()`, we call `utf8_width()` to compute the width
of the current glyph. If the glyph is a control character though it can
be that `utf8_width()` returns `-1`, but because we assign this value to
a `size_t` the conversion will cause us to underflow. This bug can
easily be triggered with the following command:
$ git log --pretty='format:xxx%<|(1,trunc)%x10'
>From all I can see though this seems to be a benign underflow that has
no security-related consequences.
Fix the bug by using an `int` instead. When we see a control character,
we now copy it into the target buffer but don't advance the current
width of the string.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
The return type of both `utf8_strwidth()` and `utf8_strnwidth()` is
`int`, but we operate on string lengths which are typically of type
`size_t`. This means that when the string is longer than `INT_MAX`, we
will overflow and thus return a negative result.
This can lead to an out-of-bounds write with `--pretty=format:%<1)%B`
and a commit message that is 2^31+1 bytes long:
=================================================================
==26009==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x603000001168 at pc 0x7f95c4e5f427 bp 0x7ffd8541c900 sp 0x7ffd8541c0a8
WRITE of size 2147483649 at 0x603000001168 thread T0
#0 0x7f95c4e5f426 in __interceptor_memcpy /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:827
#1 0x5612bbb1068c in format_and_pad_commit pretty.c:1763
#2 0x5612bbb1087a in format_commit_item pretty.c:1801
#3 0x5612bbc33bab in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:429
#4 0x5612bbb110e7 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869
#5 0x5612bbb12d96 in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161
#6 0x5612bba0a4d5 in show_log log-tree.c:781
#7 0x5612bba0d6c7 in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117
#8 0x5612bb691ed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508
#9 0x5612bb69235b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549
#10 0x5612bb6951a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883
#11 0x5612bb56c993 in run_builtin git.c:466
#12 0x5612bb56d397 in handle_builtin git.c:721
#13 0x5612bb56db07 in run_argv git.c:788
#14 0x5612bb56e8a7 in cmd_main git.c:923
#15 0x5612bb803682 in main common-main.c:57
#16 0x7f95c4c3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f)
#17 0x7f95c4c3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349)
#18 0x5612bb5680e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115
0x603000001168 is located 0 bytes to the right of 24-byte region [0x603000001150,0x603000001168)
allocated by thread T0 here:
#0 0x7f95c4ebe7ea in __interceptor_realloc /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:85
#1 0x5612bbcdd556 in xrealloc wrapper.c:136
#2 0x5612bbc310a3 in strbuf_grow strbuf.c:99
#3 0x5612bbc32acd in strbuf_add strbuf.c:298
#4 0x5612bbc33aec in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:418
#5 0x5612bbb110e7 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869
#6 0x5612bbb12d96 in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161
#7 0x5612bba0a4d5 in show_log log-tree.c:781
#8 0x5612bba0d6c7 in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117
#9 0x5612bb691ed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508
#10 0x5612bb69235b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549
#11 0x5612bb6951a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883
#12 0x5612bb56c993 in run_builtin git.c:466
#13 0x5612bb56d397 in handle_builtin git.c:721
#14 0x5612bb56db07 in run_argv git.c:788
#15 0x5612bb56e8a7 in cmd_main git.c:923
#16 0x5612bb803682 in main common-main.c:57
#17 0x7f95c4c3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f)
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:827 in __interceptor_memcpy
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
0x0c067fff81d0: fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa
0x0c067fff81e0: fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd
0x0c067fff81f0: fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa
0x0c067fff8200: fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa 00 00 00 fa
0x0c067fff8210: fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd
=>0x0c067fff8220: fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa 00 00 00[fa]fa fa
0x0c067fff8230: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c067fff8240: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c067fff8250: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c067fff8260: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c067fff8270: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
Addressable: 00
Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Heap left redzone: fa
Freed heap region: fd
Stack left redzone: f1
Stack mid redzone: f2
Stack right redzone: f3
Stack after return: f5
Stack use after scope: f8
Global redzone: f9
Global init order: f6
Poisoned by user: f7
Container overflow: fc
Array cookie: ac
Intra object redzone: bb
ASan internal: fe
Left alloca redzone: ca
Right alloca redzone: cb
==26009==ABORTING
Now the proper fix for this would be to convert both functions to return
an `size_t` instead of an `int`. But given that this commit may be part
of a security release, let's instead do the minimal viable fix and die
in case we see an overflow.
Add a test that would have previously caused us to crash.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
The `utf8_strnwidth()` function calls `utf8_width()` in a loop and adds
its returned width to the end result. `utf8_width()` can return `-1`
though in case it reads a control character, which means that the
computed string width is going to be wrong. In the worst case where
there are more control characters than non-control characters, we may
even return a negative string width.
Fix this bug by treating control characters as having zero width.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
The `utf8_strnwidth()` function accepts an optional string length as
input parameter. This parameter can either be set to `-1`, in which case
we call `strlen()` on the input. Or it can be set to a positive integer
that indicates a precomputed length, which callers typically compute by
calling `strlen()` at some point themselves.
The input parameter is an `int` though, whereas `strlen()` returns a
`size_t`. This can lead to implementation-defined behaviour though when
the `size_t` cannot be represented by the `int`. In the general case
though this leads to wrap-around and thus to negative string sizes,
which is sure enough to not lead to well-defined behaviour.
Fix this by accepting a `size_t` instead of an `int` as string length.
While this takes away the ability of callers to simply pass in `-1` as
string length, it really is trivial enough to convert them to instead
pass in `strlen()` instead.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
The `%w(width,indent1,indent2)` formatting directive can be used to
rewrap text to a specific width and is designed after git-shortlog(1)'s
`-w` parameter. While the three parameters are all stored as `size_t`
internally, `strbuf_add_wrapped_text()` accepts integers as input. As a
result, the casted integers may overflow. As these now-negative integers
are later on passed to `strbuf_addchars()`, we will ultimately run into
implementation-defined behaviour due to casting a negative number back
to `size_t` again. On my platform, this results in trying to allocate
9000 petabyte of memory.
Fix this overflow by using `cast_size_t_to_int()` so that we reject
inputs that cannot be represented as an integer.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
When a formatting directive has a `+` or ` ` after the `%`, then we add
either a line feed or space if the placeholder expands to a non-empty
string. In specific cases though this logic doesn't work as expected,
and we try to add the character even in the case where the formatting
directive is empty.
One such pattern is `%w(1)%+d%+w(2)`. `%+d` expands to reference names
pointing to a certain commit, like in `git log --decorate`. For a tagged
commit this would for example expand to `\n (tag: v1.0.0)`, which has a
leading newline due to the `+` modifier and a space added by `%d`. Now
the second wrapping directive will cause us to rewrap the text to
`\n(tag:\nv1.0.0)`, which is one byte shorter due to the missing leading
space. The code that handles the `+` magic now notices that the length
has changed and will thus try to insert a leading line feed at the
original posititon. But as the string was shortened, the original
position is past the buffer's boundary and thus we die with an error.
Now there are two issues here:
1. We check whether the buffer length has changed, not whether it
has been extended. This causes us to try and add the character
past the string boundary.
2. The current logic does not make any sense whatsoever. When the
string got expanded due to the rewrap, putting the separator into
the original position is likely to put it somewhere into the
middle of the rewrapped contents.
It is debatable whether `%+w()` makes any sense in the first place.
Strictly speaking, the placeholder never expands to a non-empty string,
and consequentially we shouldn't ever accept this combination. We thus
fix the bug by simply refusing `%+w()`.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
An out-of-bounds read can be triggered when parsing an incomplete
padding format string passed via `--pretty=format` or in Git archives
when files are marked with the `export-subst` gitattribute.
This bug exists since we have introduced support for truncating output
via the `trunc` keyword a7f01c6b4d (pretty: support truncating in %>, %<
and %><, 2013-04-19). Before this commit, we used to find the end of the
formatting string by using strchr(3P). This function returns a `NULL`
pointer in case the character in question wasn't found. The subsequent
check whether any character was found thus simply checked the returned
pointer. After the commit we switched to strcspn(3P) though, which only
returns the offset to the first found character or to the trailing NUL
byte. As the end pointer is now computed by adding the offset to the
start pointer it won't be `NULL` anymore, and as a consequence the check
doesn't do anything anymore.
The out-of-bounds data that is being read can in fact end up in the
formatted string. As a consequence, it is possible to leak memory
contents either by calling git-log(1) or via git-archive(1) when any of
the archived files is marked with the `export-subst` gitattribute.
==10888==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x602000000398 at pc 0x7f0356047cb2 bp 0x7fff3ffb95d0 sp 0x7fff3ffb8d78
READ of size 1 at 0x602000000398 thread T0
#0 0x7f0356047cb1 in __interceptor_strchrnul /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:725
#1 0x563b7cec9a43 in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:417
#2 0x563b7cda7060 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869
#3 0x563b7cda8d0f in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161
#4 0x563b7cca04c8 in show_log log-tree.c:781
#5 0x563b7cca36ba in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117
#6 0x563b7c927ed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508
#7 0x563b7c92835b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549
#8 0x563b7c92b1a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883
#9 0x563b7c802993 in run_builtin git.c:466
#10 0x563b7c803397 in handle_builtin git.c:721
#11 0x563b7c803b07 in run_argv git.c:788
#12 0x563b7c8048a7 in cmd_main git.c:923
#13 0x563b7ca99682 in main common-main.c:57
#14 0x7f0355e3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f)
#15 0x7f0355e3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349)
#16 0x563b7c7fe0e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115
0x602000000398 is located 0 bytes to the right of 8-byte region [0x602000000390,0x602000000398)
allocated by thread T0 here:
#0 0x7f0356072faa in __interceptor_strdup /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_interceptors.cpp:439
#1 0x563b7cf7317c in xstrdup wrapper.c:39
#2 0x563b7cd9a06a in save_user_format pretty.c:40
#3 0x563b7cd9b3e5 in get_commit_format pretty.c:173
#4 0x563b7ce54ea0 in handle_revision_opt revision.c:2456
#5 0x563b7ce597c9 in setup_revisions revision.c:2850
#6 0x563b7c9269e0 in cmd_log_init_finish builtin/log.c:269
#7 0x563b7c927362 in cmd_log_init builtin/log.c:348
#8 0x563b7c92b193 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:882
#9 0x563b7c802993 in run_builtin git.c:466
#10 0x563b7c803397 in handle_builtin git.c:721
#11 0x563b7c803b07 in run_argv git.c:788
#12 0x563b7c8048a7 in cmd_main git.c:923
#13 0x563b7ca99682 in main common-main.c:57
#14 0x7f0355e3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f)
#15 0x7f0355e3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349)
#16 0x563b7c7fe0e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:725 in __interceptor_strchrnul
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
0x0c047fff8020: fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 06 fa fa 05 fa fa fa fd fd
0x0c047fff8030: fa fa 00 02 fa fa 06 fa fa fa 05 fa fa fa fd fd
0x0c047fff8040: fa fa 00 07 fa fa 03 fa fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 00
0x0c047fff8050: fa fa 00 01 fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 01
0x0c047fff8060: fa fa 00 06 fa fa 00 06 fa fa 05 fa fa fa 05 fa
=>0x0c047fff8070: fa fa 00[fa]fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fd
0x0c047fff8080: fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 fa fa fa fd fa
0x0c047fff8090: fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c047fff80a0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c047fff80b0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c047fff80c0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
Addressable: 00
Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Heap left redzone: fa
Freed heap region: fd
Stack left redzone: f1
Stack mid redzone: f2
Stack right redzone: f3
Stack after return: f5
Stack use after scope: f8
Global redzone: f9
Global init order: f6
Poisoned by user: f7
Container overflow: fc
Array cookie: ac
Intra object redzone: bb
ASan internal: fe
Left alloca redzone: ca
Right alloca redzone: cb
==10888==ABORTING
Fix this bug by checking whether `end` points at the trailing NUL byte.
Add a test which catches this out-of-bounds read and which demonstrates
that we used to write out-of-bounds data into the formatted message.
Reported-by: Markus Vervier <markus.vervier@x41-dsec.de>
Original-patch-by: Markus Vervier <markus.vervier@x41-dsec.de>
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
With the `%>>(<N>)` pretty formatter, you can ask git-log(1) et al to
steal spaces. To do so we need to look ahead of the next token to see
whether there are spaces there. This loop takes into account ANSI
sequences that end with an `m`, and if it finds any it will skip them
until it finds the first space. While doing so it does not take into
account the buffer's limits though and easily does an out-of-bounds
read.
Add a test that hits this behaviour. While we don't have an easy way to
verify this, the test causes the following failure when run with
`SANITIZE=address`:
==37941==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x603000000baf at pc 0x55ba6f88e0d0 bp 0x7ffc84c50d20 sp 0x7ffc84c50d10
READ of size 1 at 0x603000000baf thread T0
#0 0x55ba6f88e0cf in format_and_pad_commit pretty.c:1712
#1 0x55ba6f88e7b4 in format_commit_item pretty.c:1801
#2 0x55ba6f9b1ae4 in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:429
#3 0x55ba6f88f020 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869
#4 0x55ba6f890ccf in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161
#5 0x55ba6f7884c8 in show_log log-tree.c:781
#6 0x55ba6f78b6ba in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117
#7 0x55ba6f40fed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508
#8 0x55ba6f41035b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549
#9 0x55ba6f4131a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883
#10 0x55ba6f2ea993 in run_builtin git.c:466
#11 0x55ba6f2eb397 in handle_builtin git.c:721
#12 0x55ba6f2ebb07 in run_argv git.c:788
#13 0x55ba6f2ec8a7 in cmd_main git.c:923
#14 0x55ba6f581682 in main common-main.c:57
#15 0x7f2d08c3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f)
#16 0x7f2d08c3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349)
#17 0x55ba6f2e60e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115
0x603000000baf is located 1 bytes to the left of 24-byte region [0x603000000bb0,0x603000000bc8)
allocated by thread T0 here:
#0 0x7f2d08ebe7ea in __interceptor_realloc /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:85
#1 0x55ba6fa5b494 in xrealloc wrapper.c:136
#2 0x55ba6f9aefdc in strbuf_grow strbuf.c:99
#3 0x55ba6f9b0a06 in strbuf_add strbuf.c:298
#4 0x55ba6f9b1a25 in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:418
#5 0x55ba6f88f020 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869
#6 0x55ba6f890ccf in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161
#7 0x55ba6f7884c8 in show_log log-tree.c:781
#8 0x55ba6f78b6ba in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117
#9 0x55ba6f40fed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508
#10 0x55ba6f41035b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549
#11 0x55ba6f4131a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883
#12 0x55ba6f2ea993 in run_builtin git.c:466
#13 0x55ba6f2eb397 in handle_builtin git.c:721
#14 0x55ba6f2ebb07 in run_argv git.c:788
#15 0x55ba6f2ec8a7 in cmd_main git.c:923
#16 0x55ba6f581682 in main common-main.c:57
#17 0x7f2d08c3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f)
#18 0x7f2d08c3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349)
#19 0x55ba6f2e60e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow pretty.c:1712 in format_and_pad_commit
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
0x0c067fff8120: fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd
0x0c067fff8130: fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa
0x0c067fff8140: fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa
0x0c067fff8150: fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa 00 00 00 fa fa fa fd fd
0x0c067fff8160: fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa
=>0x0c067fff8170: fd fd fd fa fa[fa]00 00 00 fa fa fa 00 00 00 fa
0x0c067fff8180: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c067fff8190: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c067fff81a0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c067fff81b0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c067fff81c0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
Addressable: 00
Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Heap left redzone: fa
Freed heap region: fd
Stack left redzone: f1
Stack mid redzone: f2
Stack right redzone: f3
Stack after return: f5
Stack use after scope: f8
Global redzone: f9
Global init order: f6
Poisoned by user: f7
Container overflow: fc
Array cookie: ac
Intra object redzone: bb
ASan internal: fe
Left alloca redzone: ca
Right alloca redzone: cb
Luckily enough, this would only cause us to copy the out-of-bounds data
into the formatted commit in case we really had an ANSI sequence
preceding our buffer. So this bug likely has no security consequences.
Fix it regardless by not traversing past the buffer's start.
Reported-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Reported-by: Eric Sesterhenn <eric.sesterhenn@x41-dsec.de>
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
When using a padding specifier in the pretty format passed to git-log(1)
we need to calculate the string length in several places. These string
lengths are stored in `int`s though, which means that these can easily
overflow when the input lengths exceeds 2GB. This can ultimately lead to
an out-of-bounds write when these are used in a call to memcpy(3P):
==8340==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7f1ec62f97fe at pc 0x7f2127e5f427 bp 0x7ffd3bd63de0 sp 0x7ffd3bd63588
WRITE of size 1 at 0x7f1ec62f97fe thread T0
#0 0x7f2127e5f426 in __interceptor_memcpy /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:827
#1 0x5628e96aa605 in format_and_pad_commit pretty.c:1762
#2 0x5628e96aa7f4 in format_commit_item pretty.c:1801
#3 0x5628e97cdb24 in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:429
#4 0x5628e96ab060 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869
#5 0x5628e96acd0f in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161
#6 0x5628e95a44c8 in show_log log-tree.c:781
#7 0x5628e95a76ba in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117
#8 0x5628e922bed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508
#9 0x5628e922c35b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549
#10 0x5628e922f1a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883
#11 0x5628e9106993 in run_builtin git.c:466
#12 0x5628e9107397 in handle_builtin git.c:721
#13 0x5628e9107b07 in run_argv git.c:788
#14 0x5628e91088a7 in cmd_main git.c:923
#15 0x5628e939d682 in main common-main.c:57
#16 0x7f2127c3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f)
#17 0x7f2127c3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349)
#18 0x5628e91020e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115
0x7f1ec62f97fe is located 2 bytes to the left of 4831838265-byte region [0x7f1ec62f9800,0x7f1fe62f9839)
allocated by thread T0 here:
#0 0x7f2127ebe7ea in __interceptor_realloc /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:85
#1 0x5628e98774d4 in xrealloc wrapper.c:136
#2 0x5628e97cb01c in strbuf_grow strbuf.c:99
#3 0x5628e97ccd42 in strbuf_addchars strbuf.c:327
#4 0x5628e96aa55c in format_and_pad_commit pretty.c:1761
#5 0x5628e96aa7f4 in format_commit_item pretty.c:1801
#6 0x5628e97cdb24 in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:429
#7 0x5628e96ab060 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869
#8 0x5628e96acd0f in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161
#9 0x5628e95a44c8 in show_log log-tree.c:781
#10 0x5628e95a76ba in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117
#11 0x5628e922bed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508
#12 0x5628e922c35b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549
#13 0x5628e922f1a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883
#14 0x5628e9106993 in run_builtin git.c:466
#15 0x5628e9107397 in handle_builtin git.c:721
#16 0x5628e9107b07 in run_argv git.c:788
#17 0x5628e91088a7 in cmd_main git.c:923
#18 0x5628e939d682 in main common-main.c:57
#19 0x7f2127c3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f)
#20 0x7f2127c3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349)
#21 0x5628e91020e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:827 in __interceptor_memcpy
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
0x0fe458c572a0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0fe458c572b0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0fe458c572c0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0fe458c572d0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0fe458c572e0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
=>0x0fe458c572f0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa[fa]
0x0fe458c57300: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x0fe458c57310: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x0fe458c57320: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x0fe458c57330: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x0fe458c57340: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
Addressable: 00
Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Heap left redzone: fa
Freed heap region: fd
Stack left redzone: f1
Stack mid redzone: f2
Stack right redzone: f3
Stack after return: f5
Stack use after scope: f8
Global redzone: f9
Global init order: f6
Poisoned by user: f7
Container overflow: fc
Array cookie: ac
Intra object redzone: bb
ASan internal: fe
Left alloca redzone: ca
Right alloca redzone: cb
==8340==ABORTING
The pretty format can also be used in `git archive` operations via the
`export-subst` attribute. So this is what in our opinion makes this a
critical issue in the context of Git forges which allow to download an
archive of user supplied Git repositories.
Fix this vulnerability by using `size_t` instead of `int` to track the
string lengths. Add tests which detect this vulnerability when Git is
compiled with the address sanitizer.
Reported-by: Joern Schneeweisz <jschneeweisz@gitlab.com>
Original-patch-by: Joern Schneeweisz <jschneeweisz@gitlab.com>
Modified-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttalorr.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Allow tests that assume a 64-bit `size_t` to be skipped in 32-bit
platforms and regardless of the size of `long`.
This imitates the `LONG_IS_64BIT` prerequisite.
Signed-off-by: Carlo Marcelo Arenas Belón <carenas@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
The deprecated versions of these Actions still use node.js 12 whereas
workflows will need to use node.js 16 to avoid problems going forward.
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
When the "js/ci-github-workflow-markup" topic was originally merged in
[1] it included a change to get rid of the "ci/print-test-failures.sh"
step[2]. This was then brought back in [3] as part of a fix-up patches
on top[4].
The problem was that [3] was not a revert of the relevant parts of
[2], but rather copy/pasted the "ci/print-test-failures.sh" step that
was present for the Windows job to all "ci/print-test-failures.sh"
steps. The Windows steps specified "shell: bash", but the non-Windows
ones did not.
This broke the "ci/print/test-failures.sh" step for the "linux-musl"
job, where we don't have a "bash" shell, just a "/bin/sh" (a
"dash"). This breakage was reported at the time[5], but hadn't been
fixed.
It would be sufficient to change this only for "linux-musl", but let's
change this for both "regular" and "dockerized" to omit the "shell"
line entirely, as we did before [2].
Let's also change undo the "name" change that [3] made while
copy/pasting the "print test failures" step for the Windows job. These
steps are now the same as they were before [2], except that the "if"
includes the "env.FAILED_TEST_ARTIFACTS" test.
1. fc5a070f59 (Merge branch 'js/ci-github-workflow-markup', 2022-06-07)
2. 08dccc8fc1 (ci: make it easier to find failed tests' logs in the
GitHub workflow, 2022-05-21)
3. 5aeb145780 (ci(github): bring back the 'print test failures' step,
2022-06-08)
4. d0d96b8280 (Merge branch 'js/ci-github-workflow-markup', 2022-06-17)
5. https://lore.kernel.org/git/220725.86sfmpneqp.gmgdl@evledraar.gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Per [1] and the warnings our CI is emitting GitHub is phasing in
"macos-12" as their "macos-latest".
As with [2], let's pin our image to a specific version so that we're
not having it swept from under us, and our upgrade cycle can be more
predictable than whenever GitHub changes their images.
1. https://github.com/actions/runner-images/issues/6384
2. 0178420b9c (github-actions: run gcc-8 on ubuntu-20.04 image,
2022-11-25)
Signed-off-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
To be up to date with actions/checkout opens the door to use the latest
features if necessary and get the latest security patches.
This also avoids a couple of deprecation warnings in the CI runs.
Note: The `actions/checkout` Action has been known to be broken in i686
containers as of v2, therefore we keep forcing it to v1 there. See
actions/runner#2115 for more details.
Signed-off-by: Oscar Dominguez <dominguez.celada@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Similar as with the preceding commit, start ignoring gitattributes files
that are overly large to protect us against out-of-bounds reads and
writes caused by integer overflows. Unfortunately, we cannot just define
"overly large" in terms of any preexisting limits in the codebase.
Instead, we choose a very conservative limit of 100MB. This is plenty of
room for specifying gitattributes, and incidentally it is also the limit
for blob sizes for GitHub. While we don't want GitHub to dictate limits
here, it is still sensible to use this fact for an informed decision
given that it is hosting a huge set of repositories. Furthermore, over
at GitLab we scanned a subset of repositories for their root-level
attribute files. We found that 80% of them have a gitattributes file
smaller than 100kB, 99.99% have one smaller than 1MB, and only a single
repository had one that was almost 3MB in size. So enforcing a limit of
100MB seems to give us ample of headroom.
With this limit in place we can be reasonably sure that there is no easy
way to exploit the gitattributes file via integer overflows anymore.
Furthermore, it protects us against resource exhaustion caused by
allocating the in-memory data structures required to represent the
parsed attributes.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
There are two different code paths to read gitattributes: once via a
file, and once via the index. These two paths used to behave differently
because when reading attributes from a file, we used fgets(3P) with a
buffer size of 2kB. Consequentially, we silently truncate line lengths
when lines are longer than that and will then parse the remainder of the
line as a new pattern. It goes without saying that this is entirely
unexpected, but it's even worse that the behaviour depends on how the
gitattributes are parsed.
While this is simply wrong, the silent truncation saves us with the
recently discovered vulnerabilities that can cause out-of-bound writes
or reads with unreasonably long lines due to integer overflows. As the
common path is to read gitattributes via the worktree file instead of
via the index, we can assume that any gitattributes file that had lines
longer than that is already broken anyway. So instead of lifting the
limit here, we can double down on it to fix the vulnerabilities.
Introduce an explicit line length limit of 2kB that is shared across all
paths that read attributes and ignore any line that hits this limit
while printing a warning.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
When reading attributes from a file we use fgets(3P) with a buffer size
of 2048 bytes. This means that as soon as a line exceeds the buffer size
we split it up into multiple parts and parse each of them as a separate
pattern line. This is of course not what the user intended, and even
worse the behaviour is inconsistent with how we read attributes from the
index.
Fix this bug by converting the code to use `strbuf_getline()` instead.
This will indeed read in the whole line, which may theoretically lead to
an out-of-memory situation when the gitattributes file is huge. We're
about to reject any gitattributes files larger than 100MB in the next
commit though, which makes this less of a concern.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
When parsing an attributes line, we need to allocate an array that holds
all attributes specified for the given file pattern. The calculation to
determine the number of bytes that need to be allocated was prone to an
overflow though when there was an unreasonable amount of attributes.
Harden the allocation by instead using the `st_` helper functions that
cause us to die when we hit an integer overflow.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Attributes have a field that tracks the position in the `all_attrs`
array they're stored inside. This field gets set via `hashmap_get_size`
when adding the attribute to the global map of attributes. But while the
field is of type `int`, the value returned by `hashmap_get_size` is an
`unsigned int`. It can thus happen that the value overflows, where we
would now dereference teh `all_attrs` array at an out-of-bounds value.
We do have a sanity check for this overflow via an assert that verifies
the index matches the new hashmap's size. But asserts are not a proper
mechanism to detect against any such overflows as they may not in fact
be compiled into production code.
Fix this by using an `unsigned int` to track the index and convert the
assert to a call `die()`.
Reported-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
The `struct attr_stack` tracks the stack of all patterns together with
their attributes. When parsing a gitattributes file that has more than
2^31 such patterns though we may trigger multiple out-of-bounds reads on
64 bit platforms. This is because while the `num_matches` variable is an
unsigned integer, we always use a signed integer to iterate over them.
I have not been able to reproduce this issue due to memory constraints
on my systems. But despite the out-of-bounds reads, the worst thing that
can seemingly happen is to call free(3P) with a garbage pointer when
calling `attr_stack_free()`.
Fix this bug by using unsigned integers to iterate over the array. While
this makes the iteration somewhat awkward when iterating in reverse, it
is at least better than knowingly running into an out-of-bounds read.
While at it, convert the call to `ALLOC_GROW` to use `ALLOC_GROW_BY`
instead.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
It is possible to trigger an integer overflow when parsing attribute
names when there are more than 2^31 of them for a single pattern. This
can either lead to us dying due to trying to request too many bytes:
blob=$(perl -e 'print "f" . " a=" x 2147483649' | git hash-object -w --stdin)
git update-index --add --cacheinfo 100644,$blob,.gitattributes
git attr-check --all file
=================================================================
==1022==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: requested allocation size 0xfffffff800000032 (0xfffffff800001038 after adjustments for alignment, red zones etc.) exceeds maximum supported size of 0x10000000000 (thread T0)
#0 0x7fd3efabf411 in __interceptor_calloc /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:77
#1 0x5563a0a1e3d3 in xcalloc wrapper.c:150
#2 0x5563a058d005 in parse_attr_line attr.c:384
#3 0x5563a058e661 in handle_attr_line attr.c:660
#4 0x5563a058eddb in read_attr_from_index attr.c:769
#5 0x5563a058ef12 in read_attr attr.c:797
#6 0x5563a058f24c in bootstrap_attr_stack attr.c:867
#7 0x5563a058f4a3 in prepare_attr_stack attr.c:902
#8 0x5563a05905da in collect_some_attrs attr.c:1097
#9 0x5563a059093d in git_all_attrs attr.c:1128
#10 0x5563a02f636e in check_attr builtin/check-attr.c:67
#11 0x5563a02f6c12 in cmd_check_attr builtin/check-attr.c:183
#12 0x5563a02aa993 in run_builtin git.c:466
#13 0x5563a02ab397 in handle_builtin git.c:721
#14 0x5563a02abb2b in run_argv git.c:788
#15 0x5563a02ac991 in cmd_main git.c:926
#16 0x5563a05432bd in main common-main.c:57
#17 0x7fd3ef82228f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f)
==1022==HINT: if you don't care about these errors you may set allocator_may_return_null=1
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: allocation-size-too-big /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:77 in __interceptor_calloc
==1022==ABORTING
Or, much worse, it can lead to an out-of-bounds write because we
underallocate and then memcpy(3P) into an array:
perl -e '
print "A " . "\rh="x2000000000;
print "\rh="x2000000000;
print "\rh="x294967294 . "\n"
' >.gitattributes
git add .gitattributes
git commit -am "evil attributes"
$ git clone --quiet /path/to/repo
=================================================================
==15062==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x602000002550 at pc 0x5555559884d5 bp 0x7fffffffbc60 sp 0x7fffffffbc58
WRITE of size 8 at 0x602000002550 thread T0
#0 0x5555559884d4 in parse_attr_line attr.c:393
#1 0x5555559884d4 in handle_attr_line attr.c:660
#2 0x555555988902 in read_attr_from_index attr.c:784
#3 0x555555988902 in read_attr_from_index attr.c:747
#4 0x555555988a1d in read_attr attr.c:800
#5 0x555555989b0c in bootstrap_attr_stack attr.c:882
#6 0x555555989b0c in prepare_attr_stack attr.c:917
#7 0x555555989b0c in collect_some_attrs attr.c:1112
#8 0x55555598b141 in git_check_attr attr.c:1126
#9 0x555555a13004 in convert_attrs convert.c:1311
#10 0x555555a95e04 in checkout_entry_ca entry.c:553
#11 0x555555d58bf6 in checkout_entry entry.h:42
#12 0x555555d58bf6 in check_updates unpack-trees.c:480
#13 0x555555d5eb55 in unpack_trees unpack-trees.c:2040
#14 0x555555785ab7 in checkout builtin/clone.c:724
#15 0x555555785ab7 in cmd_clone builtin/clone.c:1384
#16 0x55555572443c in run_builtin git.c:466
#17 0x55555572443c in handle_builtin git.c:721
#18 0x555555727872 in run_argv git.c:788
#19 0x555555727872 in cmd_main git.c:926
#20 0x555555721fa0 in main common-main.c:57
#21 0x7ffff73f1d09 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308
#22 0x555555723f39 in _start (git+0x1cff39)
0x602000002552 is located 0 bytes to the right of 2-byte region [0x602000002550,0x602000002552) allocated by thread T0 here:
#0 0x7ffff768c037 in __interceptor_calloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:154
#1 0x555555d7fff7 in xcalloc wrapper.c:150
#2 0x55555598815f in parse_attr_line attr.c:384
#3 0x55555598815f in handle_attr_line attr.c:660
#4 0x555555988902 in read_attr_from_index attr.c:784
#5 0x555555988902 in read_attr_from_index attr.c:747
#6 0x555555988a1d in read_attr attr.c:800
#7 0x555555989b0c in bootstrap_attr_stack attr.c:882
#8 0x555555989b0c in prepare_attr_stack attr.c:917
#9 0x555555989b0c in collect_some_attrs attr.c:1112
#10 0x55555598b141 in git_check_attr attr.c:1126
#11 0x555555a13004 in convert_attrs convert.c:1311
#12 0x555555a95e04 in checkout_entry_ca entry.c:553
#13 0x555555d58bf6 in checkout_entry entry.h:42
#14 0x555555d58bf6 in check_updates unpack-trees.c:480
#15 0x555555d5eb55 in unpack_trees unpack-trees.c:2040
#16 0x555555785ab7 in checkout builtin/clone.c:724
#17 0x555555785ab7 in cmd_clone builtin/clone.c:1384
#18 0x55555572443c in run_builtin git.c:466
#19 0x55555572443c in handle_builtin git.c:721
#20 0x555555727872 in run_argv git.c:788
#21 0x555555727872 in cmd_main git.c:926
#22 0x555555721fa0 in main common-main.c:57
#23 0x7ffff73f1d09 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow attr.c:393 in parse_attr_line
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
0x0c047fff8450: fa fa 00 02 fa fa 00 07 fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 00
0x0c047fff8460: fa fa 02 fa fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 06 fa fa 05 fa
0x0c047fff8470: fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 02 fa fa 06 fa fa fa 05 fa
0x0c047fff8480: fa fa 07 fa fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 01 fa fa 00 02
0x0c047fff8490: fa fa 00 03 fa fa 00 fa fa fa 00 01 fa fa 00 03
=>0x0c047fff84a0: fa fa 00 01 fa fa 00 02 fa fa[02]fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c047fff84b0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c047fff84c0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c047fff84d0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c047fff84e0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c047fff84f0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
Addressable: 00
Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Heap left redzone: fa
Freed heap region: fd
Stack left redzone: f1
Stack mid redzone: f2
Stack right redzone: f3
Stack after return: f5
Stack use after scope: f8
Global redzone: f9
Global init order: f6
Poisoned by user: f7
Container overflow: fc
Array cookie: ac
Intra object redzone: bb
ASan internal: fe
Left alloca redzone: ca
Right alloca redzone: cb
Shadow gap: cc
==15062==ABORTING
Fix this bug by using `size_t` instead to count the number of attributes
so that this value cannot reasonably overflow without running out of
memory before already.
Reported-by: Markus Vervier <markus.vervier@x41-dsec.de>
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
It is possible to trigger an integer overflow when parsing attribute
names that are longer than 2^31 bytes because we assign the result of
strlen(3P) to an `int` instead of to a `size_t`. This can lead to an
abort in vsnprintf(3P) with the following reproducer:
blob=$(perl -e 'print "A " . "B"x2147483648 . "\n"' | git hash-object -w --stdin)
git update-index --add --cacheinfo 100644,$blob,.gitattributes
git check-attr --all path
BUG: strbuf.c:400: your vsnprintf is broken (returned -1)
But furthermore, assuming that the attribute name is even longer than
that, it can cause us to silently truncate the attribute and thus lead
to wrong results.
Fix this integer overflow by using a `size_t` instead. This fixes the
silent truncation of attribute names, but it only partially fixes the
BUG we hit: even though the initial BUG is fixed, we can still hit a BUG
when parsing invalid attribute lines via `report_invalid_attr()`.
This is due to an underlying design issue in vsnprintf(3P) which only
knows to return an `int`, and thus it may always overflow with large
inputs. This issue is benign though: the worst that can happen is that
the error message is misreported to be either truncated or too long, but
due to the buffer being NUL terminated we wouldn't ever do an
out-of-bounds read here.
Reported-by: Markus Vervier <markus.vervier@x41-dsec.de>
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
There is an out-of-bounds read possible when parsing gitattributes that
have an attribute that is 2^31+1 bytes long. This is caused due to an
integer overflow when we assign the result of strlen(3P) to an `int`,
where we use the wrapped-around value in a subsequent call to
memcpy(3P). The following code reproduces the issue:
blob=$(perl -e 'print "a" x 2147483649 . " attr"' | git hash-object -w --stdin)
git update-index --add --cacheinfo 100644,$blob,.gitattributes
git check-attr --all file
AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL
=================================================================
==8451==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x7f93efa00800 (pc 0x7f94f1f8f082 bp 0x7ffddb59b3a0 sp 0x7ffddb59ab28 T0)
==8451==The signal is caused by a READ memory access.
#0 0x7f94f1f8f082 (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x176082)
#1 0x7f94f2047d9c in __interceptor_strspn /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:752
#2 0x560e190f7f26 in parse_attr_line attr.c:375
#3 0x560e190f9663 in handle_attr_line attr.c:660
#4 0x560e190f9ddd in read_attr_from_index attr.c:769
#5 0x560e190f9f14 in read_attr attr.c:797
#6 0x560e190fa24e in bootstrap_attr_stack attr.c:867
#7 0x560e190fa4a5 in prepare_attr_stack attr.c:902
#8 0x560e190fb5dc in collect_some_attrs attr.c:1097
#9 0x560e190fb93f in git_all_attrs attr.c:1128
#10 0x560e18e6136e in check_attr builtin/check-attr.c:67
#11 0x560e18e61c12 in cmd_check_attr builtin/check-attr.c:183
#12 0x560e18e15993 in run_builtin git.c:466
#13 0x560e18e16397 in handle_builtin git.c:721
#14 0x560e18e16b2b in run_argv git.c:788
#15 0x560e18e17991 in cmd_main git.c:926
#16 0x560e190ae2bd in main common-main.c:57
#17 0x7f94f1e3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f)
#18 0x7f94f1e3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349)
#19 0x560e18e110e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115
AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info.
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x176082)
==8451==ABORTING
Fix this bug by converting the variable to a `size_t` instead.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
The function `git_attr_internal()` is called to upsert attributes into
the global map. And while all callers pass a `size_t`, the function
itself accepts an `int` as the attribute name's length. This can lead to
an integer overflow in case the attribute name is longer than `INT_MAX`.
Now this overflow seems harmless as the first thing we do is to call
`attr_name_valid()`, and that function only succeeds in case all chars
in the range of `namelen` match a certain small set of chars. We thus
can't do an out-of-bounds read as NUL is not part of that set and all
strings passed to this function are NUL-terminated. And furthermore, we
wouldn't ever read past the current attribute name anyway due to the
same reason. And if validation fails we will return early.
On the other hand it feels fragile to rely on this behaviour, even more
so given that we pass `namelen` to `FLEX_ALLOC_MEM()`. So let's instead
just do the correct thing here and accept a `size_t` as line length.
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Python is missing from the default ubuntu-22.04 runner image, which
prevents git-p4 from working. To install python on ubuntu, we need
to provide the correct package names:
* On Ubuntu 18.04 (bionic), "/usr/bin/python2" is provided by the
"python" package, and "/usr/bin/python3" is provided by the "python3"
package.
* On Ubuntu 20.04 (focal) and above, "/usr/bin/python2" is provided by
the "python2" package which has a different name from bionic, and
"/usr/bin/python3" is provided by "python3".
Since the "ubuntu-latest" runner image has a higher version, its
safe to use "python2" or "python3" package name.
Helped-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiang Xin <zhiyou.jx@alibaba-inc.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
There would be a segmentation fault when running p4 v16.2 on ubuntu
22.04 which is the latest version of ubuntu runner image for github
actions.
By checking each version from [1], p4d version 21.1 and above can work
properly on ubuntu 22.04. But version 22.x will break some p4 test
cases. So p4 version 21.x is exactly the version we can use.
With this update, the versions of p4 for Linux and macOS happen to be
the same. So we can add the version number directly into the "P4WHENCE"
variable, and reuse it in p4 installation for macOS.
By removing the "LINUX_P4_VERSION" variable from "ci/lib.sh", the
comment left above has nothing to do with p4, but still applies to
git-lfs. Since we have a fixed version of git-lfs installed on Linux,
we may have a different version on macOS.
[1]: https://cdist2.perforce.com/perforce/
Reviewed-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Helped-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiang Xin <zhiyou.jx@alibaba-inc.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
When installing p4 as a dependency, we used to pipe output of "p4 -V"
and "p4d -V" to validate the installation and output a condensed version
information. But this would hide potential errors of p4 and would stop
with an empty output. E.g.: p4d version 16.2 running on ubuntu 22.04
causes sigfaults, even before it produces any output.
By removing the pipe after "p4 -V" and "p4d -V", we may get a
verbose output, and stop immediately on errors because we have "set
-e" in "ci/lib.sh". Since we won't look at these trace logs unless
something fails, just including the raw output seems most sensible.
Reviewed-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Helped-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiang Xin <zhiyou.jx@alibaba-inc.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
GitHub starts to upgrade its runner image "ubuntu-latest" from version
"ubuntu-20.04" to version "ubuntu-22.04". It will fail to find and
install "gcc-8" package on the new runner image.
Change some of the runner images from "ubuntu-latest" to "ubuntu-20.04"
in order to install "gcc-8" as a dependency.
The first revision of this patch tried to replace "$runs_on_pool" in
"ci/*.sh" with a new "$runs_on_os" environment variable based on the
"os" field in the matrix strategy. But these "os" fields in matrix
strategies are obsolete legacies from commit [1] and commit [2], and
are no longer useful. So remove these unused "os" fields.
[1]: c08bb26010 (CI: rename the "Linux32" job to lower-case "linux32",
2021-11-23)
[2]: 25715419bf (CI: don't run "make test" twice in one job, 2021-11-23)
Reviewed-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Helped-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiang Xin <zhiyou.jx@alibaba-inc.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Work around older clang that warns against C99 zero initialization
syntax for struct.
* jh/struct-zero-init-with-older-clang:
config.mak.dev: disable suggest braces error on old clang versions
"git branch --edit-description" on an unborh branch misleadingly
said that no such branch exists, which has been corrected.
* rj/branch-edit-desc-unborn:
branch: description for non-existent branch errors
Clarify that "the sentence after <area>: prefix does not begin with
a capital letter" rule applies only to the commit title.
* jc/use-of-uc-in-log-messages:
SubmittingPatches: use usual capitalization in the log message body
The code to clean temporary object directories (used for
quarantine) tried to remove them inside its signal handler, which
was a no-no.
* jc/tmp-objdir:
tmp-objdir: skip clean up when handling a signal
Update comment in the Makefile about the RUNTIME_PREFIX config knob.
* dd/document-runtime-prefix-better:
Makefile: clarify runtime relative gitexecdir
"git multi-pack-index repack/expire" used to repack unreachable
cruft into a new pack, which have been corrected.
cf. <63a1c3d4-eff3-af10-4263-058c88e74594@github.com>
* tb/midx-repack-ignore-cruft-packs:
midx.c: avoid cruft packs with non-zero `repack --batch-size`
midx.c: remove unnecessary loop condition
midx.c: replace `xcalloc()` with `CALLOC_ARRAY()`
midx.c: avoid cruft packs with `repack --batch-size=0`
midx.c: prevent `expire` from removing the cruft pack
Documentation/git-multi-pack-index.txt: clarify expire behavior
Documentation/git-multi-pack-index.txt: fix typo
Documentation on various Boolean GIT_* environment variables have
been clarified.
* jc/environ-docs:
environ: GIT_INDEX_VERSION affects not just a new repository
environ: simplify description of GIT_INDEX_FILE
environ: GIT_FLUSH should be made a usual Boolean
environ: explain Boolean environment variables
environ: document GIT_SSL_NO_VERIFY
Cherry pick commit d3775de0 (Makefile: force -O0 when compiling with
SANITIZE=leak, 2022-10-18), as otherwise the leak checker at GitHub
Actions CI seems to fail with a false positive.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Code clean-up.
* jk/cleanup-callback-parameters:
attr: drop DEBUG_ATTR code
commit: avoid writing to global in option callback
multi-pack-index: avoid writing to global in option callback
test-submodule: inline resolve_relative_url() function
"GIT_EDITOR=: git branch --edit-description" resulted in failure,
which has been corrected.
* jc/branch-description-unset:
branch: do not fail a no-op --edit-desc
The codepath to sign learned to report errors when it fails to read
from "ssh-keygen".
* pw/ssh-sign-report-errors:
ssh signing: return an error when signature cannot be read
Fix a logic in "mailinfo -b" that miscomputed the length of a
substring, which lead to an out-of-bounds access.
* pw/mailinfo-b-fix:
mailinfo -b: fix an out of bounds access
Force C locale while running tests around httpd to make sure we can
find expected error messages in the log.
* rs/test-httpd-in-C-locale:
t/lib-httpd: pass LANG and LC_ALL to Apache
In read-only repositories, "git merge-tree" tried to come up with a
merge result tree object, which it failed (which is not wrong) and
led to a segfault (which is bad), which has been corrected.
* js/merge-ort-in-read-only-repo:
merge-ort: return early when failing to write a blob
merge-ort: fix segmentation fault in read-only repositories
"git rebase -i" can mistakenly attempt to apply a fixup to a commit
itself, which has been corrected.
* ja/rebase-i-avoid-amending-self:
sequencer: avoid dropping fixup commit that targets self via commit-ish
"git fsck" failed to release contents of tree objects already used
from the memory, which has been fixed.
* jk/fsck-on-diet:
parse_object_buffer(): respect save_commit_buffer
fsck: turn off save_commit_buffer
fsck: free tree buffers after walking unreachable objects
"git clone" did not like to see the "--bare" and the "--origin"
options used together without a good reason.
* jk/clone-allow-bare-and-o-together:
clone: allow "--bare" with "-o"
"git remote rename" failed to rename a remote without fetch
refspec, which has been corrected.
* jk/remote-rename-without-fetch-refspec:
remote: handle rename of remote without fetch refspec
The codepath that reads from the index v4 had unaligned memory
accesses, which has been corrected.
* vd/fix-unaligned-read-index-v4:
read-cache: avoid misaligned reads in index v4
Update CodingGuidelines to clarify what features to use and avoid
in C99.
* ab/coding-guidelines-c99:
CodingGuidelines: recommend against unportable C99 struct syntax
CodingGuidelines: mention C99 features we can't use
CodingGuidelines: allow declaring variables in for loops
CodingGuidelines: mention dynamic C99 initializer elements
CodingGuidelines: update for C99
Per 33665d98e6 (reftable: make assignments portable to AIX xlc
v12.01, 2022-03-28) forms like ".a.b = *c" can be replaced by using
".a = { .b = *c }" instead.
We'll probably allow these sooner than later, but since the workaround
is trivial let's note it among the C99 features we'd like to hold off
on for now.
Signed-off-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
94bc671a1f (Add directory pattern matching to attributes, 2012-12-08)
moved the code for adding the trailing slash to names of directories and
submodules up. This left both branches of the if statement starting
with the same conditional fprintf call. Deduplicate it.
Signed-off-by: René Scharfe <l.s.r@web.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
The C99 section of the CodingGuidelines is a good overview of what we
can use, but is sorely lacking in what we can't use. Something that
comes up occasionally is the portability of %z.
Per [1] we couldn't use it for the longest time due to MSVC not
supporting it, but nowadays by requiring C99 we rely on the MSVC
version that does, but we can't use it yet because a C library that
MinGW uses doesn't support it.
1. https://lore.kernel.org/git/a67e0fd8-4a14-16c9-9b57-3430440ef93c@gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Since 44ba10d671 (revision: use C99 declaration of variable in for()
loop, 2021-11-14) released with v2.35.0 we've had a variable declared
with in a for loop.
Since then we've had inadvertent follow-ups to that with at least
cb2607759e (merge-ort: store more specific conflict information,
2022-06-18) released with v2.38.0.
As November 2022 is within the window of this upcoming release,
let's update the guideline to allow this. We can have the promised
"revisit" discussion while this patch cooks, and drop it if it turns
out that it is still premature, which is not expected to happen at
this moment.
Signed-off-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
The first use of variables in initializer elements appears to have
been 2b6854c863 (Cleanup variables in cat-file, 2007-04-21) released
with v1.5.2.
Some of those caused portability issues, and e.g. that "cat-file" use
was changed in 66dbfd55e3 (Rewrite dynamic structure initializations
to runtime assignment, 2010-05-14) which went out with v1.7.2.
But curiously 66dbfd55e3 missed some of them, e.g. an archive.c use
added in d5f53d6d6f (archive: complain about path specs that don't
match anything, 2009-12-12), and another one in merge-index.c (later
builtin/merge-index.c) in 0077138cd9 (Simplify some instances of
run_command() by using run_command_v_opt()., 2009-06-08).
As far as I can tell there's been no point since 2b6854c863 in 2007
where a compiler that didn't support this has been able to compile
git. Presumably 66dbfd55e3 was an attempt to make headway with wider
portability that ultimately wasn't completed.
In any case, we are thoroughly reliant on this syntax at this point,
so let's update the guidelines, see
https://lore.kernel.org/git/xmqqy1tunjgp.fsf@gitster.g/ for the
initial discussion.
Signed-off-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Since 7bc341e21b (git-compat-util: add a test balloon for C99
support, 2021-12-01) we've had a hard dependency on C99, but the prose
in CodingGuidelines was written under the assumption that we were
using C89 with a few C99 features.
As the updated prose notes we'd still like to hold off on novel C99
features, but let's make it clear that we target that C version, and
then enumerate new C99 features that are safe to use.
Signed-off-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
rebase --preserve-merges no longer exists so there is no point in
carrying this failing test case.
Signed-off-by: Phillip Wood <phillip.wood@dunelm.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Add the "-Wno-missing-braces" option when building with an old version
of clang to suppress the "suggest braces around initialization" error
in developer mode.
For example, using an old version of clang gives the following errors
(when in DEVELOPER=1 mode):
$ make builtin/merge-file.o
CC builtin/merge-file.o
builtin/merge-file.c:29:23: error: suggest braces around initialization \
of subobject [-Werror,-Wmissing-braces]
mmfile_t mmfs[3] = { 0 };
^
{}
builtin/merge-file.c:31:20: error: suggest braces around initialization \
of subobject [-Werror,-Wmissing-braces]
xmparam_t xmp = { 0 };
^
{}
2 errors generated.
This example compiles without error/warning with updated versions of
clang. Since this is an obsolete error, use the -Wno-missing-braces
option to silence the warning when using an older compiler. This
avoids the need to update the code to use "{{0}}" style
initializations.
Upstream clang version 8 has the problem. It was fixed in version 9.
The version of clang distributed by Apple with XCode has its own
unique set of version numbers. Apple clang version 11 has the
problem. It was fixed in version 12.
Signed-off-by: Jeff Hostetler <jeffhost@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Call fspathncmp() instead of open-coding it. This shortens the code and
makes it less repetitive.
Signed-off-by: René Scharfe <l.s.r@web.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
When the repository does not yet have commits, some errors describe that
there is no branch:
$ git init -b first
$ git branch --edit-description first
error: No branch named 'first'.
$ git branch --set-upstream-to=upstream
fatal: branch 'first' does not exist
$ git branch -c second
error: refname refs/heads/first not found
fatal: Branch copy failed
That "first" branch is unborn but to say it doesn't exists is confusing.
Options "-c" (copy) and "-m" (rename) show the same error when the
origin branch doesn't exists:
$ git branch -c non-existent-branch second
error: refname refs/heads/non-existent-branch not found
fatal: Branch copy failed
$ git branch -m non-existent-branch second
error: refname refs/heads/non-existent-branch not found
fatal: Branch rename failed
Note that "--edit-description" without an explicit argument is already
considering the _empty repository_ circumstance in its error. Also note
that "-m" on the initial branch it is an allowed operation.
Make the error descriptions for those branch operations with unborn or
non-existent branches, more informative.
This is the result of the change:
$ git init -b first
$ git branch --edit-description first
error: No commit on branch 'first' yet.
$ git branch --set-upstream-to=upstream
fatal: No commit on branch 'first' yet.
$ git branch -c second
fatal: No commit on branch 'first' yet.
$ git branch [-c/-m] non-existent-branch second
fatal: No branch named 'non-existent-branch'.
Signed-off-by: Rubén Justo <rjusto@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Update the description of the summary section to clarify that the
"do not capitalize" rule applies only the word after the "<area>:"
prefix of the title and nowhere else. This hopefully will prevent
folks from writing their proposed log message in all lowercase.
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Two documentation issues exist in the technical docs for the bundle URI
feature.
First, there is an extraneous "the" across a linebreak, making the
nonsensical phrase "the bundle the list" which should just be "the
bundle list".
Secondly, the asciidoc update treats the string "`have`s" as starting a
"<code>" block, but the second tick is interpreted as an apostrophe
instead of a closing "</code>" tag. This causes entire sentences to be
formatted as code until the next one comes along. Simply adding a space
here does not work properly as the rendered HTML keeps that space.
Instead, restructure the sentence slightly to avoid using a plural,
allowing the HTML to render correctly.
Reported-by: Philip Oakley <philipoakley@iee.email>
Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <derrickstolee@github.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
The strvec "argv" is used to build a command for run_command_v_opt(),
but never freed. Use a constant string array instead, which doesn't
require any cleanup.
Suggested-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: René Scharfe <l.s.r@web.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Explicitly cloning over the "file://" protocol in t7527 in preparation
for merging a security release which will change the default value of
this configuration to be "user".
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
Since its inception in d0bfd026a8 (Add basic infrastructure to assign
attributes to paths, 2007-04-12), the attribute code carries a little
bit of debug code that is conditionally compiled only when DEBUG_ATTR is
set. But since you have to know about it and make a special build of Git
to use it, it's not clear that it's helping anyone (and there are very
few mentions of it on the list over the years).
Meanwhile, it causes slight headaches. Since it's not built as part of a
regular compile, it's subject to bitrot. E.g., this was dealt with in
712efb1a42 (attr: make it build with DEBUG_ATTR again, 2013-01-15), and
it currently fails to build with DEVELOPER=1 since e810e06357 (attr:
tighten const correctness with git_attr and match_attr, 2017-01-27).
And it causes confusion with -Wunused-parameter; the "what" parameter of
fill_one() is unused in a normal build, but needed in a debug build.
Let's just get rid of this code (and the now-useless parameter).
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
The callback function for --trailer writes directly to the global
trailer_args and ignores opt->value completely. This is OK, since that's
where we expect to find the value. But it does mean the option
declaration isn't as clear. E.g., we have:
OPT_BOOL(0, "reset-author", &renew_authorship, ...),
OPT_CALLBACK_F(0, "trailer", NULL, ..., opt_pass_trailer)
In the first one we can see where the result will be stored, but in the
second, we get only NULL, and you have to go read the callback.
Let's pass &trailer_args, and use it in the callback. As a bonus, this
silences a -Wunused-parameter warning.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
We declare the --object-dir option like:
OPT_CALLBACK(0, "object-dir", &opts.object_dir, ...);
but the pointer to opts.object_dir is completely unused. Instead, the
callback writes directly to a global. Which fortunately happens to be
opts.object_dir. So everything works as expected, but it's unnecessarily
confusing.
Instead, let's have the callback write to the option value pointer that
has been passed in. This also quiets a -Wunused-parameter warning (since
we don't otherwise look at "opt").
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
The resolve_relative_url() function takes argc and argv parameters; it
then reads up to 3 elements of argv without looking at argc at all. At
first glance, this seems like a bug. But it has only one caller,
cmd__submodule_resolve_relative_url(), which does confirm that argc is
3.
The main reason this is a separate function is that it was moved from
library code in 96a28a9bc6 (submodule--helper: move
"resolve-relative-url-test" to a test-tool, 2022-09-01).
We can make this code simpler and more obviously safe by just inlining
the function in its caller. As a bonus, this silences a
-Wunused-parameter warning.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
t5411 starts a web server with no explicit language setting, so it uses
the system default. Ten of its tests expect it to return error messages
containing the prefix "fatal: ", emitted by die(). This prefix can be
localized since a1fd2cf8cd (i18n: mark message helpers prefix for
translation, 2022-06-21), however. As a result these ten tests break
for me on a system with LANG="de_DE.UTF-8" because the web server sends
localized messages with "Schwerwiegend: " instead of "fatal: ".
Fix these tests by passing LANG and LC_ALL to the web server, which are
set to "C" by t/test-lib.sh, to get untranslated messages on both sides.
Helped-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Signed-off-by: René Scharfe <l.s.r@web.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
https://gcc.gnu.org/gcc-4.5/changes.html says
The deprecated attribute now takes an optional string argument, for
example, __attribute__((deprecated("text string"))), that will be
printed together with the deprecation warning.
While GCC 4.5 is already 12 years old, git checks for even older
versions in places. Let's not needlessly break older compilers when
a small and simple fix is readily available.
Signed-off-by: Alejandro R. Sedeño <asedeno@mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Alejandro R Sedeño <asedeno@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
"git" built with RUNTIME_PREFIX flag turned on could figure out
gitexecdir and other paths as relative to "git" executable.
However, in the section specifies gitexecdir, RUNTIME_PREFIX wasn't
mentioned, thus users may wrongly assume that "git" always locates
gitexecdir as relative path to the executable.
Let's clarify that only "git" built with RUNTIME_PREFIX will locate
gitexecdir as relative path.
Signed-off-by: Đoàn Trần Công Danh <congdanhqx@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Explicitly cloning over the "file://" protocol in t5537 in preparation
for merging a security release which will change the default value of
this configuration to be "user".
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
Explicitly cloning over the "file://" protocol in t3206 in preparation
for merging a security release which will change the default value of
this configuration to be "user".
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
Pass a constant string array directly to run_command_v_opt() instead of
copying it into a strvec first. This shortens the code and avoids heap
allocations.
Signed-off-by: René Scharfe <l.s.r@web.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
If the signature file cannot be read we print an error message but do
not return an error to the caller. In practice it seems unlikely that
the file would be unreadable if the call to ssh-keygen succeeds.
The unlink_or_warn() call is moved to the end of the function so that
we always try and remove the signature file. This isn't strictly
necessary at the moment but it protects us against any extra code
being added between trying to read the signature file and the cleanup
at the end of the function in the future. unlink_or_warn() only prints
a warning if it exists and cannot be removed.
Signed-off-by: Phillip Wood <phillip.wood@dunelm.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
As we parse the author-script file, we check for missing or duplicate
lines for GIT_AUTHOR_NAME, etc. But after reading the whole file, our
final error conditional checks "date_i" twice and "name_i" not at all.
This not only leads to us failing to abort, but we may do an
out-of-bounds read on the string_list array.
The bug goes back to 442c36bd08 (am: improve author-script error
reporting, 2018-10-31), though the code was soon after moved to this
spot by bcd33ec25f (add read_author_script() to libgit, 2018-10-31).
It was presumably just a typo in 442c36bd08.
We'll add test coverage for all the error cases here, though only the
GIT_AUTHOR_NAME ones fail (even in a vanilla build they segfault
consistently, but certainly with SANITIZE=address).
Reported-by: Michael V. Scovetta <michael.scovetta@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
To remove bracketed strings containing "PATCH" from the subject line
cleanup_subject() scans the subject for the opening bracket using an
offset from the beginning of the line. It then searches for the
closing bracket with strchr(). To calculate the length of the
bracketed string it unfortunately adds rather than subtracts the
offset from the result of strchr(). This leads to an out of bounds
access in memmem() when looking to see if the brackets contain
"PATCH".
We have tests that trigger this bug that were added in ae52d57f0b
(t5100: add some more mailinfo tests, 2017-05-31). The commit message
mentions that they are marked test_expect_failure as they trigger an
assertion in strbuf_splice(). While it is reassuring that
strbuf_splice() detects the problem and dies in retrospect that should
perhaps have warranted a little more investigation. The bug was
introduced by 17635fc900 (mailinfo: -b option keeps [bracketed]
strings that is not a [PATCH] marker, 2009-07-15). I think the reason
it has survived so long is that '-b' is not a popular option and
without it the offset is always zero.
This was found by the address sanitizer while I was cleaning up the
test_todo idea in [1].
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/git/db558292-2783-3270-4824-43757822a389@gmail.com/
Signed-off-by: Phillip Wood <phillip.wood@dunelm.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Explicitly cloning over the "file://" protocol in t7814 in preparation
for merging a security release which will change the default value of
this configuration to be "user".
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
Explicitly cloning over the "file://" protocol in t5537 in preparation
for merging a security release which will change the default value of
this configuration to be "user".
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
Explicitly cloning over the "file://" protocol in t5516 in preparation
for merging a security release which will change the default value of
this configuration to be "user".
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
Explicitly cloning over the "file://" protocol in t3207 in preparation
for merging a security release which will change the default value of
this configuration to be "user".
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
Explicitly cloning over the "file://" protocol in t1092 in preparation
for merging a security release which will change the default value of
this configuration to be "user".
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
Explicitly cloning over the "file://" protocol in t1092 in preparation
for merging a security release which will change the default value of
this configuration to be "user".
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
Explicitly cloning over the "file://" protocol in t1092 in preparation
for merging a security release which will change the default value of
this configuration to be "user".
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
Explicitly cloning over the "file://" protocol in t1092 in preparation
for merging a security release which will change the default value of
this configuration to be "user".
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
In the tmp-objdir api, tmp_objdir_create will create a temporary
directory but also register signal handlers responsible for removing
the directory's contents and the directory itself. However, the
function responsible for recursively removing the contents and
directory, remove_dir_recurse() calls opendir(3) and closedir(3).
This can be problematic because these functions allocate and free
memory, which are not async-signal-safe functions. This can lead to
deadlocks.
One place we call tmp_objdir_create() is in git-receive-pack, where
we create a temporary quarantine directory "incoming". Incoming
objects will be written to this directory before they get moved to
the object directory.
We have observed this code leading to a deadlock:
Thread 1 (Thread 0x7f621ba0b200 (LWP 326305)):
#0 __lll_lock_wait_private (futex=futex@entry=0x7f621bbf8b80
<main_arena>) at ./lowlevellock.c:35
#1 0x00007f621baa635b in __GI___libc_malloc
(bytes=bytes@entry=32816) at malloc.c:3064
#2 0x00007f621bae9f49 in __alloc_dir (statp=0x7fff2ea7ed60,
flags=0, close_fd=true, fd=5)
at ../sysdeps/posix/opendir.c:118
#3 opendir_tail (fd=5) at ../sysdeps/posix/opendir.c:69
#4 __opendir (name=<optimized out>)
at ../sysdeps/posix/opendir.c:92
#5 0x0000557c19c77de1 in remove_dir_recurse ()
git#6 0x0000557c19d81a4f in remove_tmp_objdir_on_signal ()
#7 <signal handler called>
git#8 _int_malloc (av=av@entry=0x7f621bbf8b80 <main_arena>,
bytes=bytes@entry=7160) at malloc.c:4116
git#9 0x00007f621baa62c9 in __GI___libc_malloc (bytes=7160)
at malloc.c:3066
git#10 0x00007f621bd1e987 in inflateInit2_ ()
from /opt/gitlab/embedded/lib/libz.so.1
git#11 0x0000557c19dbe5f4 in git_inflate_init ()
git#12 0x0000557c19cee02a in unpack_compressed_entry ()
git#13 0x0000557c19cf08cb in unpack_entry ()
git#14 0x0000557c19cf0f32 in packed_object_info ()
git#15 0x0000557c19cd68cd in do_oid_object_info_extended ()
git#16 0x0000557c19cd6e2b in read_object_file_extended ()
git#17 0x0000557c19cdec2f in parse_object ()
git#18 0x0000557c19c34977 in lookup_commit_reference_gently ()
git#19 0x0000557c19d69309 in mark_uninteresting ()
git#20 0x0000557c19d2d180 in do_for_each_repo_ref_iterator ()
git#21 0x0000557c19d21678 in for_each_ref ()
git#22 0x0000557c19d6a94f in assign_shallow_commits_to_refs ()
git#23 0x0000557c19bc02b2 in cmd_receive_pack ()
git#24 0x0000557c19b29fdd in handle_builtin ()
git#25 0x0000557c19b2a526 in cmd_main ()
git#26 0x0000557c19b28ea2 in main ()
Since we can't do the cleanup in a portable and signal-safe way, skip
the cleanup when we're handling a signal.
This means that when signal handling, the temporary directory may not
get cleaned up properly. This is mitigated by b3cecf49ea (tmp-objdir: new
API for creating temporary writable databases, 2021-12-06) which changed
the default name and allows gc to clean up these temporary directories.
In the event of a normal exit, we should still be cleaning up via the
atexit() handler.
Helped-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: John Cai <johncai86@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
This function improperly uses an int to represent the number of entries
in the resulting argument array. This allows a malicious actor to
intentionally overflow the return value, leading to arbitrary heap
writes.
Because the resulting argv array is typically passed to execv(), it may
be possible to leverage this attack to gain remote code execution on a
victim machine. This was almost certainly the case for certain
configurations of git-shell until the previous commit limited the size
of input it would accept. Other calls to split_cmdline() are typically
limited by the size of argv the OS is willing to hand us, so are
similarly protected.
So this is not strictly fixing a known vulnerability, but is a hardening
of the function that is worth doing to protect against possible unknown
vulnerabilities.
One approach to fixing this would be modifying the signature of
`split_cmdline()` to look something like:
int split_cmdline(char *cmdline, const char ***argv, size_t *argc);
Where the return value of `split_cmdline()` is negative for errors, and
zero otherwise. If non-NULL, the `*argc` pointer is modified to contain
the size of the `**argv` array.
But this implies an absurdly large `argv` array, which more than likely
larger than the system's argument limit. So even if split_cmdline()
allowed this, it would fail immediately afterwards when we called
execv(). So instead of converting all of `split_cmdline()`'s callers to
work with `size_t` types in this patch, instead pursue the minimal fix
here to prevent ever returning an array with more than INT_MAX entries
in it.
Signed-off-by: Kevin Backhouse <kevinbackhouse@github.com>
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
When git-shell is run in interactive mode (which must be enabled by
creating $HOME/git-shell-commands), it reads commands from stdin, one
per line, and executes them.
We read the commands with git_read_line_interactively(), which uses a
strbuf under the hood. That means we'll accept an input of arbitrary
size (limited only by how much heap we can allocate). That creates two
problems:
- the rest of the code is not prepared to handle large inputs. The
most serious issue here is that split_cmdline() uses "int" for most
of its types, which can lead to integer overflow and out-of-bounds
array reads and writes. But even with that fixed, we assume that we
can feed the command name to snprintf() (via xstrfmt()), which is
stuck for historical reasons using "int", and causes it to fail (and
even trigger a BUG() call).
- since the point of git-shell is to take input from untrusted or
semi-trusted clients, it's a mild denial-of-service. We'll allocate
as many bytes as the client sends us (actually twice as many, since
we immediately duplicate the buffer).
We can fix both by just limiting the amount of per-command input we're
willing to receive.
We should also fix split_cmdline(), of course, which is an accident
waiting to happen, but that can come on top. Most calls to
split_cmdline(), including the other one in git-shell, are OK because
they are reading from an OS-provided argv, which is limited in practice.
This patch should eliminate the immediate vulnerabilities.
I picked 4MB as an arbitrary limit. It's big enough that nobody should
ever run into it in practice (since the point is to run the commands via
exec, we're subject to OS limits which are typically much lower). But
it's small enough that allocating it isn't that big a deal.
The code is mostly just swapping out fgets() for the strbuf call, but we
have to add a few niceties like flushing and trimming line endings. We
could simplify things further by putting the buffer on the stack, but
4MB is probably a bit much there. Note that we'll _always_ allocate 4MB,
which for normal, non-malicious requests is more than we would before
this patch. But on the other hand, other git programs are happy to use
96MB for a delta cache. And since we'd never touch most of those pages,
on a lazy-allocating OS like Linux they won't even get allocated to
actual RAM.
The ideal would be a version of strbuf_getline() that accepted a maximum
value. But for a minimal vulnerability fix, let's keep things localized
and simple. We can always refactor further on top.
The included test fails in an obvious way with ASan or UBSan (which
notice the integer overflow and out-of-bounds reads). Without them, it
fails in a less obvious way: we may segfault, or we may try to xstrfmt()
a long string, leading to a BUG(). Either way, it fails reliably before
this patch, and passes with it. Note that we don't need an EXPENSIVE
prereq on it. It does take 10-15s to fail before this patch, but with
the new limit, we fail almost immediately (and the perl process
generating 2GB of data exits via SIGPIPE).
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
We have no tests of even basic functionality of git-shell. Let's add a
couple of obvious ones. This will serve as a framework for adding tests
for new things we fix, as well as making sure we don't screw anything up
too badly while doing so.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
An earlier patch discussed and fixed a scenario where Git could be used
as a vector to exfiltrate sensitive data through a Docker container when
a potential victim clones a suspicious repository with local submodules
that contain symlinks.
That security hole has since been plugged, but a similar one still
exists. Instead of convincing a would-be victim to clone an embedded
submodule via the "file" protocol, an attacker could convince an
individual to clone a repository that has a submodule pointing to a
valid path on the victim's filesystem.
For example, if an individual (with username "foo") has their home
directory ("/home/foo") stored as a Git repository, then an attacker
could exfiltrate data by convincing a victim to clone a malicious
repository containing a submodule pointing at "/home/foo/.git" with
`--recurse-submodules`. Doing so would expose any sensitive contents in
stored in "/home/foo" tracked in Git.
For systems (such as Docker) that consider everything outside of the
immediate top-level working directory containing a Dockerfile as
inaccessible to the container (with the exception of volume mounts, and
so on), this is a violation of trust by exposing unexpected contents in
the working copy.
To mitigate the likelihood of this kind of attack, adjust the "file://"
protocol's default policy to be "user" to prevent commands that execute
without user input (including recursive submodule initialization) from
taking place by default.
Suggested-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
To prepare for the default value of `protocol.file.allow` to change to
"user", ensure tests that rely on local submodules can initialize them
over the file protocol.
Tests that interact with submodules a handful of times use
`test_config_global`.
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
To prepare for the default value of `protocol.file.allow` to change to
"user", ensure tests that rely on local submodules can initialize them
over the file protocol.
Tests that only need to interact with submodules in a limited capacity
have individual Git commands annotated with the appropriate
configuration via `-c`. Tests that interact with submodules a handful of
times use `test_config_global` instead. Test scripts that rely on
submodules throughout use a `git config --global` during a setup test
towards the beginning of the script.
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
To prepare for the default value of `protocol.file.allow` to change to
"user", ensure tests that rely on local submodules can initialize them
over the file protocol.
Tests that only need to interact with submodules in a limited capacity
have individual Git commands annotated with the appropriate
configuration via `-c`.
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
To prepare for the default value of `protocol.file.allow` to change to
"user", ensure tests that rely on local submodules can initialize them
over the file protocol.
Tests that only need to interact with submodules in a limited capacity
have individual Git commands annotated with the appropriate
configuration via `-c`. Tests that interact with submodules a handful of
times use `test_config_global` instead. Test scripts that rely on
submodules throughout use a `git config --global` during a setup test
towards the beginning of the script.
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
To prepare for the default value of `protocol.file.allow` to change to
"user", ensure tests that rely on local submodules can initialize them
over the file protocol.
Tests that only need to interact with submodules in a limited capacity
have individual Git commands annotated with the appropriate
configuration via `-c`. Tests that interact with submodules a handful of
times use `test_config_global` instead. Test scripts that rely on
submodules throughout use a `git config --global` during a setup test
towards the beginning of the script.
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
To prepare for the default value of `protocol.file.allow` to change to
"user", ensure tests that rely on local submodules can initialize them
over the file protocol.
Tests that only need to interact with submodules in a limited capacity
have individual Git commands annotated with the appropriate
configuration via `-c`. Tests that interact with submodules a handful of
times use `test_config_global` instead. Test scripts that rely on
submodules throughout use a `git config --global` during a setup test
towards the beginning of the script.
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
To prepare for the default value of `protocol.file.allow` to change to
"user", ensure tests that rely on local submodules can initialize them
over the file protocol.
Tests that only need to interact with submodules in a limited capacity
have individual Git commands annotated with the appropriate
configuration via `-c`. Tests that interact with submodules a handful of
times use `test_config_global` instead. Test scripts that rely on
submodules throughout use a `git config --global` during a setup test
towards the beginning of the script.
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
To prepare for the default value of `protocol.file.allow` to change to
"user", ensure tests that rely on local submodules can initialize them
over the file protocol.
Tests that only need to interact with submodules in a limited capacity
have individual Git commands annotated with the appropriate
configuration via `-c`. Tests that interact with submodules a handful of
times use `test_config_global` instead.
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
To prepare for changing the default value of `protocol.file.allow` to
"user", update the `prolog()` function in lib-submodule-update to allow
submodules to be cloned over the file protocol.
This is used by a handful of submodule-related test scripts, which
themselves will have to tweak the value of `protocol.file.allow` in
certain locations. Those will be done in subsequent commits.
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
When cloning a repository with `--local`, Git relies on either making a
hardlink or copy to every file in the "objects" directory of the source
repository. This is done through the callpath `cmd_clone()` ->
`clone_local()` -> `copy_or_link_directory()`.
The way this optimization works is by enumerating every file and
directory recursively in the source repository's `$GIT_DIR/objects`
directory, and then either making a copy or hardlink of each file. The
only exception to this rule is when copying the "alternates" file, in
which case paths are rewritten to be absolute before writing a new
"alternates" file in the destination repo.
One quirk of this implementation is that it dereferences symlinks when
cloning. This behavior was most recently modified in 36596fd2df (clone:
better handle symlinked files at .git/objects/, 2019-07-10), which
attempted to support `--local` clones of repositories with symlinks in
their objects directory in a platform-independent way.
Unfortunately, this behavior of dereferencing symlinks (that is,
creating a hardlink or copy of the source's link target in the
destination repository) can be used as a component in attacking a
victim by inadvertently exposing the contents of file stored outside of
the repository.
Take, for example, a repository that stores a Dockerfile and is used to
build Docker images. When building an image, Docker copies the directory
contents into the VM, and then instructs the VM to execute the
Dockerfile at the root of the copied directory. This protects against
directory traversal attacks by copying symbolic links as-is without
dereferencing them.
That is, if a user has a symlink pointing at their private key material
(where the symlink is present in the same directory as the Dockerfile,
but the key itself is present outside of that directory), the key is
unreadable to a Docker image, since the link will appear broken from the
container's point of view.
This behavior enables an attack whereby a victim is convinced to clone a
repository containing an embedded submodule (with a URL like
"file:///proc/self/cwd/path/to/submodule") which has a symlink pointing
at a path containing sensitive information on the victim's machine. If a
user is tricked into doing this, the contents at the destination of
those symbolic links are exposed to the Docker image at runtime.
One approach to preventing this behavior is to recreate symlinks in the
destination repository. But this is problematic, since symlinking the
objects directory are not well-supported. (One potential problem is that
when sharing, e.g. a "pack" directory via symlinks, different writers
performing garbage collection may consider different sets of objects to
be reachable, enabling a situation whereby garbage collecting one
repository may remove reachable objects in another repository).
Instead, prohibit the local clone optimization when any symlinks are
present in the `$GIT_DIR/objects` directory of the source repository.
Users may clone the repository again by prepending the "file://" scheme
to their clone URL, or by adding the `--no-local` option to their `git
clone` invocation.
The directory iterator used by `copy_or_link_directory()` must no longer
dereference symlinks (i.e., it *must* call `lstat()` instead of `stat()`
in order to discover whether or not there are symlinks present). This has
no bearing on the overall behavior, since we will immediately `die()` on
encounter a symlink.
Note that t5604.33 suggests that we do support local clones with
symbolic links in the source repository's objects directory, but this
was likely unintentional, or at least did not take into consideration
the problem with sharing parts of the objects directory with symbolic
links at the time. Update this test to reflect which options are and
aren't supported.
Helped-by: Johannes Schindelin <Johannes.Schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
Imagine running "git branch --edit-description" while on a branch
without the branch description, and then exit the editor after
emptying the edit buffer, which is the way to tell the command that
you changed your mind and you do not want the description after all.
The command should just happily oblige, adding no branch description
for the current branch, and exit successfully. But it fails to do
so:
$ git init -b main
$ git commit --allow-empty -m commit
$ GIT_EDITOR=: git branch --edit-description
fatal: could not unset 'branch.main.description'
The end result is OK in that the configuration variable does not
exist in the resulting repository, but we should do better. If we
know we didn't have a description, and if we are asked not to have a
description by the editor, we can just return doing nothing.
This of course introduces TOCTOU. If you add a branch description
to the same branch from another window, while you had the editor
open to edit the description, and then exit the editor without
writing anything there, we'd end up not removing the description you
added in the other window. But you are fooling yourself in your own
repository at that point, and if it hurts, you'd be better off not
doing so ;-).
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Since 131b94a10a (test-lib.sh: Use GLIBC_TUNABLES instead of
MALLOC_CHECK_ on glibc >= 2.34, 2022-03-04) compiling with
SANITIZE=leak has missed reporting some leaks. The old MALLOC_CHECK
method used before glibc 2.34 seems to have been (mostly?) compatible
with it, but after 131b94a10a e.g. running:
TEST_NO_MALLOC_CHECK=1 make SANITIZE=leak test T=t6437-submodule-merge.sh
Would report a leak in builtin/commit.c, but this would not:
TEST_NO_MALLOC_CHECK= make SANITIZE=leak test T=t6437-submodule-merge.sh
Since the interaction is clearly breaking the SANITIZE=leak mode,
let's mark them as explicitly incompatible.
A related regression for SANITIZE=address was fixed in
067109a5e7 (tests: make SANITIZE=address imply TEST_NO_MALLOC_CHECK,
2022-04-09).
Signed-off-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Phillip Wood <phillip.wood@dunelm.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
The process for reading the index into memory from disk is to first read its
contents into a single memory-mapped file buffer (type 'char *'), then
sequentially convert each on-disk index entry into a corresponding incore
'cache_entry'. To access the contents of the on-disk entry for processing, a
moving pointer within the memory-mapped file is cast to type 'struct
ondisk_cache_entry *'.
In index v4, the entries in the on-disk index file are written *without*
aligning their first byte to a 4-byte boundary; entries are a variable
length (depending on the entry name and whether or not extended flags are
used). As a result, casting the 'char *' buffer pointer to 'struct
ondisk_cache_entry *' then accessing its contents in a 'SANITIZE=undefined'
build can trigger the following error:
read-cache.c:1886:46: runtime error: member access within misaligned
address <address> for type 'struct ondisk_cache_entry', which requires 4
byte alignment
Avoid this error by reading fields directly from the 'char *' buffer, using
the 'offsetof' individual fields in 'struct ondisk_cache_entry'.
Additionally, add documentation describing why the new approach avoids the
misaligned address error, as well as advice on how to improve the
implementation in the future.
Reported-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Victoria Dye <vdye@github.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
In the previous commit, we fixed a segmentation fault when a tree object
could not be written.
However, before the tree object is written, `merge-ort` wants to write
out a blob object (except in cases where the merge results in a blob
that already exists in the database). And this can fail, too, but we
ignore that write failure so far.
Let's pay close attention and error out early if the blob could not be
written. This reduces the error output of t4301.25 ("merge-ort fails
gracefully in a read-only repository") from:
error: insufficient permission for adding an object to repository database ./objects
error: error: Unable to add numbers to database
error: insufficient permission for adding an object to repository database ./objects
error: error: Unable to add greeting to database
error: insufficient permission for adding an object to repository database ./objects
fatal: failure to merge
to:
error: insufficient permission for adding an object to repository database ./objects
error: error: Unable to add numbers to database
fatal: failure to merge
This is _not_ just a cosmetic change: Even though one might assume that
the operation would have failed anyway at the point when the new tree
object is written (and the corresponding tree object _will_ be new if it
contains a blob that is new), but that is not so: As pointed out by
Elijah Newren, when Git has previously been allowed to add loose objects
via `sudo` calls, it is very possible that the blob object cannot be
written (because the corresponding `.git/objects/??/` directory may be
owned by `root`) but the tree object can be written (because the
corresponding objects directory is owned by the current user). This
would result in a corrupt repository because it is missing the blob
object, and with this here patch we prevent that.
Note: This patch adjusts two variable declarations from `unsigned` to
`int` because their purpose is to hold the return value of
`handle_content_merge()`, which is of type `int`. The existing users of
those variables are only interested whether that variable is zero or
non-zero, therefore this type change does not affect the existing code.
Reviewed-by: Elijah Newren <newren@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
If the blob/tree objects cannot be written, we really need the merge
operations to fail, and not to continue (and then try to access the tree
object which is however still set to `NULL`).
Let's stop ignoring the return value of `write_object_file()` and
`write_tree()` and set `clean = -1` in the error case.
Reviewed-by: Elijah Newren <newren@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Schindelin <johannes.schindelin@gmx.de>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
In 2708ce62d2 (branch: sort detached HEAD based on a flag, 2021-01-07) a
call to wt_status_state_free_buffers, responsible of freeing the
resources that could be allocated in the local struct wt_status_state
state, was eliminated.
The call to wt_status_state_free_buffers was introduced in 962dd7ebc3
(wt-status: introduce wt_status_state_free_buffers(), 2020-09-27). This
commit brings back that call in get_head_description.
Signed-off-by: Rubén Justo <rjusto@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Martin Ågren <martin.agren@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Commit 68d5d03bc4 (rebase: teach --autosquash to match on sha1 in
addition to message, 2010-11-04) taught autosquash to recognize
subjects like "fixup! 7a235b" where 7a235b is an OID-prefix. It
actually did more than advertised: 7a235b can be an arbitrary
commit-ish (as long as it's not trailed by spaces).
Accidental(?) use of this secret feature revealed a bug where we
would silently drop a fixup commit. The bug can also be triggered
when using an OID-prefix but that's unlikely in practice.
Let the commit with subject "fixup! main" be the tip of the "main"
branch. When computing the fixup target for this commit, we find
the commit itself. This is wrong because, by definition, a fixup
target must be an earlier commit in the todo list. We wrongly find
the current commit because we added it to the todo list prematurely.
Avoid these fixup-cycles by only adding the current commit to the
todo list after we have finished looking for the fixup target.
Reported-by: Erik Cervin Edin <erik@cervined.in>
Signed-off-by: Johannes Altmanninger <aclopte@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
We return an error when trying to rename a remote that has no fetch
refspec:
$ git config --unset-all remote.origin.fetch
$ git remote rename origin foo
fatal: could not unset 'remote.foo.fetch'
To make things even more confusing, we actually _do_ complete the config
modification, via git_config_rename_section(). After that we try to
rewrite the fetch refspec (to say refs/remotes/foo instead of origin).
But our call to git_config_set_multivar() to remove the existing entries
fails, since there aren't any, and it calls die().
We could fix this by using the "gently" form of the config call, and
checking the error code. But there is an even simpler fix: if we know
that there are no refspecs to rewrite, then we can skip that part
entirely.
Reported-by: John A. Leuenhagen <john@zlima12.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
We explicitly forbid the combination of "--bare" with "-o", but there
doesn't seem to be any good reason to do so. The original logic came as
part of e6489a1bdf (clone: do not accept more than one -o option.,
2006-01-22), but that commit does not give any reason.
Furthermore, the equivalent combination via config is allowed:
git -c clone.defaultRemoteName=foo clone ...
and works as expected. It may be that this combination was considered
useless, because a bare clone does not set remote.origin.fetch (and
hence there is no refs/remotes/origin hierarchy). But it does set
remote.origin.url, and that name is visible to the user via "git fetch
origin", etc.
Let's allow the options to be used together, and switch the "forbid"
test in t5606 to check that we use the requested name. That test came
much later in 349cff76de (clone: add tests for --template and some
disallowed option pairs, 2020-09-29), and does not offer any logic
beyond "let's test what the code currently does".
Reported-by: John A. Leuenhagen <john@zlima12.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
If the global variable "save_commit_buffer" is set to 0, then
parse_commit() will throw away the commit object data after parsing it,
rather than sticking it into a commit slab. This goes all the way back
to 60ab26de99 ([PATCH] Avoid wasting memory in git-rev-list,
2005-09-15).
But there's another code path which may similarly stash the buffer:
parse_object_buffer(). This is where we end up if we parse a commit via
parse_object(), and it's used directly in a few other code paths like
git-fsck.
The original goal of 60ab26de99 was avoiding extra memory usage for
rev-list. And there it's not all that important to catch parse_object().
We use that function only for looking at the tips of the traversal, and
the majority of the commits are parsed by following parent links, where
we use parse_commit() directly. So we were wasting some memory, but only
a small portion.
It's much easier to see the effect with fsck. Since we now turn off
save_commit_buffer by default there, we _should_ be able to drop the
freeing of the commit buffer in fsck_obj(). But if we do so (taking the
first hunk of this patch without the rest), then the peak heap of "git
fsck" in a clone of git.git goes from 136MB to 194MB. Teaching
parse_object_buffer() to respect save_commit_buffer brings that down to
134.5MB (it's hard to tell from massif's output, but I suspect the
savings comes from avoiding the overhead of the mostly-empty commit
slab).
Other programs should see a small improvement. Both "rev-list --all" and
"fsck --connectivity-only" improve by a few hundred kilobytes, as they'd
avoid loading the tip objects of their traversals.
Most importantly, no code should be hurt by doing this. Any program that
turns off save_commit_buffer is already making the assumption that any
commit it sees may need to have its object data loaded on demand, as it
doesn't know which ones were parsed by parse_commit() versus
parse_object(). Not to mention that anything parsed by the commit graph
may be in the same boat, even if save_commit_buffer was not disabled.
This should be the only spot that needs to be fixed. Grepping for
set_commit_buffer() shows that this and parse_commit() are the only
relevant calls.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
When parsing a commit, the default behavior is to stuff the original
buffer into a commit_slab (which takes ownership of it). But for a tool
like fsck, this isn't useful. While we may look at the buffer further as
part of fsck_commit(), we'll always do so through a separate pointer;
attaching the buffer to the slab doesn't help.
Worse, it means we have to remember to free the commit buffer in all
call paths. We do so in fsck_obj(), which covers a regular "git fsck".
But with "--connectivity-only", we forget to do so in both
traverse_one_object(), which covers reachable objects, and
mark_unreachable_referents(), which covers unreachable ones. As a
result, that mode ends up storing an uncompressed copy of every commit
on the heap at once.
We could teach the code paths for --connectivity-only to also free
commit buffers. But there's an even easier fix: we can just turn off the
save_commit_buffer flag, and then we won't attach them to the commits in
the first place.
This reduces the peak heap of running "git fsck --connectivity-only" in
a clone of linux.git from ~2GB to ~1GB. According to massif, the
remaining memory goes where you'd expect: the object structs themselves,
the obj_hash containing them, and the delta base cache.
Note that we'll leave the call to free commit buffers in fsck_obj() for
now; it's not quite redundant because of a related bug that we'll fix in
a subsequent commit.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
After calling fsck_walk(), a tree object struct may be left in the
parsed state, with the full tree contents available via tree->buffer.
It's the responsibility of the caller to free these when it's done with
the object to avoid having many trees allocated at once.
In a regular "git fsck", we hit fsck_walk() only from fsck_obj(), which
does call free_tree_buffer(). Likewise for "--connectivity-only", we see
most objects via traverse_one_object(), which makes a similar call.
The exception is in mark_unreachable_referents(). When using both
"--connectivity-only" and "--dangling" (the latter of which is the
default), we walk all of the unreachable objects, and there we forget to
free. Most cases would not notice this, because they don't have a lot of
unreachable objects, but you can make a pathological case like this:
git clone --bare /path/to/linux.git repo.git
cd repo.git
rm packed-refs ;# now everything is unreachable!
git fsck --connectivity-only
That ends up with peak heap usage ~18GB, which is (not coincidentally)
close to the size of all uncompressed trees in the repository. After
this patch, the peak heap is only ~2GB.
A few things to note:
- it might seem like fsck_walk(), if it is parsing the trees, should
be responsible for freeing them. But the situation is quite tricky.
In the non-connectivity mode, after we call fsck_walk() we then
proceed with fsck_object() which actually does the type-specific
sanity checks on the object contents. We do pass our own separate
buffer to fsck_object(), but there's a catch: our earlier call to
parse_object_buffer() may have attached that buffer to the object
struct! So by freeing it, we leave the rest of the code with a
dangling pointer.
Likewise, the call to fsck_walk() in index-pack is subtle. It
attaches a buffer to the tree object that must not be freed! And
so rather than calling free_tree_buffer(), it actually detaches it
by setting tree->buffer to NULL.
These cases would _probably_ be fixable by having fsck_walk() free
the tree buffer only when it was the one who allocated it via
parse_tree(). But that would still leave the callers responsible for
freeing other cases, so they wouldn't be simplified. While the
current semantics for fsck_walk() make it easy to accidentally leak
in new callers, at least they are simple to explain, and it's not a
function that's likely to get a lot of new call-sites.
And in any case, it's probably sensible to fix the leak first with
this simple patch, and try any more complicated refactoring
separately.
- a careful reader may notice that fsck_obj() also frees commit
buffers, but neither the call in traverse_one_object() nor the one
touched in this patch does so. And indeed, this is another problem
for --connectivity-only (and accounts for most of the 2GB heap after
this patch), but it's one we'll fix in a separate commit.
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Apply similar treatment with respect to cruft packs as in a few commits
ago to `repack` with a non-zero `--batch-size`.
Since the case of a non-zero `--batch-size` is handled separately (in
`fill_included_packs_batch()` instead of `fill_included_packs_all()`), a
separate fix must be applied for this case.
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
The fill_included_packs_batch() routine is responsible for aggregating
objects in packs with a non-zero value for the `--batch-size` option of
the `git multi-pack-index repack` sub-command.
Since this routine is explicitly called only when `--batch-size` is
non-zero, there is no point in checking that this is the case in our
loop condition.
Remove the unnecessary part of this condition to avoid confusion.
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Replace a direct invocation of Git's `xcalloc()` wrapper with the
`CALLOC_ARRAY()` macro instead.
The latter is preferred since it is more conventional in Git's codebase,
but also because it automatically picks the correct value for the record
size.
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
The `repack` sub-command of the `git multi-pack-index` builtin creates a
new pack aggregating smaller packs contained in the MIDX up to some
given `--batch-size`.
When `--batch-size=0`, this instructs the MIDX builtin to repack
everything contained in the MIDX into a single pack.
In similar spirit as a previous commit, it is undesirable to repack the
contents of a cruft pack in this step. Teach `repack` to ignore any
cruft pack(s) when `--batch-size=0` for the same reason(s).
(The case of a non-zero `--batch-size` will be handled in a subsequent
commit).
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
The `expire` sub-command unlinks any packs that are (a) contained in the
MIDX, but (b) have no objects referenced by the MIDX.
This sub-command ignores `.keep` packs, which remain on-disk even if
they have no objects referenced by the MIDX. Cruft packs, however,
aren't given the same treatment: if none of the objects contained in the
cruft pack are selected from the cruft pack by the MIDX, then the cruft
pack is eligible to be expired.
This is less than desireable, since the cruft pack has important
metadata about the individual object mtimes, which is useful to
determine how quickly an object should age out of the repository when
pruning.
Ordinarily, we wouldn't expect the contents of a cruft pack to
duplicated across non-cruft packs (and we'd expect to see the MIDX
select all cruft objects from other sources even less often). But
nonetheless, it is still possible to trick the `expire` sub-command into
removing the `.mtimes` file in this circumstance.
Teach the `expire` sub-command to ignore cruft packs in the same manner
as it does `.keep` packs, in order to keep their metadata around, even
when they are unreferenced by the MIDX.
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
The `expire` sub-command of `git multi-pack-index` will never expire
`.keep` packs, regardless of whether or not any of their objects were
selected in the MIDX.
This has always been the case since 19575c7c8e (multi-pack-index:
implement 'expire' subcommand, 2019-06-10), which came after cff9711616
(multi-pack-index: prepare for 'expire' subcommand, 2019-06-10), when
this documentation was originally written.
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Remove the extra space character between "tracked" and "by", which dates
back to when this paragraph was originally written in cff9711616
(multi-pack-index: prepare for 'expire' subcommand, 2019-06-10).
Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Get rid of special-casing of 'suppress' in set_diff_merges(). Instead
set 'merges_need_diff' flag correctly in every option handling
function.
Signed-off-by: Sergey Organov <sorganov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Get rid of unneeded "else" statements in func_by_opt().
Signed-off-by: Sergey Organov <sorganov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
This uses atoi() and checks if the result is not zero to decide what
to do. Turning it into the usual Boolean environment variable to
use git_env_bool() would not break those who have been using "set to
0, or set to non-zero, that can be parsed with atoi()" values, but
will match the expectation of those who expected "true" to mean
"yes".
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Many environment variables use the git_env_bool() API to parse their
values, and allow the usual "true/yes/on are true, false/no/off are
false. In addition non-zero numbers are true and zero is false. An
empty string is also false." set of values.
Mark them as such, and consistently say "true" or "false", instead
of random mixes of '1', '0', 'yes', 'true', etc. in their
description.
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
Even though the name of the environment variable is mentioned in
"git config --help" from http.sslVerify, there is no description for
it. Add one.
Note that this is not a usual Boolean environment variable whose
value can be yes/true/on vs no/false/off; the existence of it is
enough to trigger the feature named by the variable.
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
2022-09-15 11:34:51 -07:00
146 changed files with 1728 additions and 529 deletions
test_expect_success 'fetch.writeCommitGraph with submodules''
test_config_global protocol.file.allow always &&
git clone dups super &&
(
cd super &&
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